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ABSTRACT
APPLICATIONS AND EXTENSIONS OF COUNTERPART THEORY
SEPTEMBER 2017
BRIDGETTE BAILIE PETERSON
B.A., UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO BOULDER
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Maya Eddon

An exploration of the details of counterpart theory, and some applications
of the view. In Chapter 1, I set out the view and clarify the most important features:
that the counterpart relation is a context dependent similarity relation, and that
individuals are world-bound entities. I then set out what I take to be the most
promising methods of filling in important details. Chapter 2 is a discussion of an
alternative view, lump theory.

I attempt to distinguish lump theory from

counterpart theory, and argue that several attempt to do so fail. Chapter 3 is an
attempt to apply counterpart theory for individuals to properties. I attempt to stay
as close to the standard view as possible, but find it necessary to modify the worldbound condition. I suggest a version of property counterpart theory that overcomes
the obstacles I have identified. The final chapter is a discussion of a recent attempt
to apply counterpart theory to the comparativist view of quantitative properties. I
argue that an attempt to rely on counterpart theory to overcome an objection is
unsuccessful.
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INTRODUCTION
Since its introduction in 1968, Counterpart theory has sparked interest and
discussion. In part, this is due to the challenges of accommodating de re modal
statements, as described below. In particular, it appears to be a result of the flexibility of
the similarity-based counterpart relation, especially in comparison to the identity-based
alternative. This dissertation is in many ways an attempt to push this flexible theory a bit
further, and explore further applications.
In what follows, I will discuss a potential alternative to transworld identity and
counterpart theory, and argue that it relies upon the resources of counterpart theory
without adequately distinguishing itself from the view. I will then discuss two ways that
counterpart theory can be extended. In particular, I will provide a thorough exploration
of the potential for counterpart theory to be applied to properties. In the end, I will argue
that certain concepts (‘world-bound’ and ‘transworld’) do not apply cleanly to properties,
but that a property counterpart theory can neatly capture our intuitions about de re
modality given that we include a notion of higher order naturalness, and understand that
properties can be both transworld and world-bound entities. I conclude by exploring a
specific application of counterpart theory to defend a relational (or ‘compartivist’) view
of quantities against an objection based on trans-world mass comparisons. I argue that,
as it is presented, the mass-counterpart relation cannot avoid the problem.

1

CHAPTER 1
COUNTERPART THEORY
David Lewis developed counterpart theory in the late 1960s as an alternative to
Kripke’s possible worlds semantics for quantified modal logic. His view has been
discussed extensively and continues to be a source of investigation and potential
application today. This is in part because of the challenges associated with analyses of de
re modal claims (see below), and additionally because the ingenuity and flexibility of
counterpart theory, which allow one to sidestep various metaphysical puzzles and
intuitive challenges.
In general, possible world semantics allows one to make sense of sentences that
involve modal claims (claims involving possibility and necessity)1 by quantifying over
possible worlds. Possible worlds semantics, which became popular after Saul Kripke’s
innovations in the late nineteen fifties2, is now well-established. Before moving in to the
discussion of counterpart theory, I will provide some background on Kripke’s
contribution.

1.1 Kripke’s Possible Worlds Semantics
Modal logic in its most basic form is just sentential logic with the addition of
modal operators. However, unlike operators like ‘&’ and ‘’, the additional operators,

1

Necessity and possibility can be understood in various ways; e.g., nomological, causal, deontic, analytical
etc. Here I mean to refer to logical (or metaphysical) necessity broadly understood. This notion of
necessity can be explained by reference to possible worlds: a statement is necessary if it holds in all
possible worlds, possible if it holds in at least one, and impossible if it holds in none.
2
e.g., Kripke: 1959 “A Completeness Theorem in Modal Logic.” Other philosophers, such as Rudolf
Carnap developed similar systems previously, which can be seen as precursors to Kripke’s possible worlds
semantics. See, for example, Carnap, “Modalities and Quantification”(1946). This history is discussed in
Ballarin, “Modern Origins of Modal Logic.”
2

‘’ and ‘’, are not “truth functional.” A connective is truth-functional when the truth
value of any compound statement is completely determined by the individual truth values
of the parts of the compound statement. For example, the truth value of the compound
statement (A & B) can be discovered by seeking the truth values of each of the
components; A, B, and the rules governing the connective ‘&’. The rules governing ‘&’
tell us that the entire statement is true if and only if each of the conjuncts is true.
Unfortunately, this simple method cannot yield the truth values for compound modal
statements. From the fact that ‘A’ is true, and the meaning of ‘,’ we cannot simply
infer that ‘A’ is true.3
Kripke developed models that rely on a domain, often understood to be a domain
of all of the possible worlds, or of all possible “states of the world.” In these models, 
and  function as quantifiers over these worlds. Each model has a set of worlds, and a
particular world that is picked out as the actual world. In addition, there is an
accessibility relation over the worlds. This is meant to capture the intuitive notion that
what is possible “according to” one world might not be possible according to another,
and to account for iterated modalities.4 “ P” means “In all accessible possible worlds,
P,” and “P” means “In some accessible possible world, P.”

Any modal logic satisfying the characteristic axiom (A  A) is not truth functional. For these logics, if
A is false, we can be sure that A is false as well. However, the truth of A does not say anything about
whether or not A is true. The case of  is similar: from the fact that A is true, we can infer that A is
true, but the falsity of A does not yield the falsity of A. (This issue becomes more pronounced when
dealing with iterated modalities such as A).
4
For example, a normal model structure is an ordered triple (G,K,R), where K is a non-empty set, GK,
and R is a relation defined on K. Intuitively, K is the set of possible worlds, G is the actual world, and R
captures the notion of accessibility between worlds, or is the notion of possible “relative to” a world. The
accessibility relation can be understood as capturing which worlds can be “seen” by other worlds, or which
worlds another world has access to (Kripke, “Semantical Considerations,” 64). Kripke expands this simple
structure to include quantificational model structures. This is a normal model structure (G,K,R) together
with a function ‘ψ’ which assigns to each world ‘H’ that is a member of K a set ψ(H), called the domain of
H. Intuitively, ψ(H) is the set of all individuals existing in H. Kripke notes that “ψ(H) need not be the
3

3

1.2 Possible Worlds and Modal Realism
Utilizing possible worlds semantics means interpreting the modal operators as
quantifiers over possible worlds. Naturally, this leads to questions about the nature of
possible worlds.

Are they just a useful tool for evaluating modal statements, or are they

entities in their own right? Although there are a variety of views, the main distinction is
between views that take possible worlds to be abstract entities of some variety, and views
that take possible worlds to be concrete entities, not ontologically different from the
actual world.
One version of the view that worlds are concrete is Lewis’s Modal Realism.5
According to Modal Realism, the actual world is just one of an infinite number of
possible worlds, which are causally and spatiotemporally isolated from each other. All of
the worlds are equally real, and the term ‘actual’ functions as an indexical, like ‘here’ or
‘now.’ 6 The actual world is therefore not ontologically special on this view; instead, it
just happens to be the world that we inhabit.7
There are many potential benefits to this view, and it has proven to be quite useful
in analyzing modal statements, as well as providing definitions of counterfactuals, etc.
Modal realism is able to provide conceptual underpinnings for our modal operators, and
provides reductive accounts of a wide range of useful entities and concepts, from
propositions and properties to counterfactuals, causation, and verisimilitude. The

same set for different arguments H, just as, intuitively, in worlds other than the real one, some actually
existing individuals may be absent, while new individuals, like Pegasus, may appear (Ibid, 65).”
5
See Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds. See also: Loux, The Possible and the Actual and Stalnaker, Ways
a World Might Be.
6
The terminology is a source of some challenges here; although it is often couched in terms of ‘concrete’
and ‘abstract’ worlds, it is not clear that this is the best terminology.
7
Another option is to adopt a version of modal realism while maintaining the notion that the actual world is
privileged, and denying that ‘actual’ functions as an indexical. See Bricker, “Absolute Actuality and the
Plurality of Worlds.”
4

concreteness or mind independence of modal realism is often taken to be its most
unattractive feature of the view.8 Lewis has much to say in support of the view despite
this challenge.9 One promising line of argument is based on comparison with set theory:
“I know of no accusation against possibles that cannot be made with equal justice
against sets. Yet few philosophical consciences scruple at set theory. Sets and possibles
alike make for a crowded ontology. Sets and possibles alike raise questions we have no
way to answer. [. . .] I propose to be equally undisturbed by these equally mysterious
mysteries.”10
In much of my discussion of counterpart theory, I will be assuming modal realism
for simplicity. However, note that it is possible to formulate and defend counterpart
theory without accepting modal realism. Although counterpart theory seems most
favorable against the backdrop of modal realism, other accounts of possible worlds have
been put forth, which make use of counterpart theory without accepting modal realism. 11
Therefore, the status of Modal Realism should not be used to rule out counterpart theory
as such.

1.3 Analyzing Modal Claims
Assuming modal realism, though, we can analyze a sentence like: “It is possible
that panda bears are carnivorous,” by considering a possible world at which panda bears

8

Lewis has a convincing response to this consideration. He asks us to consider set theory, which includes
ontological commitment to an infinite number of sets. In this case, the cost is worth paying in order to
receive the immense mathematical benefits of set theory. In similar fashion, he argues, modal realism can
be accepted on the grounds that the ontological costs are paid for by their theoretical benefits and
explanatory power. See Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds.
9
See Lewis ibid for a thorough discussion and many arguments in favor of the view.
10
Convention, 208.
11
For discussion of this point, see, for example, Sider, “The Ersatz Pluriverse.”
5

are carnivores; and we can analyze sentences like: “Necessarily, all humans are mortal,”
by considering whether all humans in all possible worlds are mortal. So far, the analyses
are pretty straightforward and more complicated semantic analyses may seem
unnecessary. However, some modal statements are more challenging. Compare the
claims that:
1) Oskar, my cat, could have been polydactyl.
and
2) A cat could have been elected president.
Like the above examples, 2) can be analyzed simply by identifying a possible world in
which some cat is president. But 1) seems to require a world in which Oskar himself
exists and has extra toes.12
In general, this corresponds to a distinction between de re modal claims and de
dicto modal claims, roughly, claims that make reference to a particular individual, and
those that do not.13 In sentence 2), the identity of the cat does not matter, and the
statement concerns de dicto claims about the objects at a world. But in sentence 1), the
identity of the cat does matter, and it is a de re claim. 14

12

This sentence also has a de re reading: it is true of some particular cat that it could have been elected
president.
13
Graeme Forbes uses the following example to illustrate the distinction between de dicto and de re modal
statements: For the sentence (x)(x is made of matter) to be true at a world w, the objects that exist at w
must be made out of matter at every world. But the sentence (x) (x is made of matter) will be true at w
just as long as, at each world, all of the objects that exist there are made of matter (there). This is because
the sentence is claiming that in all possible worlds, everything that exists is made out of matter. (Forbes,
The Metaphysics of Modality, 49).”
14
It should be noted that some philosophers have raised concerns for the de dicto/ de re distinction. Quine
was famously skeptical of de re modality. In particular, he thought the substitutivity of identity caused
problems for de re modal statements. Quine argued that claims involving the necessity operator can create
“referentially opaque” contexts, when two terms that refer to the same individual cannot be substituted for
each other while preserving the truth value. Here is his famous example:
1. Necessarily 9 is greater than 7.
2. 9 = the number of planets.
6

One way of spelling out what is meant by the claim that some formulas are
sensitive to the identities of objects at worlds claim involves “transworld identity,” or
identity between an individual at two distinct worlds. Accordingly, the claim that ‘Oskar
could’ve been polydactyl’ is to be understood as the claim that there is a possible world
in which Oskar exists, and has extra toes. That is to say that the same individual cat
exists in multiple possible worlds.
In general, we can draw a distinction between de re modal claims and de dicto
modal claims, and note that de re modal claims seem to require transworld identity or
some other way to account for this way of referring to the modal properties of a particular
individual.

1.4 Transworld Identity and the Counterpart Relation
Considering a world where Oskar exists and has extra toes seems to rely on there
being identity between individuals across possible worlds, or “transworld identity.”
However, Transworld identity is not the only way to analyze de re modal statements, and
some have found it counterintuitive to imagine that, e.g., one and the same cat exists in
multiple distinct possible worlds. This is further complicated depending on one’s
understanding of the nature of possible worlds. It may be difficult to image that my cat is
identical with a merely possible cat who is part of a non-concrete possible world.

3. Necessarily the number of planets is greater than 7.
Both (1) and (2) are true. However, it seems possible for there to have been less than seven planets, and so
(3) is false. But (3) comes from an instance of substitution in (1), of another way of referring to ‘9’, shown
in (2). Quine thought that modal operators could not be attached to objects or individuals independently of
how they are referred to. He took the fact that modal contexts are referentially opaque to show that one
cannot ‘quantify into’ modal contexts. Therefore, he concluded that de re modal claims are incoherent.
(For more see, e.g., Quine, From a Logical Point of View).

7

Counterpart theory, introduced by David Lewis in 1968, provides an alternative
account of de re modal claims that rejects transworld identity. According to the view, an
individual exists only in its own world, and nowhere else, and there are no identity
relations that hold between objects in distinct possible worlds. There is no identity
relation between my actual cat Oskar, and the otherworldly polydactyl cat. Instead,
another relation, the ‘counterpart relation’ connects these cats. The counterpart relation is
not an identity relation, and individuals in different worlds are never identical:
“Where some would say that you are in several worlds, in which you have
somewhat different properties and somewhat different things happen to you, I prefer to
say that you are in the actual world and no other, but you have counterparts in several
other worlds. Your counterparts resemble you closely in content and context in important
respects. They resemble you more closely than do the other things in their worlds. But
they are not really you.”15 The counterpart relation is a relation of similarity. Whether
two things are counterparts depends on the “similarities and dissimilarities in a multitude
of respects, weighted by the importances of the various respects and by the degrees of the
similarities.”16
A counterpart of you is therefore an individual in a possible world who is
relevantly similar to you relative to a particular context, and can represent de re modal
properties of you, by instantiating those properties in its world. To say that Oskar is
possibly polydactyl is to say that in some context, it is true to say that another cat in

15
16

Lewis, “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic,” 114.
Ibid, 115.
8

another possible world is similar to Oskar and represents Oskar as being polydactyl by
having extra toes in that possible world. 17
An illustrative example of the representation of modal facts about individuals
comes from considering Hubert Humphrey, the losing democratic candidate of the 1968
election: “Humphrey may be represented in absentia at other worlds, just as he may be
in museums in this world. The museum can have a wax work figure to represent
Humphrey, or better yet an animated simulacrum. Another world can do better still: it can
have as part a Humphrey of its own, a flesh-and-blood counterpart of our Humphrey, a
man very like Humphrey in his origins, in his intrinsic character, or in his historical role.
By having such a part, a world represents de re, concerning Humphrey - that is, the
Humphrey of our world [. . .] that he exists and does thus-and-so.”18

1.4.1 Further Details of Counterpart Theory
Counterpart theory is first introduced by Lewis in his 1968 paper Counterpart
Theory and Quantified Modal Logic. There, Lewis provides four primitive predicates of
counterpart theory:
Wx
Ixy
Ax
Cxy

(x is a possible world)
(x is in a possible world y)
(x is actual)
(x is a counterpart of y)

17

Interestingly, something like Counterpart Theory has been suggested in the work of Leibniz, whose
reference to ‘possible worlds’ is well known. Elisabeta Sarca, for example, cites the following passage
from Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, 72 : “I have said that all human events can be deduced not simply by
assuming the creation of a vague Adam, but by assuming the creation of an Adam determined with respect
to all these circumstances, chosen from among an infinity of possible Adams. […] [B]ut when speaking of
several Adams, I was not taking Adam as a determinate individual. […] [W]hen one calls Adam the person
to whom these predicates are attributed, all this is not sufficient to determine the individual, for there can be
an infinity of Adams, that is, an infinity of possible persons, different from one another, whom this fits.”
Sarca notes that this description is similar to the notion of an individual’s counterparts in other possible
worlds. (Sarca, “Leibniz and Kripke”, 75).
18
On the Plurality of Worlds, 194.
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The domain of quantification contains every world and everything in every world. In
addition, there are eight postulates:
P1: xy (IxyWy)(Nothing is in anything except a world)
P2: xyz ((Ixy & Ixz) y = z)(Nothing is in two worlds)
P3: xy (Cxy  z Ixz)(Whatever is a counterpart is in a world)
P4: xy (Cxy z Iyz) (Whatever has a counterpart is in a world)
P5: xyz ((Ixy & Izy &Cxz)  x = z) (Nothing is a counterpart of anything else in its
world)
P6: xy (Ixy  Cxx) (Anything in a world is a counterpart of itself)
P7: x (Wx & y (Iyx  Ay)) (Some world contains all and only actual things)
P8: x Ax (Something is actual)
In a postscript to this paper, Lewis rejects P5, since it may be possible for an
individual to have multiple counterparts in his own world, including counterparts that are
distinct from himself.19
Lewis points out that the world in P7 is unique, given P2 and P8. This is because
there is at least one thing that is actual (P8), and because nothing is in two worlds (P2),
there is a unique world that is actual. He also offers an abbreviated description of this
world:
@ = df. xy (Iyx  Ay) (the actual world)
This is the world that contains all and only the actual things. In this way, the
actual world is special, but it is not ontologically different from the other worlds. Because
the objects in the actual world are ontologically on a par with all the other possible
objects and individuals, there is no ontological difference between a counterpart in the
actual world or any other possible world.
Lewis emphasizes the point that the difference between his view and the
transworld identity view is not verbal. In part this is because the counterpart relation,

19

See Lewis, Counterfactuals, and On the Plurality of Worlds, 232.
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unlike the identity relation, is not an equivalence relation; it is not transitive or
symmetric.
Because the counterpart relation is not transitive, even though a is a counterpart of
b, and b is a counterpart of c, it is not necessarily the case that a is a counterpart of c. To
illustrate, Lewis asks us to consider the possible world w1. In that world, there is an
object x1 that resembles you more closely than anything else in w1 does. In w1, x1 is your
counterpart. In another world, w2, there is an object x2 that resembles x1 far more closely
than anything else in w2.20 This means that x2 is a counterpart of x1, and is therefore a
counterpart of your counterpart. At the same time, x2 might not resemble you very
closely at all, and there may be another object in w2 that resembles you more closely. If
so, then this object is your counterpart, and x2 is not.21
In addition, the counterpart relation is not symmetric. Here, Lewis asks us to
imagine a world w3, where there is an object x3 that is a blend of you and your brother,
such that x3 resembles both of you closely, far more closely than anything else in w3
resembles either of you. In this example, x3 is your counterpart. However, if x3
resembles your brother more closely than it resembles you, you are not a counterpart of
x3.22
Lewis holds that something in one world can have more than one counterpart in
another world. Here he provides the example of two twins, x4a and x4b both of whom
resemble you closely, and both of whom resemble you far more closely than anything

E.g., “X's counterparts in other worlds are all and only those things which resemble X closely enough in
important respects, and more closely than do the other things in their worlds (“Counterparts of Persons and
Their Bodies, 205).”
21
Lewis, “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic,” 115.
22
Ibid, 116.
20
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else at w4. In this case, both are your counterparts, and so an individual can have
multiple counterparts in one world. Similarly, based on the same example, Lewis accepts
that two things in one world can have a common counterpart in another world. Again,
since both of the twins can have you as a counterpart, there can be two things in one
world with a common counterpart in another.23
Lewis also provides a counterexample to the claim that for any two worlds,
anything in one is a counterpart of something in the other. Here he asks us to imagine w5,
which contains an object x5 which does not resemble anything at the actual world very
much, such as Batman. Since Batman is not a counterpart of anything in the actual
world, there can be things in one world without counterparts in another.24
Lastly, he rejects the claim that for any two possible worlds, anything in one has
to have some counterpart in the other. Similar to the last example, there might be a world
where the object that most resembles you is very unlike you, such that nothing in this
world resembles you closely at all. In this world, you have no counterparts.25

1.5 Preliminary Benefits of Counterpart Theory
Although the main use of counterpart theory is to make sense of de re modal
statements, the theory has many theoretical virtues which make it preferable to
Transworld identity.

23

Ibid.
Ibid.
25
Lewis’s emphasis on the looseness of context, which becomes more apparent later, will allow an
individual to have more counterparts than it might seem based on this claim. For example, see Lewis’s
response to Feldman’s “there but for the grace of God” cases (see Lewis On the Plurality of Worlds,
Feldman, “Counterparts”).
24
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Perhaps its main virtue is that it is much more flexible than the standard view,
since the counterpart relation is a relation of similarity rather than identity. This
flexibility also allows counterpart theory to reflect the shifting nature of our de re modal
intuitions. For example, in two different contexts, I might make claims that seem
inconsistent, but can be understood. For example, I might claim that “I could have been
a professional gymnast,” perhaps while watching an interview with a young Olympian
describing her initial lack of athleticism and childhood interests and goals, which might
be very similar to my own. Later the same day, perhaps I claim that “There is no possible
way I could have ever been a gymnast!” while watching this Olympian perform a
complicated flip on a balance beam, highlighting the chasm between this athlete’s
comfort and skill and my own inability and discomfort at the thought of being hurled
through the air onto a narrow landing space. These two utterances seems perfectly
acceptable for me to make, and we speak this way often. However, such claims are not
easily accommodated by transworld identity, since then I am both identical to this
gymnast in some possible world, and yet identical to no gymnast in any possible world.
Although some transworld identity theorists may be able to offer explanations for this
phenomenon too, the flexibility of counterpart theory can easily account for such facts
without any inconsistency.26 This is an important benefit since it reflects our actual
patterns of modal speech, and the flexible nature of de re modal properties.
In addition, the flexibility of the counterpart relation is able to provide answers to
various modal paradoxes and can explain haecceitistic intuitions without commitment to
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Lewis discusses this issue in On the Plurality of Worlds. There, he lays out several alternative views,
including ways for ersatz views to accommodate this inconstancy while incorporating something like
transworld identity. However, he argues that modal realism with transworld identity cannot be inconstant.
See Lewis On the Plurality of Worlds, 262-263.
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haecceitism.27 Although some philosophers accept haecceitistic differences between
worlds, others do not, and it is beneficial for such additions to be optional, rather than
required by the view. For example, counterpart theory provides a straightforward
solution to certain versions of the paradox of material constitution, without the need to
posit particular haecceities or essences of objects across worlds. 28
Related to the ability to avoid commitment to haecceities, counterpart theory is
also compatible with a purely qualitative, descriptive metaphysics of modality which may
be seen by many as a benefit.29
Parallel theories have been constructed in other areas, such as temporality. Using
a relation like the counterpart relation to analyze temporal statements provides similar
benefits, such as the ability to deal with various temporal paradoxes. Finally, as will be
explored below, there have been recent attempts to further modify counterpart theory in
order to extend the benefits to other areas, such as to a relational account of quantity and
a property counterpart view. Such extensions would increase the benefits of the view.

Lewis gives the following definition of a haecceitistic difference: “two worlds differ in what they
represent de re concerning some individual, but do not differ qualitatively in any way.” For example, it
might seem possible for Ted and Fred to ‘switch places’ without there being any qualitative difference—
Fred would be Ted and Ted would be Fred. Whether or not this represents a distinct possible world from
the world where Ted is Ted and Fred is Fred is at stake. Haecceitism is the view that there are at least some
cases of haecceitistic differences between worlds, such that this switching would result in a distinct
possible world. (Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, 221.)
28
A classic example of the paradox comes from Alan Gibbard. The basic idea is that two halves of a statue
are made out of some clay. The halves are joined forming both a new statue, Goliath, and a new lump of
clay, Lumpl. The statue is then smashed, destroying both Lumpl and Goliath. It appears that Lumpl and
Goliath are one and the same thing, given their common historical properties, relational properties, etc.
However, if the statue had been smashed just before the clay hardened, then Lumpl would continue to exist,
although Goliath wouldn’t. If two things are identical, then they are necessarily identical. However, it
appears to be possible for Lumpl and Goliath to exist without being identical. (Goliath= Lumpl & 
(Goliath exists & Lumpl exists & Goliath  Lumpl)). See: Gibbard, “Contingent Identity.” See Lewis (On
the Plurality of Worlds, 248-263) for a similar case along with discussion and reply using the resources of
counterpart theory.
29
See Sider, “Beyond the Humphrey Objection,” 2).
27
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1.6 Criticism of Counterpart Theory
However, it should be noted that Counterpart theory has also been met with much
criticism. In 1972, Kripke presented what is perhaps the most famous objection to the
view, claiming that counterpart theory strongly conflicts with our intuitions about cases
like the possible success of Hubert Humphrey in the 1968 presidential election.
According to Counterpart theory, Humphrey is not actually identical to the other-worldly
Humphrey, his counterpart, who wins the election. Therefore, Kripke claims that we are
not actually talking about what could’ve happened to Humphrey, and this is at odds with
our intuitive analysis of the claim.30
Because this objection has had lasting influence and may immediately make
counterpart theory appear to be counterintuitive even before getting into further details, it
is worthwhile to briefly discuss what I take to be a promising and decisive response to
this objection, as outlined by Ted Sider.
Sider argues that although the objection can be understood in multiple ways, each
of them fails to damage counterpart theory, and is instead based on a mistaken
understanding of the view or can be otherwise explained. First, if the objection is taken
to be claiming that Counterpart theory is false because Humphrey himself does not have
the modal property of possibly winning, given that only his counterpart wins, the
counterpart theorist can respond by noting that this is just what it is for Humphrey to have
a modal property according to counterpart theory. If the objection is instead based on
whether or not Humphrey cares about that he has a counterpart who wins, the counterpart

As Kripke puts it, “Probably, however, Humphrey could not care less whether someone else, no matter
how much resembling him, would have been victorious in another possible world (“Naming and
Necessity,” 45, n. 13).”
30
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theorist can respond by noting that this is a paradox of analysis: Humphrey cares about
his modal property of winning under one description, but not another. A similar response
applies if the objection is based on the claim that ‘possibly winning’ is obviously not the
same thing as ‘having a counterpart that wins.’
Lewis responded in similar fashion: “The philosophers' chorus on behalf of ‘transworld identity’ is merely insisting that, for instance, it is Humphrey himself who might
have existed under other conditions, … who might have won the presidency, who exists
according to many worlds and wins according to some of them. All that is
uncontroversial. The controversial question is how he manages to have these modal
properties.”31 This objection will briefly re-surface within the upcoming discussion of
chapter 2, but can otherwise be set aside.
There are other objections to the view, for example, a group of objections
stemming from the potential need for an actuality operator to account for our ordinary
modal language, and the inability of counterpart theory to accommodate this.32 Other
objections have been raised as well.33 These objections require detailed analysis and
response, which will not be undertaken here.34

1.7 The Components of Counterpart Theory
Nevertheless, the vast theoretical virtues of counterpart theory make the view an
interesting and important theory and certainly a live option worthy of a careful analysis.
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On the Plurality of World, 198.
See Forbes, The Metaphysics of Modality, Ramachandran, “Alternative Translation Scheme” and Fara
and Williamson, “Counterparts and Actuality.” See also Meyer, “Counterpart Theory and the Actuality
Operator,” for discussion and replies.
33
See also Merricks, “The End of Counterpart Theory” and Hazen, “Counterpart-Theoretic Semantics.”
34
For detailed discussion of these and further objections and replies, see Sider, “Beyond the Humphrey
Objection.”
32
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In particular, this means taking a further look at these essential components of standard
counterpart theory: 1) that the counterpart relation is a similarity relation, and 2,) that
context reflects the inconstancy of de re modality, and plays an important role in
determining whether or not the counterpart relation holds. The remaining notion, that the
entities in question are world-bound, will be further discussed in subsequent chapters as it
is applied to two distinct views; lump theory, and property counterpart theory. In
addition, I will attempt to provide background for a view of properties, since they are
essential to the understanding of similarity suggested here, and to the discussion of
property counterpart theory in chapter three.

1.8 Similarity
In order to evaluate counterpart theory, and to apply it to the relevant discussion
going forward, the details of similarity, and a suggestion for how to analyze this notion,
need to be explored. Although instances of resemblance are easy to identify, the question
of what accounts for similarity in general is more difficult to answer. One popular
account is to explain similarity in terms of property sharing. Therefore, although a
thorough exploration of the nature of properties will not be undertaken here, a brief
discussion will provide background for the rest of the chapter.35

1.8.1 Properties
Properties have typically been called upon to account for resemblance and
recurrence, and are often defined in this connection, e.g., “Particular objects have

For a thorough discussion, see, for example Loux, Universals and Particulars; Oliver, “The Metaphysics
of Properties;” and Galuzzo and Loux, The Problem of Universals.
35
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properties, respects in which they may be alike or differ.” 36 Properties are also called
attributes, qualities, features, and characteristics, and “those entities that can be
predicated of things or, [. . .], attributed to them.”37 For example, to say ‘the ripe tomato
is red’ is to say that the tomato exemplifies redness, or has the property of being red; that
redness is a characteristic of the tomato.
One of the main reasons that entities like properties and universals have been
posited is to explain and account for resemblance among objects, for example to account
for the “One Over the Many” problem, roughly, the need to provide an explanation for
why it is that all of the many distinct red things that exist have something in common.38
Properties are a natural choice to provide the underlying support for such similarities.
For example, Earth and Venus are similar in many ways; being planets in our solar
system, being roughly 4k miles in diameter, having roughly 5 x 10^24 kg mass, etc. At
the same time, there are other ways that they are dissimilar; being covered in volcanoes,
being second from the sun and being inhospitable to human life. We can say they are
similar in some ways (by sharing certain properties) and dissimilar in other ways, (by
failing to share other properties). 39
Of course, the details of one’s view of properties will play a role in establishing
the details of this notion of similarity. Detailed discussion of the nature of properties can
be a challenging task due to a lack of general agreement as well as an abundance of
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Mellor and Oliver, Properties, 1.
Orilia, and Swoyer, “Properties,” 1.
38
This problem has been discussed since antiquity by philosophers like Plato, e.g. Parmenides and The
Republic, and Aristotle, e.g., Metaphysics. More recently, see, Armstrong, e.g., “Against Ostrich
Nominalism,” and Rodriguez-Pereyra, “What is the Problem of Universals?”
39
As discussed below, Lewis holds that only certain types of properties can do the work of accounting for
similarities between individuals. This is in part because properties are abundant, according to Lewis’s
view, which is to say that there is property corresponding to every predicate, even disjunctive and
gerrymandered ones. Such properties cannot be the markers of similarity. See below.
37
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distinctions among properties, such as the distinction between universals and particulars,
described below. Still, it will be useful to put a specific view of properties into the
discussion.

1.8.2 Properties as sets of actual and possible individuals
Given that the current discussion assumes much of Lewis’s metaphysical
framework, his explanation of properties is a natural place to start. In addition, several
contributors to the discussion assume that properties are something along these lines, and
so it will simplify the discussion to do so as well.40 For Lewis, properties are sets of
possible and actual individuals (or ‘possibilia’). For example, the property of being blue
just is the set of all actual and possible blue things from every world. Properties are
abundant on this view, since for any given set of possible and actual individuals, there is
a corresponding property. This yields an incredibly large number of sets and therefore of
properties.
Identifying properties with sets is a natural choice for Lewis as it follows from
two other commitments; set theory and modal realism. 41 Lewis justifies these
commitments in part by consideration of their explanatory power; commitment to set
theory includes commitment to an infinite number of sets; but on the other hand, it

See, e.g., Heller, “Property Counterparts in Ersatz Worlds;” Ball, “Property Identities and Modal
Arguments,” and Egan, “Second-order Predication and the Metaphysics of Properties.”
41
We might ask whether properties should be taken to be sets of possibilia, or classes of possibilia. Lewis
talked about properties as classes of possibilia (e.g., “New Work for a Theory of Universals”) and as sets
(e.g., On the Plurality of Worlds), where he says “I say ‘set’ not ‘class’. The reason is that I do not want to
restrict myself to properties of individuals alone; properties themselves have properties. Properties must
therefore be sets so that they may be members of other sets (Ibid 50 n. 37).” A ‘proper class’ is a collection
that is not a set, e.g., the set of all sets (Bagaria, “Set Theory,” 4). Some properties, therefore, might be
classes of possibilia even though there is no corresponding set of possibilia. Unless otherwise noted, there
is no need to distinguish between the two terms throughout my discussion.
40
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provides immense mathematical explanatory power. In a similar way, Lewis argues that
modal realism can be supported in part because the theoretical benefits outweigh the
ontological cost.42 Once these components are included in one’s ontology, properties can
be posited without extra assumptions or commitments. Because properties just are these
sets, this adds nothing additional to one’s ontology.
There are important benefits to this view. For example, it overcomes issues with
non-modal realist attempts to classify properties as sets of actual instances,43 and
provides an answer to the One Over the Many Problem. In addition, this view can
account for ‘higher-order’ properties (properties of properties), which are taken to be sets
of sets.
Although this is not the only way to understand properties, these elements work
together to provide a straightforward and useful explanation of the counterpart relation. 44
In addition, properties so understood can be used (with an additional primitive notion,
discussed below) to formulate a reductive account of similarity. This will be supported
below. Still, there are important objections to this view, 45 and further details to consider,
42

See Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds.
In the past, objections were raised in response to the suggestion to understand properties as sets of actual
individuals. An important objection is based on the problem of co-extensive properties; any properties that
have the same members cannot be distinguished. Every actual individual with a heart also has a kidney.
So, if the property of having a heart is identified with the set of individuals with hearts, then that same set
will be identified with the property of having a kidney, and on this account, they would be the same
property. Intuitively, they are distinct properties, and yet the view cannot distinguish between them. This
example of the co-extension problem comes from a case discussed by e.g., Quine, “Two Dogmas of
Empiricism,” and Philosophy of Logic. A similar objection arises for world-bound properties, as discussed
in chapter 3 below.
44
Trope theory is not discussed in detail here, but is an important alternative to consider. See, for example,
D.C. Williams, “On the Elements of Being,” and “Universals and Existents,” and Keith Campbell, Abstract
Particulars.
45
There is an additional problem related to this understanding of properties, e.g., as discussed by Andy
Egan. He presents the follow case: Elmer has a favorite property, being green, and therefore, being green
has the (higher order) property of being someone’s favorite property. Given the understanding of
properties as sets, that means that being green is in the set being someone’s favorite property. However, it
seems possible that being green might not have been anyone’s favorite property. If so, then being green
does not have the property of being someone’s favorite property, and is therefore omitted from that set. It
43

20

which slightly complicate this straightforward view. The first stems from the distinction
between sparse and abundant properties, which is needed in order to use these properties
to establish similarity. This distinction can be understood by comparison to another
distinction, between universals and particulars.

1.8.3 Universals and Particulars
Arguably one of the most important distinctions between opposing accounts of
properties concerns whether they are universals or particulars. In general, properties are
taken to be either universals, such that the same property can be instantiated by multiple
numerically distinct things, or particulars; such that two distinct individuals never
exemplify exactly the same property. Universals and particulars can be distinguished in
part by the differences in their instantiation. Universals exist wherever they are
instantiated, and if properties are universals, then they are “wholly present recurrently as
non-spatiotemporal parts of all their particular instances.”46 In contrast, many take
properties to be made up of particular instances.
Properties as particulars and as universals can also be distinguished by their
abundance: universals are ‘sparse’: “[t]here are the universals that there must be to
ground the objective resemblances and the causal powers of things, and there’s no reason

seems like we want to say that being green both is, and is not in the set being someone’s favorite property,
and so at least one of these seemingly plausible possibilities must be ruled out. Either no one can possibly
have green as their favorite property, or someone must have green as their favorite property, both of which
seem unpalatable. This is specifically a problem for properties taken as sets. Egan suggests that a worldbound property counterpart theory could allow for a response to the objection. I will discuss this objection
in Chapter 3, and show how a specific property counterpart view responds. (See Egan, “Second-order
Predication,” 49).
46
Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, 204. One recent and important theory of Universals is Armstrong’s
account. See Armstrong; (Universals and Scientific Realism, “In Defence of Structural Universals,”
Universals).
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to believe in any more.”47 However, properties can also be taken to be ‘abundant,’ such
that: “[a]ny class of things, be it ever so gerrymandered and miscellaneous and
indescribable in thought and language, and be it ever so superfluous in characterizing the
world, is nevertheless a property. So there are properties in immense abundance.”48

1.8.4 Natural properties
Lewis argues that we cannot make due with just the sparse universals since, e.g.,
we cannot accommodate certain comparisons without them,49 and yet we need more than
just the abundant properties in order to account for genuine similarity. 50 Although
property sharing can account for similarity, sharing just any the abundant properties will
not be sufficient.
Return to the comparison of Earth and Venus. In addition to sharing properties
like those mentioned above, these planets share an infinite number of additional
properties, some of which, like being a planet or a cat or a hydrogen atom, or being an
entity, do little to establish similarity in any meaningful way. Worse yet, they share
properties that are so unspeakably gerrymandered that we cannot express them, let alone
use them to establish similarity; like infinite strings of disjunctive properties.
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Lewis, Papers in Metaphysics an Epistemology, 11-12.
Ibid, 12.
49
For example, color properties are not likely to be sparse universals, and yet we need them for
comparisons such as ‘red resembles orange more than it resembles blue’ (Ibid, 16)). Lewis argues that it is
unlikely for there to be genuine universals like colors, as well as properties like ‘humility’ and ‘ripeness’.
Worse yet, there are properties like “grueness” that are even less likely candidates for universals, and yet,
are needed for similarity comparisons (Ibid 17-18). Lewis opts for keeping the abundant properties in
addition to a primitive distinction discussed below.
50
The abundant properties cannot fill the various roles played by universals. For example, they cannot
account for Lewis’s explanations of counterfactuals, as well as the concepts of ‘closeness of worlds,’
‘intrinsic properties’ and ‘duplication’, all of which are defined in terms of the sharing of ‘natural
properties’, discussed below. There are additional uses and benefits of natural properties. See Lewis (e.g.,
Philosophical Papers Volume I and II, Counterfactuals, Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology).
48
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As Lewis puts it, “[a]ny two things, be they two peas in a pod or be they a raven
and a writing-desk, are alike in infinitely many respects and unlike in equally many.”51
Therefore, the abundant properties alone are not capable of accounting for similarity.
Instead of including universals in his ontology Lewis introduces a primitive
distinction among properties; some properties are special in ways that make them useful
and fill the role that universals would play.52 Lewis calls this privileged group of
properties ‘natural properties.’53 Natural properties are those that ‘carve nature at its
joints’ and reflect things like the fundamental physical properties (mass, charge, spin,
etc.). 54,55
The most elite properties, the perfectly natural, are so specific that that ‘there are
just enough of them to characterize things completely and without redundancy.’56
Sharing properties like these can establish similarity in a meaningful way, even though it
somewhat complicates the view of similarity as property sharing.
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Philosophical Papers Volume II, 53.
In “New Work for a Theory of Universals,” Lewis lays out four options with respect to how to handle
universals, and ends that discussion agnostic between them (1983b). Elsewhere, (“Against Structural
Universals”), he rejects one of these options, which is to rely on a theory of structural universals. In On the
Plurality of Worlds, Lewis suggests the option supported above: “If we have the abundant properties (as we
do, given set theory and possibilia) then we have one of them for each of the sparse properties. So we may
as well say that the sparse properties are just some – a very small minority – of the abundant properties. We
need no other entities, just an inegalitarian distinction among the ones we’ve already got. When a property
belongs to the small minority, I call it a natural property (60).”
53
Lewis notes that ‘natural’ is meant to reflect the notion of natural kinds and is not supposed to have
anything to do with nature in the way that it would be contingent: “A property is natural or unnatural
simpliciter, not relative to one or another world. (Ibid, 60, n. 44)
54
Perfectly natural properties are described as ‘carving nature at its joints’ given that, taken together, their
patterns of instantiation makes up the fundamental structure of reality, or the ‘joints’ at which nature can be
carved. See Hall (“David Lewis’s Metaphysics,”10). See also Sider (Writing the Book of the World), and
Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds).
55
Another suggestion is that the natural properties are those such that “if somebody is presented with some
of their members, he can very easily go on and pick out further members. The class of blue things would
be a case in point (Armstrong, Universals and Scientific Realism, 40).”
56
On the Plurality of Worlds, 60.
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1.8.4.1 Degrees of Naturalness
It is important to note that although some properties are perfectly natural, and
therefore do the most to establish similarity, it is unnecessary to rely only upon the
perfectly natural properties to establish similarity. Even though perfectly natural
properties allow for more precise similarity comparisons, we often discuss aspects of
similarity that correspond to less than perfectly natural properties. In fact, Lewis argued
that naturalness comes in degrees, from the perfectly natural to more derivative natural
properties, like colors, all the way to the most gruesome properties, like infinitely long
disjunctive properties.57

Presumably, the more gruesome and less natural a property is,

the less useful it is to our similarity comparisons, with the most gruesome being
completely useless.58
Although perfect naturalness is fairly well understood and thoroughly explained,
less-than-perfectly-natural naturalness is somewhat more difficult to pin down. We know
that naturalness comes in degrees and that less than perfectly natural properties are
derived from perfectly natural properties, but exactly how this functions isn’t fully
explained.59

“The colors, [. . .], are inferior in naturalness to such perfectly natural properties as mass or charge; grue
and bleen are inferior to the colors; yet even grue does not plumb the real depths of gruesomeness. If it did,
we would not have been able to name it (On the Plurality of Worlds, 61).” Although Lewis does not
provide complete details or a specific method for determining how natural a property is, he does make
comments to suggest how this might work. See below. On a related point, note that perfect naturalness is
not thought to vary from world to world or context to context. However, which properties are natural
enough, in the sense of being useful enough for similarity comparisons varies with context or degree of
specificity. For example, color properties might not be natural enough in some contexts to establish
similarity, but in others, are sufficiently natural.
58
Note that there could very well be similarity comparisons, and therefore counterpart relations, that are
based on strange gerrymandered properties as well; e.g., given philosopher’s examples or very broad
contexts. (E.g., anything that is possible is similar in that respect, and so there is a corresponding
counterpart relation).
59
For example, Hall notes that: “Given Lewis's reductionist commitments, he [. . .] needs some account of
how the facts about the pattern of instantiation of perfectly natural properties make it the case that among
those properties that are not perfectly natural, some are nevertheless more natural than others [. . . ]. He
57
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However, one way Lewis suggests accounting for the spectrum of properties—
from the fundamental physical perfectly natural ones, to slightly less natural properties, to
somewhat gruesome ones, to unspeakably gerrymandered properties—is in terms of
chains of definability: “physics discovers which things and classes are the most elite of
all; but others are elite also, though to a lesser degree. The less elite are so because they
are connected to the most elite by chains of definability. Long chains, by the time we
reach the moderately elite classes of cats and pencils and puddles; but the chains required
to reach the utterly ineligible would be far longer still.”60 This can provide a sense of
how we can get from perfectly natural properties to less natural ones, and gives the sense
that even somewhat gerrymandered properties might be natural to some degree, since
they can be reached by sufficiently long chains.
Elsewhere, Lewis says: “Some few properties are perfectly natural. Others, even
though they may be somewhat disjunctive or extrinsic, are at least somewhat natural in a
derivative way, to the extent that they can be reached by not-too-complicated chains of
definability from the perfectly natural properties. The colours, as we now know, are
inferior in naturalness to such perfectly natural properties as mass or charge; grue and
bleen are inferior to the colours; yet even grue does not plumb the real depths of
gruesomeness. If it did, we would not have been able to name it.”61 Here, it might seem
that the utterly gruesome properties are contrasted with natural properties, and that if the
chains of definability are too complicated, the properties that they reach might not be

says very little about this issue, but the account he evidently favors gets hinted at occasionally (Hall “David
Lewis’s Metaphysics,” 34).” See, for example, Lewis, “Putnam’s Paradox,” “New Work for a Theory of
Universals,” and On the Plurality of Worlds.
60
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Lewis, “Putnum’s Paradox” reprinted in Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, 66.
On the Plurality of Worlds, 61.
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deemed natural at all, drawing solid lines between perfectly natural, natural, and nonnatural properties.
Whether or not all properties are natural to some degree (such that the
gerrymandered, gruesome, and ineffable properties are still natural, just to a very minimal
degree), or if instead there is a distinct line between the least-natural natural properties
and the non-natural properties seems to be somewhat unsettled.62, 63 Therefore,
imperfect-naturalness seems to be less than fully specified, and some details appear to be
left open. Nevertheless, we have a general sense of the distinction, which can be
strengthened by our ability to extrapolate from perfect naturalness to less than perfect
naturalness, all the way down to utter gruesomeness. Therefore, there are many ways to
explain and support naturalness among first order properties.
For our purposes, we can note that two things can be similar in a variety of more
or less natural respects, and while some of these respects can establish similarity in a
meaningful way, others cannot. Which respects of similarity are relevant plays an
important role in selecting counterpart relations, and this depends upon context.
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The distinction is sometimes put in terms of natural and non-natural properties, suggesting that some
properties are natural, others are less natural, and others are not natural at all (perhaps the ‘ineligible
properties’ mentioned above below in the category of non-natural properties). On the other hand, it could
be that the most gruesome are the least natural, but, since they can be reached by some (perhaps infinite)
chain of definability, they are still minimally natural. Perhaps this option can be supported by the fact that,
in some very broad contexts, extremely gruesome properties might be made salient (e.g., we might wish to
discuss a very general sense in each property is similar to every other, given an infinitely long disjunctive
property). The answer to this question will not impact the overall feasibility of a higher order naturalness
distinction, and so can be set aside.
63
In addition, the role of context is unclear. Perfect naturalness does not vary from world to world (On the
Plurality of Worlds, 60). Non-perfect naturalness is derived from perfect naturalness, would seem to be
similarly fixed. However, it seems like context still has a role to play if our de re discourse is inconstant
when it comes to properties in addition to individuals. For example, it could be that which properties are
natural depends upon which properties are ‘natural enough’ to be useful within a particular context. While
it is important to ensure that naturalness is not merely equated with usefulness, it seems that considerations
of naturalness might be made within a context, such that in some cases, degrees of naturalness correspond
to these features of properties, and in others, to those features. For example, in some circumstances,
blueness would be more natural than roundness, and in others, less natural, depending on what is relevant.
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1.9 Context
Consider again the comparison between Earth and Venus. Even after reducing
the types of properties relevant to similarity comparisons to those that are sufficiently
natural, they have many properties in common, and far more than we are typically
interested in considering or discussing. Therefore, when comparing two objects like
Earth and Venus, we do not need to rely on all or even many of the ways they are similar
to each other, but instead can base our comparison upon some particular aspect (or
aspects) of similarity.64 Which aspects of similarity matter to the comparison vary with
the context of utterance, such that context selects which shared properties are relevant,
and which properties are relevant depends upon the “relative importances we attach to
various different respects of similarity and dissimilarity.”65 The relevant properties will
be used to determine whether or not two things are similar. In other words, whether or
not two things are similar or not depends upon whether or not they share certain
properties, which are relevant within a particular context.
Applied to counterpart theory, this means that which counterparts an individual
has will depend on which properties a particular context makes salient. In some contexts,
Earth and Venus are counterparts because they both share the property of being planets;
in other contexts, they are counterparts because they share other properties, like being
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I have been assuming that similarity can be reduced to property sharing. Given this assumption, an
‘aspect of similarity’ can be taken to be a common property that the individuals share. This does not
appear to be controversial given the assumptions already undertaken. However, nothing seems to depend
on this way of describing contextual variation, and it is merely an attempt to clarify and explain whatever
the underlying grounds for similarity comparisons might be given the background assumptions included
here. If similarity is otherwise understood, e.g., as a primitive irreducible notion, then ‘aspects of
similarity’ would refer to something else. See chapters 3 and 4 below for continued discussion.
65
“Counterparts of Person and Their Bodies,” 206.
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spherical. Selecting certain other of Earth’s properties as relevant will no longer find
Venus among Earth’s counterparts; for example, a context that makes a property like
being hospitable to human life salient will exclude Venus from Earth’s counterparts.
Therefore, we cannot say that Earth and Venus are similar ‘a-contextually,’ and similarity
must be linked to a particular context.66

1.9.1 Inconstancy
In general, similarity comparisons are flexible on multiple fronts. For example,
Lewis acknowledges that the counterpart relation “is subject to a great deal of
indeterminacy (1) as to which respects of similarity and difference are to count at all, (2)
as to the relative weights of the respects that do count, (3) as to the minimum standard of
the similarity that is required, and (4) as to the extent to which we eliminate candidates
that are similar enough when they are beaten by competitors with stronger claims.
Further, (…) the vagueness of the counterpart relation – – and hence of essence and de re
modality generally – – may be subject to pragmatic pressures, and differently resolved in
different contexts.”67
The fact that similarity is context dependent and flexible reflects the more general
fact, according to Lewis, that de re modal discourse is inconstant in the sense that modal
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This is slightly misleading as stated. We often do say that two things are similarity without specifying a
context. The point is that there is an underlying context, and this makes some properties salient. In other
words, similarity comparisons are delineated by the relevant context, even though the specific context it is
not necessarily stated or identified. When we say ‘Earth and Venus are similar,’ we often do not specify
the relevant respects of similarity. However, as long as there is some possible context in which it is true,
the claim comes out true; and, if pressed, we could likely explain what sort of similarity comparison we
meant to make. Similarly, when we note that two things are similar, it is always within some context; but it
is not usually stated that they are similar-within-a-particular-context. It is also possible to stipulate that we
mean to refer to the broadest possible context, as we say something like “all of my counterparts are
possibilia” which is, plausibly, true in any context.
67
Philosophical Papers Volume I, 42.
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claims about individuals, and therefore, which counterparts an individual has, is not a
fixed matter, but varies with context. Because of this, there is no fact of the matter about
whether Humphrey is essentially human, for example, but only with respect to certain
contexts. In some contexts, it makes sense to say that Humphrey is essentially human,
and could not have been an aardvark, but in other contexts, it might make sense to claim
that he could have been an aardvark. As discussed above, this could be understood in
terms of selecting different shared properties in different contexts—in contexts in which
it comes out true that Humphrey is essentially human, we might be focusing on properties
of Humphrey like that he has particular DNA or ancestors that followed a particular
evolutionary path. In contexts in which Humphrey is possibly an aardvark, other
properties are made salient, like that he is a mammal, or lives in a particular region.
This means that modal claims about individuals, and therefore, which counterparts an
individual has, are not a fixed matter, but vary with context. 68 To claim that “all of my
counterparts are humans” should be understood as saying “given a particular context, all
of my counterparts are human,” even if we do not directly specify the context. 69,70
The flexibility of the counterpart relation allows us to easily accommodate this
inconstancy. Although this is reflected by the fact that the counterpart relation is a
similarity relation, is not caused by it. Therefore, other relations could potentially
accommodate this inconstancy.71
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Whether or not de re modal claims about properties are similarity inconstant is explored below.
See Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, 248-263.
70
The ‘set of all your counterparts’ will therefore vary with context as well, as it depends on which
counterpart relation or relations are relevant. For example, you might refer to an especially permissive
context in which the counterpart relation picks out all things that are in some respect similar to you;
perhaps all the things that are, in some context or other, your counterparts. Perhaps this particular
counterpart relation does not vary.
71
In addition to accepting a primitive notion of similarity, there are other reductive alternatives as well. For
example, one could take properties to be structural universals, in which case similarity might be explained
69
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To summarize, although this is more complicated than the straightforward
description of similarity in terms of property sharing, it is not difficult to accommodate
the distinction between natural and non-natural properties (as well as that this naturalness
comes in degrees); and also that similarity is context dependent, reflective of the nature
of de re modal discourse. Whether and how it can explain similarity between properties
given a property counterpart theory as well will be explored in Chapter 3. First, I will
discuss a proposed alternative to both counterpart theory and transworld identity views.

in terms of sharing of parts, see Armstrong, e.g., Universals, 102-107. Lewis rejects this alternative, see
Lewis, “Against Structural Universals”.
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CHAPTER 2
LUMP THEORY - AN ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT OF DE RE MODALITY?
The main options for accounting for de re modal statements about individuals are
transworld identity views (according to which, ordinary objects like individuals exist in
multiple possible worlds, and the facts about these individuals ground the truth of de re
modal claims), and counterpart views, according to which ordinary objects exist only in a
single possible world (and de re modal statements depend for their truth upon the facts
about world-bound individuals picked out by a counterpart relation).
A third view has cropped up in a few interesting discussions, but has received
little discussion overall. We can call this position ‘lump theory,’ after the transworld
fusions, or ‘lumps,’ that are taken to account for the truth of de re modal claims
according to this view.72
Something equivalent to lump theory is outlined and rejected by Lewis, in On the
Plurality of Worlds, and is related to a view previously discussed by Quine.73 More
recently, Meg Wallace has further discussed the view as a possible alternative to
counterpart theory and transworld identity.74 Additionally, identifying objects with
transworld sums of modal parts is part of Takashi Yagisawa’s modal ontology.75
72

This terminology comes from Weatherson, and is adopted by Wallace (See Weatherson “Stages, Worms,
Slices and Lumps” ). See also Wallace (“Composition as Identity,” “The Argument from Vagueness,” and
“The Lump Sum.”). Although credit for raising my interest in the general idea is due to Wallace (“The
Lump Sum”), my criticism is more general: my goal is to present and evaluate a particular view that makes
use of the general outline presented by Wallace, and attempts to fill in the remaining details in the most
plausible way. This view has been discussed, although under different titles, by McDaniel (“Modal
Realism with Overlap”) and Kaplan (“Transworld Heir Lines”).
73
See Lewis On the Plurality of Worlds: 217, Quine “Worlds Away.”
74
See Wallace (Ibid). Weatherson also suggests that it might be a novel alternative (“Stages, Worms,
Slices and Lump.”).
75
Yagisawa defends a similar view, which he compares to Four-dimensionalism with respect to time.
Four-dimensionalism is the view that objects extend in time by having temporal parts. The sum of these
parts makes up the object. According to Yagisawa, ordinary objects are extended across space, time, and
possible worlds by having parts in various “space-time-world regions” all of which are equally real
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Because it would be a potential benefit to have a live alternative to transworld
identity and counterpart theory, this view deserves careful attention. However, I will
argue that this view fails to meet this goal, as it cannot be distinguished from counterpart
theory in any relevant way.76 My comments will apply generally to any view that takes
this notion to be distinct from counterpart theory.77
Although this view has cropped up in several discussions, many details remain
unsettled. Therefore, while I am attempting to flesh out a version of a view based on
transworld sums, my criticism is not directed toward any specific position, and I do not
mean to imply that any of the authors mentioned support the specific view presented in
section 2.2. Still, the overall issue will apply to any view that relies on transworld sums
to ground de re modal claims for ordinary objects—unless some way of distinguishing
the relevant relation from the counterpart relation is identified, this view does not appear
to be distinguishable as a new position. As it stands, the most plausible version relies on
counterpart theory, without which, it is not a distinct view.

according to his view. Although he has a unique ontology that includes both possible and impossible
worlds, Yagisawa is relying on a similar concept, for example, for an individual like Humphrey to possibly
win is for Humphrey to have a (modal) part in some world that wins. The view I am outlining here has a
distinct background ontology, and therefore, although similar comments might apply to Yagisawa’s view,
this is not explored here. See Sider (Four-Dimensionalism) and Yagisawa (“Primitive Worlds,” Worlds
and Individuals, and “Impossibilia”).
76
Assuming that both views have the same background assumptions, namely, Modal Realism and
Unrestricted Mereological Composition.
77
One potential application of these transworld lumps could be as a means to represent properties. For
example, perhaps properties could be mereological sums of individuals. Although this is not discussed
here, it might be worth further consideration, as it might seem more suitable than using these lumps to
represent individuals. However, it is not clear that they are an improvement upon the view of properties
assumed in Chapter 1.
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2.1 Background Assumptions: Modal Realism and Unrestricted Mereological
Composition
Modal Realism was taken up as a background assumption in the previous chapter,
where some supporting reasons for accepting the view were given. The most
controversial part of the view; which is that these worlds are concrete, is again not a
necessary part of the view under consideration here, as long as some notion of possible
worlds is in play.78,79 Although modal realism is assumed here, a suitable notion of
possible worlds plus the view known as ‘Unrestricted Mereological Composition,’
discussed next, will provide the background ontology needed for lump theory.

2.1.1Mereology
Mereology is the study of part-whole relations in the familiar way that we think of
our hands being part of our bodies, keys being part of the keyboard, a nucleus being part
of an atom. Despite our familiarity with parts and wholes, various questions arise. For
example, we can ask whether parts have to be spatiotemporally contiguous in order to
compose a whole, or whether an object can be composed of parts that are spread out.
Based on our typical experience with ordinary objects, it is initially plausible to assume
that all objects must have contiguous parts. However, there are many examples of
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Most modal metaphysicians who rely on a possible worlds framework reject Lewis’s Modal Realism and
deny that the worlds are concrete. Lewis labels these ‘ersatz’ views (On the Plurality of Worlds, 136).
Proposals for what these worlds might be include sets of sentences, sets of propositions, pictorial objects,
and maximal states of affairs. See, for example; Adams, “Theories of Actuality;” Bricker, “Absolute
Actuality;” Plantinga “The Nature of Necessity; Stalnaker “Possible Worlds;” and van Inwagen, “Plantinga
on Trans-world Identity,” among others. See also Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, for thorough
discussion.
79
Yagisawa’s view is an outlier in that it has a distinct ontology that includes both possible and impossible
worlds.
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composite objects with disconnected parts, like decks of cards or fleets of ships.80
Another question in this area is whether or not there are some smallest particles at the
most fundamental level, or whether everything can be further divided into smaller parts
all the way down.81
One question of interest to the current discussion stems from the attempt to
identify criteria for distinguishing between situations in which some objects make up a
further object, and situations in which they do not.
This is known as the “Special Composition Question,” which can be stated as:
When do some objects together compose a further object?82
There are three mutually exclusive ways to respond. First, one can hold that
composition takes place only sometimes; parts form an object under some conditions (as
when they are connected in space and time), but under other conditions (as when they are
spread out in space or time) they do not. Although this answer accommodates certain
intuitions, it can be challenged by “Arguments from Vagueness.”83 These arguments are
based on the idea that if composition occurs only sometimes, it is possible to construct a
“Sorites series” of objects, which points to there being vagueness in our understanding of
composition. Sometimes, it appears that the boundaries between cases of one thing, like
a heap or a composite object, are vague. A Sorites series is the result to setting up a
series of cases, with a paradigm case of something, e.g., a heap at one end (a huge pile of
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Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, 211.
See, for example, Sider, “Van Inwagen and the Possibility of Gunk,” Nolan, “Classes, Worlds, and
Hypergunk,” Hudson, “Simples and Gunk,” and Coitnoir and Baxter Composition as Identity.
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See, e.g., van Inwagen, Material Beings, 30.
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See, for example, Wallace, “Composition as Identity Part I and Part II,” “The Argument from
Vagueness,” and “Composition as Identity, Modal Parts;” Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds; Hawley,
“Vagueness and Existence,”and Merricks, “Composition and Vagueness.”
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sand, perhaps), and a clear failure of the case, e.g., a non-heap (a single grain of sand), at
the other. Any step along the way, e.g., from the heap to the single grain, can be arrived
at by a seemingly acceptable move, here, e.g., taking away one grain. However, this
makes it impossible to find a cutoff point, given that one single grain of sand cannot seem
to make a difference between a heap and a non-heap. Although at some point there is no
longer a heap, it seems to be a vague matter given that it only differs by a single grain,
and any place to draw the line seems as good as any other.
Similarly, we might compose a series with human persons at one end (a clear case
of composition, perhaps) and at the other end, the fusion of two objects separated by
space and time, such as a hydrogen atom in ancient Athens and a helium atom in a lab in
Geneva. A similar move could be made here; at any point at which we draw the line, we
could find an equally good point to draw it somewhere else.
In both cases, it is strange to imagine that there might be ‘vague objects,’ things
that are literally indeterminate in what they are. In some cases, we can provide a quick
explanation. For example, it might be that our language is just not precise enough to
identify when something is a heap, and when it is not. If so, then there are no
indeterminate objects that lie somewhere between a heap and a non-heap, and it is only
that ‘heap’ is imprecise. However, if it is not just language, but actual vagueness in the
world, this is objectionable in many ways. It just seems unintuitive to imagine that
whether or not there is an object in front of us is a vague matter; that there is no fact of
the matter as to whether or not there is one or two objects in front of us. 84 One way to
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The argument from vagueness depends upon the claim that there cannot be vagueness in the world or in
objects, only in language. For example, Bertrand Russell proposed that “vagueness and precision alike are
characteristics which can only belong to a representation. They have to do with the relation between a
representation and that which it represents” (Russell, “Vagueness,” 85). Lewis makes the same point: “The
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resolve this issue would be to find a clear cut-off point between cases of composition and
cases where composition does not occur. Although vagueness can sometimes be
accommodated or explained, this one reason to reject this option.
A second option is to claim that composition never occurs—that there are no
composite objects whatsoever. This view is known as ‘Mereological Nihilism’.
Although he does not accept the view, van Inwagen provides the following statement of
nihilism: “(y the xs compose y) if and only if there is only one of the xs.”85
Certain issues, such as the intuition that at least some things have parts, make it
difficult to accept a wholly nihilistic view, and few philosophers accept options at this
extreme.86 For example, if you split something into two parts, it seems logical in many
cases that one object remains, even though it now has two parts (e.g., a sandwich cut in
half does not seem to become two sandwiches). Further, our intuitions in cases of
persons (which seem to be composite) and lifeforms in general, might make it difficult to
support a view according to which there are never any composite objects, even in the case
of living things.87 Instead, it might seem that a living organism is not reducible to the
smaller parts that make it up, e.g., that a human person is more than just a collection of
smaller parts. Because this view in effect assumes that composition takes place only very
only intelligible account of vagueness locates it in our thought or language. The reason it’s vague where the
outback begins is not that there’s this thing, the outback, with imprecise borders; rather, there are many
things, with different borders, and nobody has been fool enough to try to enforce a choice of one of them as
the official referent of the word ‘outback’. Vagueness is semantic indecision.” (On the Plurality of Worlds,
212).” Because there does not seem to be a reason to draw the line at one point rather than another, there
would seem to be vague objects in the world, and therefore, the argument goes, this option should be
rejected.
85
van Inwagen, Material Beings, 73.
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Unger (“There are no Ordinary Things” and “Skepticism and nihilism”) defends a form of nihilism,
arguing that there are no ordinary objects. van Inwagen (e.g., Material Beings, “Against Ontological
Structure”) and Merricks (“No Statues,” Objects and Persons) defend restricted views that are nearly
nihilistic except that they allow exceptions for composite living things, and for conscious things,
respectively. True Mereological Nihilism is the view that nothing is ever composed of any parts.
87
See for example, Van Inwagen (Ibid) and Merricks (Ibid).
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rarely, and because there are principled reasons for distinguishing between life
forms/persons and other objects, it avoids some issues tied to vagueness. In addition, it
could be argued that it is a simpler or more elegant position to hold.88 However, it
depends on the strength of the argument that the only composite objects are living things,
and, given the changes that occur over the course of time among other issues, this is not
the easiest view to support.89
The third way to respond to the special composition question is to say that
composition take place always—any two objects compose a third object, which is their
sum. This is sometimes called ‘Unrestricted Mereological Composition;’ and is the view
supported by Lewis.90 Although there are some unintuitive consequences, (discussed
below), this view is preferable to the alternatives in many ways. Here, it is taken on as an
assumption in order to lay out lump theory.

2.1.2 Unrestricted Mereological Composition
According to this view, any two parts can be combined to form a sum or fusion:
“[t]he mereological sum or fusion, of several things is the least inclusive thing that
includes all of them as parts. It is composed of them and of nothing more; any part of it
overlaps one or more of them; it is a proper part of anything else that has all of them as
parts. Equivalently: the mereological sum of several things is the thing such that, for any
X, X overlaps it iff X overlaps one of them.”91
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See, e.g., van Inwagen: Material Beings.
Because these are restricted versions of nihilism, they must overcome the issues of vagueness as well.
An absolute nihilist would avoid that problem, but only at the expense of denying that there are any
composite objects at all, which is a weighty challenge.
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Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds.
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Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, 69n.
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In addition to providing an explanation for ordinary things that are spatially and
temporally contiguous, this view can accommodate objects with spatially disconnected
parts like decks of cards. It also makes sense of the intuition that some objects, e.g.,
persons, might have temporally disconnected parts, one part being a 7 week old, another
being a 7 year old and another being a 77 year old.92 Our common sense view, which
includes non-living objects with parts like watches and mountains, can be easily
accommodated. However, given unrestricted mereological composition, there are also
very strange fusions of objects with great distances between their parts. There is a sum
made up of a fragment of concrete from the Berlin Wall and the shortest of my cat’s
whiskers, for example, and another made up of George Washington’s apple tree and the
face on a freshly printed one dollar bill.
Although it might seem somewhat odd or extravagant to include objects like these
fusions within one’s ontology, in addition to avoiding the problems plaguing other
answers to the special composition question, Lewis argues that the ontological cost of
accepting unrestricted mereological composition is very low: “To be sure, if we accept
mereology, we are committed to the existence of all manner of mereological fusion. But
given a prior commitment to cats, say, a commitment to cat-fusions is not a further
commitment. [. . . ] Commit yourself to their existence altogether or one at a time, it’s
the same commitment either way. If you draw up an inventory of reality according to [the
opponent’s] scheme of things, it would be double counting to list the cats and then also
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Of course, this assumes commitment to times outside of the present moment, as well as details about
identity over time. If other temporal parts are not part of what there is, they will not be included in any
trans-temporal sums. In addition, distinctions between past and future temporal parts may come into play.
The details of the nature of time can be set aside, as other examples (e.g., objects with spatially
disconnected parts, like a person and their right and left hands) can be used to illustrate the same point.
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list their fusion.”93 Another example discussed by Lewis is Baxter’s case of plots of land.
If a landowner divides his land into six plots, he cannot sell all six while maintaining
ownership of the whole.94,95

2.2 Modal Parts and Transworld Fusions
One result of this view is that we have strange fusions in our ontology. Within
the actual world, this includes odd fusions like the tip of my left pinky and the oldest
brick in the Great Wall in China. But, these oddities are further exaggerated given the
inclusion of Modal Realism and the abundance of additional parts entailed by the view.
Just as Lewis thinks that we cannot restrict composition at our own world, he does
not think that we can restrict transworld composition either. Both examples of
unrestricted composition can be supported by the vagueness argument. Therefore, there
are objects with parts that are not spatiotemporally or causally related to each other in any
way; in addition to trans-temporal and trans-spatial sums, there are transworld sums:
“I claim that mereological composition is unrestricted: any old class of things has
a mereological sum. Whenever there are some things, matter how disparate and
unrelated, there is something composed of just those things. Even a class of things
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(Lewis, Parts of Classes, 81-82)
See Baxter, “Identity in the Loose and Popular Sense,” 579, discussed in Lewis, Parts of Classes, 83-84.
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Baxter is using this case to support the view often called “Composition as Identity.” Roughly, if the
parts are identical to the whole, then commitment to the parts includes commitment to the whole but does
not introduce an extra entity. Another example from Baxter illustrates the same point quite well: “Someone
with a six-pack of orange juice may reflect on how many items he has when entering a 'six items or less'
line in a grocery store. He may think he has one item, or six, but he would be astonished if the cashier said
'Go to the next line please, you have seven items'. We ordinarily do not think of a six-pack as seven items,
six parts plus one whole. (ibid 579).” See e.g., Baxter, “Identity,” and “Many-one Identity,” Lewis, , Parts
of Classes, and Coitnoir and Baxter, Composition as Identity. This view is not uncontroversial, (see e.g.,
van Inwagen, “Composition as Identity,”) but these examples can hint at the sort of ontological innocence
or minimal ontological baggage that unrestricted mereological composition is supposed to provide. Still,
Composition as Identity is not a necessary part of the background included here.
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out of different worlds has a mereological sum. That sum is a trans-world
individual. It overlaps each world that contributes a part of it, and so is partly in
each of many worlds.”96
Given modal realism, there are also world-bound objects in other possible worlds,
which means that they provide more potential parts (‘modal parts’) to combine. 97,98 Just
as there are fusions of things spread out across space and time, there are fusions spread
out across worlds. This means that we will also have trans-world fusions, like the fusion
of myself and my possible brothers. There are also extremely odd trans-world fusions,
like the left lens of Gandhi’s favorite pair of glasses and the tail of an otherworldly
talking donkey.
These fusions seem odd, perhaps even more so than the fusions restricted to the
actual world, and they are not usually thought to be the sorts of things that figure into our
speech or lives in any important way. However, given Lewis’s arguments, we can note
that just like this-worldly cases of cat fusions and plots of land, transworld fusions carry
no further ontological baggage. Once we have included possibilia in our ontology,
fusions of modal parts do not add any commitment over and above these parts.
Assuming modal realism, there are an infinite amount of modal parts to combine, and an
infinite amount of transworld sums, but they do not add more to our ontology once the
parts are included.
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On the Plurality of Worlds, 211.
In addition, we might think that there are mereological sums that include abstract and concrete things,
like the mathematical point of a knife, to use an example from van Inwagen (“Doctrine of Arbitrary
Unattached Parts”). See Lewis (Parts of Classes) as well.
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Of course, if one accepts unrestricted mereological composition and yet denies non-actual concrete
things, (e.g., if possible worlds are not included in any sense) then there will be no concrete modal parts in
this sense. If possible worlds are ‘abstract’ ersatz formulations, they can still contribute parts, if, e.g., there
are sums made of abstract objects or of abstract and concrete objects.
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They are, in this way, a harmless part of our ontology that is perhaps seldom used
outside of philosopher’s examples, but not a cause for any concern either. These objects
are what Lewis called oddities.99 Lewis acknowledges these transworld sums in On the
Plurality of Worlds, where he briefly defends his own view against an argument put forth
by Quine, who, Lewis argues, has taken modal realism to entail this position.100 While
Lewis accepts that these sums are to be included within his ontology, he does not think
that they are of any use to us.101
2.2.1 Uses for these Sums?
However, given that these modal parts and their transworld sums are already
included within our ontology, it is natural to try to find uses for them. As noted above, it
has been suggested that they can provide a third option in accounting for de re modal
claims.
Since these sums are made up of individuals from other possible worlds, some of
whom can be our counterparts and thus represent de re modal facts about us, there are
sums that are formed out of a person and her counterparts.102 Wallace suggests that sums
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Because all possible individuals are world-bound on his view, these sums are “impossible” in the sense
that they are not world-bound. They are still part of his ontology, just not the typical useful objects we
discuss. “To call the trans-world individuals ‘impossible’ in this sense is not an argument for ignoring
them—that comes later. It is only a terminological stipulation. If we thought they should not be ignored,
perhaps because we thought that we ourselves were trans-world individuals, it would be appropriate and
easy to give ‘possible individual’ a more inclusive sense (On the Plurality of Worlds: 211).”
100
“In his ‘Worlds Away’, Quine portrays a version of modal realism that treats ordinary things as transworld individuals, perduring through non-overlapping worlds in just the way they perdure through time and
space. It isn’t that he advocates such a view; rather, he takes for granted that this is what modal realism
would be (On the Plurality of Worlds: 217).”
101
“[I]f summation is unrestricted, so that indeed there are trans-world individuals, are these mere oddities?
Are they nameless, do they fall outside the extensions of ordinary predicates in the domains of ordinary
quantification? Or do they include things of importance to us, such as ourselves? I consider these questions
in section 4.3, where I shall acknowledge the existence of trans-world individuals but dismiss them as
oddities (On the Plurality of Worlds, 193).”
102
Although Wallace singles out transworld sums composed of counterparts, we can note that the same
Transworld sums will exist given other analyses. In fact, as noted above, these sums stem directly from
unrestricted mereological composition and modal realism. Therefore, the fusion of myself and all of my
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like these might correspond to persons and ordinary objects, and that the various
otherworldly modal parts of any given sum can account for de re modal facts. According
to this view, you are a Transworld sum with different parts in different worlds. One
world-bound part of you is in the actual world; this part corresponds to what a non-lump
theorist might take to be an individual.103 Other modal parts of you have other properties,
and can therefore account for this world-bound part of you possibly having those
properties. Accordingly, what a non-Lump theorist would take to be all of Humphrey
(call him ‘Humphrey@’) is actually just one small world-bound modal part of a
Transworld sum, which the lump theorist would call ‘Humphrey.’ 104 The fact that a
modal part of Humphrey exists in another world, w1, and wins the election in w1, makes
it the case that Humphrey@ possibly wins the election.

2.2.2: Which Parts and Which Sums?
Some transworld fusions are composed of individuals and their counterparts. The
proposal under consideration is that these sums are ordinary individuals. However,
because every individual is a part of infinitely many distinct mereological sums, there are
many possible sums that might be used to pick out an individual. We need a method of
picking out sums that is able to show why some parts are important enough to be parts of
individuals like us.

“counterparts” contributes to what there is regardless of whether one accepts Transworld identity or
counterpart theory, even if this lump or sum is referred to in other ways. (Note that referring to a single
lump as the fusion of a person and all of her counterparts needs further explanation, given the importance
of context, as discussed in section 2.3 below).
103
See below for some concerns related to the potential for an individual to have multiple counterparts in
their world.
104
‘Humphrey@’ is meant to pick out the world-bound part of Humphrey that is in the actual world. Since
Humphrey is the transworld lump of all of Humphrey’s counterparts on this view, ‘Humphrey’ is not
specific enough to pick out the object in question.
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As noted above, Quine describes and criticizes a view that corresponds to lump
theory. His argument is based on a comparison to temporal parts, which, he argues, are
connected by various relations, importantly, by relations of causal dependence. The coin
in your pocket yesterday can be linked to the same coin in your pocket today by relations
like these. However, he argues, with transworld individuals, there is no reason to prefer
any one sum over any other, and we can basically have anything as a part. Therefore,
such a position would make little sense without some way to ‘connect’ up some parts into
a relevant transworld sum.105
Therefore, we can ask the lump theorist why it is that we select certain parts over
others in order to form the transworld lumps that correspond to persons. All parts are
united by mereological composition, but this alone does nothing to set apart the special
group of sums that is supposed to correspond to ordinary objects and individuals, and to
support modal claims about these objects and individuals. Any and all modal parts are
equally good candidates to compose further objects and so, it is important to find some
underlying grounds to limit these sums to those that are relevant. This can be made clear
by comparison to the non-modal case: it is not just mereology that underlies the various
temporal stages of a person, or the various scattered spatial parts of a deck of cards while
playing 52 Pickup. Given unrestricted mereological composition alone, any parts can be
combined to form an object, and so my left half and your right half are just as much of a
coherent sum as my left and right halves together are. Therefore, if we think that there
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Lewis describes the contrast between trans-temporal connections and trans-world connections within
Quine’s objection like this: “[Unlike the temporal case] [t]here is no such one-dimensional ordering given
in the modal case. So any path is as good as any other; and what’s more, in logical space anything that can
happen does. So linkage by a chain of short steps is too easy: it will take us more or less from anywhere to
anywhere. Therefore it must be disregarded; the unification of trans-world individuals must be a matter of
direct similarity between the stages (On the Plurality of Worlds, 218).”
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are any special sums at all, then there must be some way to pick them out, and mereology
alone is insufficient.106

2.2.2.1 The Counterpart Relation
A quick answer is that counterpart theory, and therefore, the counterpart relation,
is what distinguishes the relevant fusions that make up individuals from the myriad other
sums. After all, a lump is taken to be the transworld fusion of an individual and all of her
counterparts. However, if it is just the counterpart relation, it becomes difficult to
distinguish lump theory from counterpart theory. Given that modal realism and
unrestricted mereological composition are both assumed, all possible individuals from all
possible worlds exist, and any possible way to put them together results in a sum.
Therefore, both views include all of these sums. If the counterpart relation is what
underlies picking out certain parts over others on both views, then the same parts will be
selected as relevant to an individual by both views. Both views can talk about the sum of
an individual and all of her counterparts.107 In addition, it seems like both views will rely
on the same ‘parts’ to ground the truth of de re modal claims. Whether we refer to him as
‘Humphrey’ or ‘Humphrey@,’ the same world-bound individual possibly wins, and

I do not mean ‘special’ in any deeper sense then that they are relevant to the purpose being considered.
We could make certain sums ‘special’ in this sense, by stipulation. E.g., the examples of strange fusions
discussed it this chapter are special in that they are used to exemplify weird fusions. Sums of temporal
parts of persons are special because they are connected by various relations that unite them into a particular
individual. Sums of 52 scattered playing cards are special because of causal and spatiotemporal relations
that make them a deck. All of these methods require something in addition to mereology. While the lump
theorist could just stipulate that she is relying on whatever unites modal parts of individuals, this answer is
insufficient to silence the objection that it is the counterpart relation that is doing the work.
107
Below I will discuss a further complication, regarding the role of context and ability to pick out the sum
of an individual and all of her counterparts.
106
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whether we think that they are mereologically connected or not, Humphrey’s winning
counterpart in w1 grounds the claim.
Therefore, it seems that the only difference is the decision to say that these sums
are more important than their world-bound parts are.108 Other than the claim that these
sums are what ‘matter’ in the sense that they are what we are actually picking out when
we refer to ordinary objects, it is challenging to distinguish the views.109
This view could be distinguished, perhaps, by identifying a relevant method for
picking out some sums over others, and showing why the sums matter more than their
parts. One way to establish that the view is distinct would be to find a way to identify the
important sums that goes beyond what the counterpart relation offers. I will set out some
potential options. Later, I will evaluate two additional attempts to distinguish the views.

2.2.2.2 Options Beyond the Counterpart Relation
Some of the main options appear to be identity, causal dependence,
spatiotemporal connections, collective interest or other potential relations of personal
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There are a few other details to be considered shortly. First we can ask what exactly is included in a
world-bound part. Given the details of counterpart theory, there are cases where an individual has
counterparts in its world. Are both of these individuals included in the world-bound part of the transworld
individual? Second, we can ask whether the same sum is always associated with an individual, or whether
it is a context dependent matter. Both of these issues will be considered below, as potential means of
distinguishing the views.
109
Other than that this is a novel view, it has been argued that it would be beneficial to have the same
picture of trans-temporal and trans-world individuals, e.g., see Weatherson (“Stages, Worms, Slices and
Lumps”), Wallace (“The Lump Sum”) and Yagisawa (“Primitive Worlds” and “Impossibilia”). In addition,
it has been suggested that lump theory provides a different answer to Kripke’s Humphrey Objection
(Weatherson ibid, Wallace ibid). Finally, Wallace (2009) has used this view in combination with the view
known as Mereological Essentialism to support Composition as Identity. A careful analysis of this
potential would go too deeply into issues beyond the present concerns, and does not appear to offer any
way to distinguish the views. I will discuss the first two of these considerations.
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identity, and perhaps a brute ‘part of individual’ relation. Another option might be to rely
upon some notion of similarity that is distinct from the counterpart relation.110
Since modal realism is part of the background, it would be unfavorable to include
transworld identity, given, e.g., Lewis’s arguments against “Modal Realism with
Overlap” considered in On the Plurality of Worlds.111 Such a view leads to unintuitive
results like the problem of accidental intrinsics and the inability to accommodate the
inconstancy of de re modality.112 There would also be further issues if it were used to
select the relevant sums.113
Another way to try to select the relevant sums of modal parts would be to look to
the relations that connect temporal parts, given that analogies between temporal and
modal parts are often made.114 Unfortunately, temporal parts are connected in ways that
do not apply to all modal parts, and certainly not to most modal parts. For example,
although temporal parts of the same object might be connected by relations of causal
dependence and spatio-temporal connections, this is ruled out given that possible worlds
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I am not claiming that any of the authors mentioned are relying on any of these relations or methods. I
am attempting to fill in what I take to be a missing detail that is needed to distinguish lump theory from
counterpart theory.
111
See section 4.2 and 4.3 of On the Plurality of Worlds, 198-220. As noted at the outset, lump theory is
also compatible with ersatz views.
112
I consider whether or not the lump theorist has room for inconstancy below. It was assumed in chapter
1 that this is a favorable view to hold, however, it could be rejected. Nevertheless, even if one is seeking a
constant relation, identity does not seem to be the right one. In particular, Wallace seems to rule out this
option: “By ‘trans-world’ in ‘trans-world object’ or ‘trans-world individual’ I mean something similar to
‘trans-continental’ in ‘trans-continental country’. An object (country) is stretched out across worlds
(continents), yet is not wholly located in one world (continent). I do not mean by ‘trans-world individual’
(as it is sometimes used) to indicate an individual that is wholly located in more than one world, as in
‘trans-world identity’ (“The Lump Sum,” 2).”
113
In addition, if transworld sums are connected by identity relations, then parallel arguments could be
made to the arguments being made here with respect to counterpart theory. If transworld identity is what
connects the parts of the lump, then it seems that the resulting view would not be interestingly different
from transworld identity.
114
For example, see Sider, Four Dimensionalism, Wallace “The Lump Sum”, Yagisawa “Impossibilia.”
As noted above, those who discuss lump theory have sometimes suggested that this would be a benefit.
Wallace defines ‘world-bound part’ based on Sider’s definition of ‘temporal part,’ see below.
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are not connected in these ways.115 Other ways that parts of individuals might be thought
to be united across time (common histories, match of origins, or having a collective selfinterest, for example), 116 are problematic for the same reasons, and trans-temporal
relations like these are irrelevant.117
Another way to put the current question is, “why should we care about the lumps
rather than the parts?” Perhaps this could be answered by relying upon a primitive
relation of transworld sums used to link together all of the relevant modal parts of an
ordinary object. However, this would negate the otherwise minimal ontological
commitments of this view in comparison to the alternatives. Finally, it could seem ad
hoc to state that there is a new view that depends upon a primitive relation that is
otherwise difficult to distinguish from the counterpart relation.
Perhaps a better option would be to rely on a relation of similarity between the
various parts. Given that these sums are supposed to be composed of a world-bound
objects and their otherworldly counterparts, and that the counterpart relation is a relation
of similarity, this seems to be the obvious option. Like the counterpart relation, a
similarity relation could connect these various world-bound individuals without relying
on identity. At the same time, a similarity relation could connect parts in distinct worlds
despite a lack of spatiotemporal or causal dependence, and without the need for there to
be common histories or collective self-interest. However, given that the counterpart
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See Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, 217-220 for discussion of some of the connections between
temporal parts. He argues that the same connections fail to apply across worlds.
116
See, for example, Perry, Personal Identity, and Parfit, Reasons and Persons, for discussion of some
potential relations of personal identity.
117
Finally, since the resulting transworld objects are to be used to support de re modal claims, it is
important to note that many of these relations would conflict with constancy as well, unless some
allowance for contextual dependence is provided.
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relation is just a relation of similarity, it is hard to imagine how relying on this notion
would allow for the lump theorist to distinguish their view.
One way to distinguish the view would be to rely on a notion of similarity that is
not identical to that used in counterpart theory. This may not seem to be plausible since
we might have thought that there is only one relation of similarity, and that it is the
similarity notion used by the counterpart theorist. However, if, e.g., counterpart theory
relies on a flexible notion of similarity, and lump theory does not, then this would be a
way to show that they are distinct, as well as to explain what it is that selects certain
trans-world sums as relevant. This option is explored briefly below, but for the moment,
it is sufficient to imagine that some notion of similarity unites the world-bound parts of
transworld sums.

2.3: Comparison to Counterpart Theory
Similarity appears to be the best way to represent the part-whole relationships
relevant to the transworld sums that compose ordinary objects. If this is the notion that
lump theory is relying upon, then it shares this relation, and this way of selecting modal
‘parts’ with counterpart theory. Looking deeper into the resulting theory, it is difficult to
find any other relevant differences between counterpart theory and lump theory so
understood.118
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There might be other options not considered here, but of those considered, similarity seems to be the
best option.
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2.3.1: Potential Differences?
As noted above, both views have the same background ontology, the same worldbound parts, and the ability to form all the same sums. In some instances, counterpart
theory can even talk about the equivalent of the lump, i.e., by discussing what is possible
for an individual and all of her counterparts.119 The counterpart theorist can talk about
any transworld sum she wishes; she just typically chooses not to. If lump theory amounts
to nothing more than the view that we should talk about these sums instead of their parts,
it is not a very interesting alternative. There are a few additional avenues to consider,
but I will argue that none provide a way to distinguish lump theory.

2.3.1.1 Concern for Your Parts
It has been suggested that this view can provide a distinct, and possibly better,
reply to Kripke’s Humphrey Objection.120 As discussed above, the objection is that
counterpart theory cannot provide the correct analysis of our de re modal statements,
since the activities of otherworldly individuals have nothing to do with our own wants
and concerns. Put another way, counterpart theory says that what it is for Humphrey to
possibly win the election is for a distinct otherworldly individual to win, and yet
Humphrey doesn’t care about what takes place for this otherworldly individual. This is
not typically taken to be a successful objection, but it might be a means of distinguishing
the views, provided that they respond in relevantly distinct ways.
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Note that this is more complicated given that counterpart theory is based on a flexible counterpart
relation meant to reflect the inconstancy of de re modal claims.
120
E.g., see Weatherson, “Stages, Worms, Slices and Lumps,” and Wallace, “The Lump Sum.”
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One might think that lump theory can provide a more satisfying answer, given
that we are now looking at a modal part of the transworld object that is Humphrey, rather
than a counterpart. Even though Humphrey does not care what happens to his
counterpart, he might care about what happens to his otherworldly modal part, given that
he and his part make up a portion of the same composite individual.
There are problems with this claim, however. First, it looks like the same ‘part’ is
doing the work to ground the de re claim that Humphrey possibly wins. This can be
made clear by considering that unrestricted mereological composition is taken on as a
background assumption, and therefore counterpart theory has the same machinery
available. The counterpart theorist could also try to reassure Humphrey by telling him
that he is a part of a transworld mereological sum that includes a winning part.
However, given that the counterpart relation is what picks out the relevant sums,
this means that the same ‘part’ will be picked out by either view. Therefore, even if
Humphrey is comforted by this fact, it does not show that there is a metaphysical
difference between the views.
Furthermore, mereology without the counterpart relation cannot distinguish a
relevant transworld sum from any of the others, and there are infinitely many.
Presumably, there are plenty of trans-worldly fusions that Humphrey is part of, yet
doesn’t care about. Given that Humphrey@ does not care what happens to a piece of
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dryer lint in Linz, why would he care more just because that lint is part of a mereological
sum that he is part of?121 The lump view cannot be distinguished in this way.122
2.3.1.2 Distinct World-bound Parts?
As noted in Chapter 1, the counterpart relation is permissive enough to allow for
an individual to have counterparts in her own world, as well as allowing individuals to
have multiple counterparts within a single world. We can ask whether or not there are
also multiple modal parts of an object at a single world. Wallace bases her working
definition of modal part on Sider’s definition of temporal part. It appears that there is to
be only one part per world:
X is a world bound modal part of Y at a world W means that 1) X exists at, but only
at W, 2) X is a part of y at W, and 3) X overlaps at W everything that is a part of y at
W. 123
Each of these world parts is world bound in much the same way that an instantaneous
temporal part is temporally bound.
Although world-bound parts are supposed to be analogous to temporal parts, it is
not clear that the analogy is sufficiently strong to ground the meaning of world-bound

Note that nothing depends on the claim that we don’t care about what happens to our otherworldly
counterparts. It might be the case, as Wallace suggests, that we do care about other modal parts of
ourselves (“The Lump Sum”). For example, we might hope that we would do the right thing in a
counterfactual situation—e.g., I hope that if I would have witnessed the murder of Kitty Genovese, that I
would have called the police. In this case, I seem to care about what happens to my counterparts in nearby
worlds, and what they are like. Of course, if I care about them or not, I will care about the same part, the
same individuals in the same worlds, given either view.
122
To be fair, Weatherson suggests that lump theory can provide a better answer in part because of the way
that it can answer more puzzles overall, including the Humphrey objection, then rival views, rather than
specifically arguing that this objection fares better with lump theory. The objection is used here to
illustrate the point that mereology is not enough to provide a relevant difference between a person and
some of her counterparts, and a sum of a person and her counterparts.
123
“The Lump Sum,” 2.
121
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based on instantaneity.124 In order to pick out a world-bound part of an individual, we
need to know what (sub)parts from that world to include. For example, we can ask
whether more than one object (in the traditional sense of object) from within a world
makes up the world-bound part of the transworld sum from that world. In other words, in
w2, does the world-bound part of Humphrey include both the winning candidate and the
second runner up? Or only one of these parts? We can evaluate the response provided by
counterpart theory, and compare to what the lump theorist might say. If they provide
distinct answers, this can distinguish the views.
First, according to counterpart theory, there are cases in which an individual has a
counterpart at their own world. Lewis imagines an example in which he trades places
with another actual individual, his unfortunate neighbor Fred.125 Because it seems
possible for there to be a situation in which all else is qualitatively just the same as it
actually is, and yet Lewis is Fred, this possibility needs to be accommodated. There are a
few options, here, one in which there is a distinct yet qualitatively identical world where
Fred and Lewis have switched places; another is that the actual world itself can represent
the possibility, by Fred and David Lewis being counterparts. Lewis opts for the second
choice, given the chance to avoid commitment to haecceitism.126
According to lump theory, for there to be two or more ‘counterparts’ within one
world would mean that there are sometimes two (or more) ‘individuals’ (in the traditional

124

Consider the fact that in the temporal case, we have past, present, and future. Perhaps the present could
be said to correspond to the actual, but it is not clear what non-actual corresponds to. Wallace
acknowledges that the analogy might not hold up.
125
On the Plurality of Worlds, 231-232.
126
Lewis gives the following definition of a haecceitistic difference: “two worlds differ in what they
represent de re concerning some individual, but do not differ qualitatively in any way.” Haecceitism is the
view that there are at least some cases of haecceitistic differences between worlds. Without taking a stance
on haecceitism, it can be seen as a general benefit if a view allows more options. (Ibid, 221.)
52

non-lump sense) within one world-bound part. For example, the actual world would have
the David-Fred fusion as the world-bound part that makes up the transworld sum that is
David. This would diminishes the intuitive understanding of world-bound modal part for
the lump view, given that it cannot easily explain why it is that we think we are a single
individual in a world when really, we are part of a world-bound mereological sum of
parts that may also include other individuals.127
Another option would be to accept haecceitism and argue that these are distinct
worlds, and that therefore, Fred and Lewis are never parts of the same trans-world sum.
If the first option is taken, it looks like we will again have a situation in which we cannot
distinguish the views. However, the second option will only provide a difference based
on acceptance of haecceitism, and therefore, may not be distinguished from counterparttheory-plus-haecceitism. Of course, it would also be possible to reject the notion that this
is a possible situation (on essentialist grounds, for example) or to provide another
explanation not considered here.

2.3.1.3 Context and Modal Parts
I suggested that lump theory relies on a similarity relation that may or may not be
distinct from the counterpart relation. If a similarity relation supports the view, we need
to mention an important feature, discussed in Chapter 1—the role of context.
A popular understanding of similarity holds that context plays an essential role in
determining which aspects of similarity are relevant to the particular de re statement we
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Furthermore, it seems to point to some difficulties in the analogy between temporal and modal parts, and
potentially, a problem for the lump theorist’s ability to pick out a world-bound individual. However, it
should be noted that to some extent, all views have the issue of how to individuate world-bound objects,
(e.g., ‘the Problem of the Many’ mentioned in Chapter 3). See Lewis, Parts of Classes.
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are considering, and therefore, which things are our counterparts.128 Similarity is
notoriously flexible, and seems to depend on context even in non-modal cases: "even
when all talk of similarity is explicit and de re modality is out of the picture. I can say
that Ted and Fred are very much alike, yet very different. Uniform resolutions would
make that a contradiction - so much the worse for them!” 129, 130 Depending on the
context, we will identify Ted and Fred as counterparts, or not. Perhaps they are similar in
that they are philosophers, for example. Still, one can say that they are very dissimilar in
other ways, e.g., in their specializations or alma maters.
Of course, counterpart theory does rely on a flexible notion of similarity, in part
because that’s taken to be how similarity is, but also to reflect the claim that de re modal
claims are an inconstant matter. This is taken up as an assumption with counterpart
theory,131 but perhaps it could be omitted from lump theory. Some support for the claim
that de re modal claims are inconstant is provided in Chapters 1 and 3, and Lewis
provides many more examples.132 Nonetheless, it might be rejected. This alternative is
not explored here, however, because it will also fail to set the views apart either. If
counterpart theory and lump theory are otherwise metaphysically indistinguishable, the
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For example, Lewis explains that: “The principle advantage of the method of counterparts over the
method of inter-world identities is that if we adopted the latter in its most plausible form, we would say that
things were identical with all and only those things which we would otherwise call their counterparts. But
that could not be correct: first, because the counterpart relation is not transitive or symmetric, as identity is;
and second, because the counterpart relation depends on the relative importances we attach to various
different respects of similarity and dissimilarity, as identity does not. (“Counterparts of Persons,” 206)."
129
Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, 255.
130
See, for example, Goodman, “Seven Strictures on Similarity,” for concerns about the pervasively
contextual element of similarity comparisons. The examples of Earth and Venus in Chapter 1 also support
the idea that similarity is had in a context. Earth and Venus might be similar in that they are both planets,
but dissimilar in that they are not both inhabited by humans.
131
See the arguments against constancy in Lewis On the Plurality of Worlds, 248-263.
132
ibid.
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choice to add an additional assumption to one or other of the views will not be sufficient
to establish that they are relevantly distinct.
If instead, lump theory relies on a flexible notion (and accepts inconstancy), then
it cannot be distinguished from counterpart theory. In addition, it seems to offer a strange
view of individuals, given that what parts one has is a matter of context. Counterpart
theory would appear to be in a better position in this respect. Consider that, according to
counterpart theory, Humphrey has angel counterparts in some contexts, and Humphrey
has poached egg counterparts in other contexts.133 In addition, in some contexts, he is
essentially human and therefore has neither angels nor eggs as counterparts. These are
both potential counterparts of Humphrey, but will not typically be picked out in the same
context. As counterparts of Humphrey, they are not literally ‘parts’ of him, as they will
be according to lump theory. Lump theory (with inconstancy) will hold that
‘Humphrey@’ (the actual world-bound modal part of the transworld sum that is
Humphrey) is literally a part of multiple trans-world mereological sums, and which parts
this transworld sum has is a matter of context. Although this view can be helped perhaps
by analogies to views about identity across time, it may seem odd to imagine that what
parts an individual has is not a fixed matter.

2.4 Conclusion
I have argued that lump theory is not an acceptable alternative to counterpart
theory. If what delineates a particular “transworld sum” turns out to be nothing more
than the typical counterpart relation, then we do not appear to have a relevantly different
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See Lewis On the Plurality of Worlds, 251. This example is used in a footnote in section 4.3.1 as well.
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theory. First, I argued that the counterpart relation is the best option for picking out the
relevant parts. With respect to counterpart theory, talking of ‘all of one’s counterparts’ is
a bit misleading without further clarification, given that which counterparts an individual
has depends upon the context. Therefore, I attempted to clarify what the lump theorist
might mean, and argued that the choice is either to give up inconstancy, or accept that
lump theory becomes more unattractive given that what parts something has is a matter of
context. There may also be other ways to distinguish the views but that I have laid out
what I take to be the best options and none seem to set it apart.
In conclusion, it seems like transworld mereological sums cannot do the work of
ordinary objects in our modal language without relying on the tools of counterpart theory,
and, given that they seem to offer no benefits beyond what is offered by counterpart
theory (and may be less intuitive in some ways) they are not an acceptable alternative for
grounding the truth of de re modal claims. In the remaining chapters, I return to
considerations of counterpart theory in particular, beginning with an attempt to apply
counterpart theory to properties.
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CHAPTER 3
COUNTERPART THEORY AND PROPERTIES

Counterpart theory has recently been applied to entities like properties, relations,
and propositions.134 The goal of this chapter is to analyze attempts like these, and to
comment more generally on the overall viability of views that fit into this category. In
addition, I will outline a specific property counterpart view and provide initial support.

3.1 Motivation
Properties play a central role in current discussion of causation, dispositions,
natural laws, theories of measurement and more, and so it is a worthwhile endeavor to
explore counterpart theoretic applications. The move to apply counterpart theory to
properties has been suggested in various contexts by multiple philosophers. For example,
in the context of comparing haecceitism and quidditism, 135 David Lewis mentions, and
ultimately rejects, a property counterpart view according to which no property is ever
instantiated in two different worlds.136
Other philosophers are more optimistic about the potential applications of
counterpart theory to properties and similar entities, and have suggested that such views
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I am focusing primarily upon properties in this chapter for simplicity.
As discussed above, haecceitism is the view that there are haecceitistic difference between worlds; i.e.,
worlds that differ in some non-qualitative way, but not in any qualitative way. Quidditism is more or less
the property analogue of haecceitism—quidditism allows the possibility for properties to swap their roles,
or replace each other, in other possible worlds. (For discussion, see, for example Armstrong, “Universals,”
Hawthorne, “Causal Structuralism,” Heller, “Anti-Essentialism and Counterpart Theory,” and Black,
“Against Quidditism”).
136
He is concerned about the viability of such a view, and ultimately finds that it is unwarranted except to
provide support for applications that he rejects: “It could be for the sake of upholding identity of
structurally indiscernible worlds, but I see no good reason for wanting to uphold that principle. Or it could
be for the sake of blocking the argument for Humility. But why would I want to block that argument?
(“Ramseyan Humility,” 211).”
135
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could solve metaphysical puzzles or support other philosophical theses. For example,
Derek Ball suggests relying on a counterpart-theoretic understanding of properties in
order to respond to modal arguments against Physicalism; Mark Heller proposes a
property-counterpart view in order to allow for the ‘Linguistic Ersatzist’ to respond to
several objections; Andy Egan suggests taking the de re modal facts of properties to be
understood counterpart theoretically as a potential response to a problem he raises for a
Lewisian conception of properties; and Cian Dorr raises a problem for a particular view
of propositions, and initially considers a proposition-counterpart view in reply.137,138 In
the next chapter, I will discuss an attempt put forth by Shamik Dasgupta to use a
relational counterpart theory to allow relationalists about quantity to avoid particular
puzzles.139
There are other reasons to consider property counterpart theory as well. Some
philosophers reject the “hybrid nature” of taking de re facts about individuals and about
properties to be analyzed in distinct ways. For example, Dorr argues that we ought to
have a counterpart view for properties if we have one for individuals: “[n]o matter what
sort of thing we take propositions to be, if we accept counterpart theory for individuals
we must also accept some form of counterpart theory for propositions, properties and
relations.”140 Similarly, Derek Ball argues that attempts to treat modal claims about
See Ball “Property Identities and Modal Arguments,” Heller “Property Counterparts in Ersatz Worlds,”
“Transworld Identity for the Ersatzist,” Dorr, “Propositions and Counterpart Theory,” Egan “Second-order
Predication,” Ehring “Property Counterparts and Natural Class Trope Nominalism.” See also Guigon
“Overall Similarity, Natural Properties, and Paraphrases”, and “Coextension and Identity.”
In addition, Denis Robinson briefly discusses a potential property counterpart view, which relies on
transworld similarity. He makes this suggestion (which he ultimately rejects) in response to an argument
about Epiphenomenalism. (See Robinson, “Epiphenomenalism, Laws, and Properties.”
138
The most complete explications of property counterpart views are put forth by Heller (“Property
Counterparts in Ersatz Worlds,”), and Ball, (“Property Identities and Modal Arguments,”) and although
they have set out some of the groundwork, this chapter provides an in depth analysis.
139
See Dasgupta, “Comparativism and Absolutism about Quantity.”
140
Dorr, 213.
137
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properties in a different way from modal claims about individuals “is rendered
problematic by the disuniform, arguably non-compositional treatment of modal claims
that it would require. It would be inelegant and methodologically undesirable to give
entirely different semantics for modal claims involving properties and those involving
other individuals.”141
In contrast, one might think that the differences between individuals and
properties are sufficient to warrant non-uniform treatment of de re modal claims in these
areas, as Lewis does in his discussion of the ‘accidental intrinsics’ problem.142
Properties and individuals are distinct in many ways and these might be sufficient to
justify different semantics for each.
In any case, the question of whether or not counterpart theory is uniquely
applicable to individuals, and/or if properties can benefit from such an analysis will be
explored in more depth within this chapter. My primary task will to set forth and analyze
a property counterpart theory. I will also explore the effects of these considerations on
the overall viability of standard counterpart theory in connection to the issues explored
here.
3.2 Property Counterpart Theory

In chapter 1 I suggested one particular view of properties. Using this view, I will
set out a preliminary property counterpart view for evaluation by briefly reviewing the

Ball “Property Identities,” 8.
For example, there are concerns about the transworld identity of individuals that do not apply to
properties (for example, the view known as ‘quidditism’ might be taken to be more acceptable than the
equivalent for individuals; ‘haecceitism’). See Lewis On the Plurality of Worlds. In addition, the reasons to
support a world-bound view for individuals and not for properties discussed below can further support this
distinction.
141
142
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elements of counterpart theory and attempting to incorporate each into a property version
of the view. The goal will be to remain as close to standard counterpart theory as
possible while attempting to accommodate important intuitions, and holding fixed the
background assumptions laid out so far, e.g., Modal Realism, properties as sets of
possibilia, and similarity understood in terms of property sharing, which reflects the fact
that de re modality is inconstant.

3.2.1 Components of a Counterpart Theory Revisited
Above I suggested that the essential components of standard counterpart theory
appear to be that the counterpart relation is a (non-transitive) similarity relation143, that
context plays an important role in determining whether or not the counterpart relation
holds, and that the entities in question are world bound. 144
As discussed in the first chapter, counterpart theory assumes that individuals exist
in one world only. In other versions of counterpart theory, (e.g., when the entities under
consideration in are not individuals or ordinary objects, or when the underlying structure
is not modal but e.g., temporal), it seems that there are still analogies to an entity’s being
world-bound. For example, Sider’s temporal counterpart theory, takes stages to be
instantaneous time slices, which is the equivalent of being ‘world-bound’ within his
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Similarity relations are not transitive; x can be similar to y, and y can be similar to z and without x
being similar to z. Similarity, as an alternative to identity, seems to be the backbone of counterpart views,
and most views rely on similarity or nearby notions (e.g., for a related notion, see Fara, “Relative-Sameness
Counterpart Theory,” and “Possibility Relative to a Sortal.”).
144
Although I will suggest and explore views that do not rely on all of these components, there are some
reasons to doubt that these components can be separated from each other. For example, Woodward’s reply
to Schaffer, “The Internal Relatedness of All Things,” raises an issue for anyone who seeks to rely on the
notion of being world-bound without the other elements of counterpart theory (Woodward, “Worldmates
and Internal Relatedness,” 423).
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theory.145 Heller’s ersatz view includes that properties are ‘world’ bound as well, as they
are restricted to the actual world plus representations of them in ersatz worlds.146 The
property counterpart theories discussed in the introduction, (e.g., Ball’s view) rely on a
worldbound notion of properties as well.147 Still, it is worthwhile to question whether or
not this is a necessary part of any counterpart theory, given that counterpart theory can be
formulated without this condition as well.148 The initial goal is to formulate a property
counterpart theory with as much in common with traditional counterpart theory for
individuals as possible, and so this assumption is taken on initially. Later, restricting the
theory to include only worldbound properties will be challenged, but initially, we can
assume that any form of counterpart theory would require each of these key components,
or suitable substitutions. Later, ways to modify and adjust this requirement are explored,
since a property counterpart theory with all of these elements appears to lead to
counterintuitive results.

3.2.2 Initial Complications
Preliminarily, then, we can assume that a property counterpart view is any theory
that holds that properties are world bound, and that a distinct counterpart of a given
property is a property that is similar to the given property within a particular context.149
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Sider, Four Dimensionalism.
Heller, “Property Counterparts in Ersatz Worlds.”
147
Ball, “Property Identities and Modal Arguments.”
148
For example, the counterpart relation could be relativized to worlds, as a four-place relation such that an
individual ‘x’ in world w is a counterpart of an individual ‘y’ in w2. Thanks to Phillip Bricker for this
suggestion.
149
An entity can also be its own counterpart. See Lewis On the Plurality of Worlds.
146
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Although this is just an outline of a theory, questions arise even before attempting to fill
in the details.
First, there may not be a straightforward translation from a theory about objects
and individuals to a theory about properties for any of the components, given the
substantial differences between properties and individuals.150 These differences will
affect whether or not all components of counterpart theory can be applied to properties,
and become apparent when we try to formulate the theory.
For example, consider what it means for the counterpart relation, a similarity
relation, to be applied to properties. Although we have a general sense of what it takes
for two individuals to be similar to one another, we might not have the same intuitive
grasp of what it is for two properties to be similar to one another. Furthermore, our very
understanding of similarity can complicate things; e.g., if similarity is understood as
property sharing among individuals, then it is difficult to see how this definition could
apply in a straightforward way to similarity among properties, rather than individuals.151
Here again, the nature of properties will partially determine our understanding of the
similarity between them.
Consider next the claim that an individual is world-bound according to standard
counterpart theory.152 Although we have a straightforward understanding of what this
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E.g., as mentioned above, differences between the nature of properties and of individuals have been
upheld to account for certain metaphysical distinctions, e.g., choices to support haecceitism without
admitting quidditism.
151
Perhaps, the closest analogy would be sharing of higher order properties, or properties-of-properties.
This will be explored below.
152
In On the Plurality of Worlds, Lewis mentions his preference for the terminology “possible individual”
instead: “I avoid the convenient phrase ‘world-bound individual’ because it often seems to mean an
individual that exists according to one world only, and I very much doubt that there are any such
individuals (214 n.)” However, it has become more or less standard terminology, see Lewis elsewhere,
e.g., (“Ramseyan Humility,” 211). I will continue to use the phrase ‘world-bound individual’ here, and
given that modal realism is a background assumption, ‘world-bound’ should reflect this meaning.
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means for individuals in standard counterpart theory, ‘world-boundness’ for properties
will depend on the nature of properties. This seems to be a point of departure from
individuals, since properties are typically thought to be constant across worlds—they
appear to pick out the same thing in every world, such that saying that something is
possibly red in the actual world means that there is a world in which an object has that
property, of being red as we mean the term here. In other words, it seems that redness
picks out the same property in all worlds, and is therefore a transworld property.
In addition, we might question whether the inconstancy of de re modal statements
about individuals has a corollary with respect to properties, such that ‘redness’ picks out
different properties in different contexts. These questions will be explored below.

3.3 Similarity among Properties
Recall that one of the main reasons that entities like properties and universals
have been posited is to explain and account for resemblance among objects. In chapter 1,
I adopted the suggestion that similarity be reduced to property sharing. Because this is an
appealing and plausible account of similarity generally, it would be beneficial if other
counterpart relations based on similarity (such as the property counterpart relation) were
compatible with this account.
A main goal of this section will be to see if this view can be supported given a
similarity based property counterpart theory, and in particular, one that includes the
assumption that properties are understood to be sets of possibilia. I will argue that this
understanding of similarity can also underlie a property counterpart relation, with slight
modifications.
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When it comes to individuals, similarity is easy to discuss, as we tend to have
pretty clear views on whether or not two individuals are similar. We know that
Humphrey could be similar to a winning candidate in terms of being a potential
presidential candidate, in terms of being a human, being a Democrat or many other
things. However, we do not have such clear views when it comes to similarity among
properties.153 In part, this may be because we do not compare properties as often or as
freely as we compare individuals, and are less familiar in general with the nature of
properties than we are with individuals.
Even if we make fewer property comparisons in everyday discourse, we do seem
to have insight into what makes for similarity among properties, as when we say that
redness is more similar to orangeness than it is to blueness, or that roundness and
triangularity are similar, but less similar than triangularity and rectangularity. We also
group together certain properties in terms of other properties that they share, such as
being natural, physical, gruesome, moral, intrinsic, qualitative, categorical, or
dispositional properties. We might claim that e.g., redness and blueness are similar in
terms of properties that they share (that they are both color properties; that their
instantiations come in various hues; that they are typically visible to human beings in the
actual world under normal conditions; etc.). Property comparisons are not entirely
unfamiliar.
We can also get a sense of property comparisons from the examples discussed in
the literature. According to Heller, for example, two properties are similar when they
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Heller acknowledges this difficulty and asks: “Is positive charge more similar to spin up than it is to
negative charge? (“Property Counterparts in Ersatz Worlds,” 301).”
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play the same causal and nomological roles. Ball considers commonalities such as being
compatible with similar laws of nature, or being sets with similar members. 154 In other
cases, we group together properties based on features like that they possess certain
conditional powers, as in the case of dispositional properties, or that they figure into the
fundamental structure of the world, as in the case of perfectly natural properties.
Because properties are sets of possibilia, it is important to keep this in mind when
discussing similarity among properties. One way to establish similarity between two sets
is for these sets to have some member (or members) in common. With respect to
properties, that is to say, two properties might be similar by having instantiations in
common. For example, the set of all red things and the set of all round things have some
instances in common, e.g., some particular red balloon. Considering an individual object
like the balloon, and two of the sets that it is a member of, we can establish similarity
between the two properties. In other words, the set of red things and the set of round
things are similar in that they share a red balloon as a member, and therefore, redness and
roundness are similar in this respect.
A related way to try to establish similarity between properties might be to
compare individual members of two sets, which is to say, to compare individual
instantiations of two properties. For example, the set of all red objects includes a stop
sign, and the set of all green objects contains a green traffic light. There are various
similarities between these two objects, (e.g., they are both traffic signals, are both
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Heller proposed relying on Ramsey sentences to describe the distribution of properties, which is
connected to his ‘linguistic ersatz’ theory of possible worlds. However, the comparison he makes between
property roles depend on things like which patterns of space time points they instantiate, and what their
relationships to various natural laws are. Ball makes similar suggestions. See Heller, “Property
Counterparts in Ersatz Worlds,” Ball, “Property Identities and Modal Arguments.”
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instantiated in the actual world, etc.), any of which might be used to establish that the set
of red objects and the set of green objects are similar (since they have members that are
also members of the set of actual objects, for example) and therefore that redness and
greenness are similar.

3.3.1 Sharing Higher Order Properties
These comparisons share an important feature: each of these options can be
described in terms of properties sharing further ‘higher order’ properties.155 While “firstorder” properties are only instantiated by individuals, “higher-order properties” are
instantiated by properties; they are properties of properties. For example, a first-order
property like being fragile can have a higher order property being a dispostional property
in common with other properties, like being poisonous. Likewise, first-order properties
like being positively charged and being two grams mass have in common that the secondorder property being a fundamental property. In each of these cases, it is possible to
describe similarity between properties in terms of properties sharing higher order
properties.
Taking similarity among properties in terms of higher order property sharing
provides a close approximation of the particular understanding of similarity we have been
using to compare individuals, and requires no additional primitive notions or entities to
explain similarity. In addition, it seems that however similarity is understood, it should
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I wish to acknowledge, but set aside, concerns regarding the existence of higher order properties. While
some (e.g., Bergmann, “Meaning and Existence,”) have denied that there is any need to posit higher order
properties, there is not space for further discussion here, beyond the preliminary remark that, given the
ontology being assumed here, higher order properties do not require further ontological commitments
beyond sets of possibilia that make up first order properties.
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be understood the same way regardless of the entities being compared. 156 Because this
view fits well with the other assumptions made so far, as well as with standard
counterpart theory, it is worth further consideration.

3.3.2 An Account of Similarity among Properties
Even if this is initially promising and closely related to similarity among
individuals, these methods of comparison could seem to be unsatisfying in terms of
establishing similarity among properties. Return to the property comparisons discussed
above. In the first example, it might seem somehow artificial to claim that redness and
roundness are similar to each other in virtue of the fact that some particular object
instantiates both properties. Regarding the second suggestion, we might worry that the
similarities between the stop sign and traffic light have little to do with the properties of
redness or greenness, but only to the common properties that the objects they instantiate
share as individuals. Given that many properties have infinite instantiations, two
extremely disparate properties are likely to have members with shared properties, making
this notion of similarity feel particularly weak. Other instances of higher order property
sharing seem to be even less useful. The potential for two properties to share extremely
gruesome higher order properties makes the problem clearer, as two properties can be
similar by sharing properties like those represented by infinite chains of disjunctive
higher order properties. Other higher order properties, like ‘being a property’ or maybe
‘being instantiated by something or other,’ will be shared by all properties and also fail to

156

Intuitively, it seems likely that however similarity is understood, it should be understood in the same
way whether it is applied to properties or to individuals. However, it could perhaps turn out that the
differences between the nature of properties and the nature of individuals could justify such a difference in
treatment. This is not explored here.
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establish meaningful similarity comparisons.157 In contrast, there are properties, like
being fundamental properties or being compatible with the same laws of nature, which
seem to establish useful respects of similarity.
One could respond to concerns about the usefulness of higher order property
sharing as a means of similarity comparison between properties by rejecting this method
of analyzing similarity in favor other alternatives. However, higher order property
sharing is intuitively plausible and worthy of further exploration. It may also allow us to
mirror the cohesive picture Lewis has developed with respect to standard counterpart
theory. Therefore, it is worth exploring other options.

3.3.2.1 Higher-order Naturalness?
One method of response is to draw a distinction among higher order properties
akin to the distinction between natural and non-natural first order properties. There are
prima facie reasons to support holding a distinction of this sort, since we need to be able
to pick out certain higher order properties and exclude others if we are to make useful
similarity comparisons among properties, and this method is successful when applied to
first order properties.
First, we can note that this is no different than in the case of individuals, who can
be similar in very broad and uninteresting respects, like being part of the same world as
each other, or being part of a world that has more than two objects in it.158 Similarly,
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Whether or not there are un-instantiated properties is not explored, but nothing in the current discussion
depends on this.
158
Again, there are similarity comparisons among individuals based on strange properties as well, as this
stems from the fact that properties are abundant, and so very different properties can play a role in
similarity comparisons. To use an example from Woodward; “If the only respect of resemblance you care
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even though the property of redness does not seem to have much to do with the property
of being a traffic signal, these two properties are related by many other higher order
properties, (including, being instantiated by a stop sign), which can be used to establish
similarity between them. If similarity among properties is explained in terms of higher
order property sharing, then the fact that higher order properties are abundant leads to
issues like those found when making similarity comparisons among individuals.
Properties can be similar in countless ways by sharing any number of properties, and
unless we have some way of distinguishing the useful respects of similarity from the
gruesome and gerrymandered, this way of establishing similarity seems fatally flawed.
This seems to support a distinction at the level of higher order properties similar
to the distinction between natural and non-natural properties. Although this distinction
could potentially resolve the abundance issue here, it needs to be carefully spelled out
and evaluated, and sufficient support must be provided.
First, recall that with respect to first order properties, naturalness in general is
derived from perfect naturalness. Although they are the most useful in establishing
similarity, perfectly natural properties are not defined by their usefulness in establishing
similarity—that is just one of the jobs that they can do. Instead, they can be distinguished
by the role that they play in establishing and defining the fundamental structure of reality.
There is a set number of these perfectly natural properties such that, taken together, they
specify the world completely and without redundancy.159 In other words, the perfectly

about is self-identity, you can say that I might have been a pure set (“Worldmates and Internal
Relatedness,” 424).”
159
See Lewis, “Ramseyan Humility.”
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natural properties form a minimal supervenience base for all else.160 Furthermore,
perfectly natural properties play a role in explanations of natural laws, causation, events,
mental content, supervenience, closeness of worlds, and world mates. When it comes to
perfectly natural properties, we can say much more about them than just that they are
useful for establishing respects of similarity. Therefore, we ought to consider whether or
not there are higher order perfectly natural properties, and if so, how they are
distinguished from other higher order properties. However, it may seem that higher order
perfect naturalness must be based on more than just that it is needed to establish
similarity. Although the fact that some properties are useful in this sense can go some
way towards establishing such a distinction, 161 there are additional reasons to support
perfect naturalness among higher order properties as well.
3.3.2.2 Higher Order Perfect Naturalness?
One possibility is to base a higher order distinction upon the first order
distinction. Given that first order imperfectly natural properties can be connected to
perfectly natural ones by chains of definability, we can attempt to apply a similar
concept, by working from first order natural properties (and what they have in common),
to less natural higher order properties. If higher order perfectly natural properties can be
160

According to Lewis, the perfectly natural properties and relations do not just characterize the world
completely, they also characterize it minimally: “there are only just enough of them to characterise things
completely and without redundancy (Lewis, Philosophical Papers: Volume II, 60).”
161
In her discussion of higher order perfectly natural relations, Maya Eddon makes the related claim that
there must be more to such a distinction than just its usefulness within a theory of quantities: “In a related
vein, one might be reticent to posit an objective distinction between natural second-order relations and
gerrymandered ones without evidence that such a distinction is required beyond an account of the structure
of quantity. After all, a more conservative explanation for why we’re inclined to posit such a distinction is
that some second-order relations are interesting or useful to us, and nothing more. If the distinction between
perfectly natural quantitative second-order relations and gerrymandered ones is not required to do any
philosophical work, then it seems unduly extravagant to claim that certain second-order relations are
metaphysically privileged (“Fundamental Properties of Fundamental Properties,” 15).” Because higher
order perfectly natural properties are able to support similarity comparisons, this might be sufficient to
justify the inclusion of such a distinction.
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distinguished based on their connection to first order perfectly natural properties, it might
be possible to define the imperfectly natural higher order out of these162.
One way this could work is by considering that first order perfectly natural
properties share many higher order properties, like being a fundamental property. It is
plausible that these higher order properties are themselves more natural than others, like
being a gruesome property. Properties like being perfectly natural could be used to
establish genuine similarity, given that all of the properties that fit within this set will
have important further respects of similarity in common, like ‘being the properties that
can form a minimal supervenience base,’ which help to distinguish them as perfectly
natural.163 This is due in part because the degree of specificity with respect to
fundamental properties is maximal. Although the details would need to be further
supplied, these types of higher order properties appear to be the most natural. If so, we
could use them to define less natural higher order properties.
If higher order naturalness can be grounded in first order naturalness, then even if
there are insufficient reasons to posit the distinction beyond its use in similarity
comparisons, it might still be a justified move since it would not require any additional
metaphysical machinery. There are additional considerations in favor of supporting such
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Another method might be to group together higher order and first order properties based on their degree
of naturalness. This might be more difficult given that imperfectly natural natural properties are not as well
explained, as discussed in Chapter 1.
163
Some respects of similarity among these fundamental properties, like ‘being of concern to philosophers’
are less important than others, like those that ground the fundamentality of these properties. This could
also correspond to the fact that some higher order properties are less natural than others. Certain similarity
comparisons seem to be tied to the naturalness of the properties in question as well. For example, given
that the distribution of fundamental properties determines things like laws and causation, two natural
properties might be similar in terms of the roles that they play in establishing these laws. Presumably, 3 g
mass plays a far different role than blueness, and a more similar role to 5 g mass. This could be used to
establish that natural properties are more similar to each other than to non-natural properties, and these
roles can be expressed in terms of higher order properties as well.
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a distinction as well. For example, Maya Eddon provides a strong argument for higher
order perfectly natural relations, based in part upon issues stemming from the structure of
quantitative properties and the need to make useful similarity comparisons between
them.164 Although she ultimately argues that including this distinction conflicts with the
possibility of a minimal supervenience base, her considerations open up potential avenues
of support for the distinction under consideration here, and provide further reasons why
certain higher order properties might be taken to be privileged over others, grounding the
claim that the distinction is based on more than just usefulness.165
So far, there are preliminary reasons for accepting a distinction of this type.
Assuming that these reasons can be strengthened, we can support perfectly natural higher
order properties, which will provide an explanation for why certain higher order
properties are more or less useful than others. In addition, this method fits with the above
considerations regarding comparisons between properties in terms of similarity between
sets. It is likely that none of the options considered there represent anything like higher
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Eddon argues that the fact that some first order quantitative properties are more similar to each other
than to others calls out for explanation, and one explanation is that some higher order properties are better
suited than others to establish similarity; e.g., and object a, having .001 grams mass, is more similar to an
object b, having .002 grams mass than it is to an object c, having 5000 metric tons of mass. Many metrics
can be used to make these similarity comparisons, and unless certain higher order properties and relations
are privileged in some way, there is no way to account for this. See Eddon (“Fundamental Properties of
Fundamental Properties,” 16).
165
As mentioned above, another option might be that higher order naturalness could be based off of first
order naturalness is such a way that there is no corollary to perfect naturalness, but still the chance to
support and distinguish more and less natural higher order properties based on their connection to first
order perfectly natural properties. This explanation has the added benefit of providing and explanation for
why and how the most perfect higher order natural properties fail to have other important features that first
order perfect naturalness does – e.g., why it cannot form a minimal supervenience base. In fact, it may
seem as if higher order perfect naturalness will have to be far weaker than first order perfect naturalness,
given the fact that higher order properties play a minimal role in establishing anything like fundamentality.
Even though a distinction is needed that goes beyond just what is useful, it might not be possible to get all
the way to a consideration of something like perfect naturalness among higher order properties. The idea is
that even if we cannot get perfect naturalness in a robust sense among higher order properties, the most
natural higher order properties can be distinguished based on their connection to first order perfectly natural
properties.
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order perfect naturalness, even though they may correspond to lesser degrees of
naturalness. This view can also explain why it is more obvious that two properties are
similar given that they are fundamental properties than that two properties are similar in
that they are properties instantiated by more than seventeen individuals.166
Without a notion like this, there are seemingly problematic cases of similarity
between properties, given that similarity between two properties is established by
properties sharing higher order properties, and sometimes these higher order properties
fail to correspond to any useful respect of similarity. For example, the property of
blueness and the property of greenness share the higher order property being instantiated
by blue or green things. With a notion like the current proposal in play, we can explain
this as well, given that being instantiated by blue or green things does not appear to be a
good candidate for a perfectly natural higher order property.
A question remains regarding how well a notion like higher order perfect
naturalness can fit within our overall project of supporting property counterpart theory.
Given that certain details (e.g., inconstancy, and whether or not properties can be worldbound) have been left open so far, these remarks are preliminary. However, it appears so
far that such a notion could work well in establishing a property counterpart relation.
3.4 Context and Inconstancy among Properties
The standard counterpart relation is a similarity relation, which allows the theory to
accommodate the inconstancy of de re modality. Similarity relations in general depend
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With regard to a specific property, like redness, it might be that higher order properties like being
instantiated in conditions where 650nm wavelengths of light are reflected are more natural than properties
like being instantiated by ripe tomatoes and canaries. It seems plausible that the first property is more
useful than the second in establishing similarity, and that it is directly tied to first order naturalness,
whereas the second is not.
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on context, even when making non-modal comparisons167, and so if the property
counterpart relation is a relation of similarity, it must include a role for context.
There are two related, but distinct questions to explore in this regard. The first is
a question of our modal discourse concerning properties, and whether or not it is
inconstant. Second, we can ask whether our proposed theory accurately reflects the
inconstancy168.
First, it is important to consider whether or not the inconstancy of de re modal
statements about individuals has a corollary with respect to properties. Does our modal
discourse suggest that we are flexible in our discussion of the modal properties of
properties? Do we sometimes focus on these aspects of properties, and other times those?
Does our speech seem to make certain properties important in some contexts, and others
in different contexts? For example, it seems possible that yellowness could’ve been
instantiated by more things, but does this hold true without regard to context? Or does
this vary depending on which properties of yellowness are made salient?
It seems plausible that just like claims about individuals, modal claims involving
properties are inconstant. For example, just as it might not be a context independent truth
that a red object is more similar to an orange object that is to a blue object, it might not be
a context independent fact that redness is always more similar to orangeness than it is to
blueness. Sometimes we might have other features of these colors in mind that make
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See, for example, Goodman, “Seven Strictures on Similarity,” and Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds,:
255. Goodman ultimately rejects that there is any genuine notion of similarity. The above comparison of
Earth and Venus is an example of a contextually shifting similarity relation between two individuals in the
same world. With respect to properties, we could note the way that properties like ‘3 grams mass’ and
‘green quark color’ are similar in that they are fundamental properties, but that these properties are
dissimilar in that only one is a mass property.
168
With respect to individuals, Lewis outlines ways that several views can accommodate inconstancy. He
argues that one view, modal realism with overlap, cannot.
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different comparisons relevant. For example, redness and blueness are more similar in
the sense that they are primary colors and therefore cannot be mixed or formed by some
other combination of colors, unlike orange. Two shades of blue might be less similar in
terms of hue, or chroma, or saturation, than a particular shade of blue and a particular
shade or red, etc. Context selects which aspects of similarity are relevant.
Above, I suggested that the aspects of similarity used in comparisons between
individuals could be properties, such that different properties are relevant to different
similarity comparisons. If this explanation holds, then applying it to comparisons
between properties would mean that context selects which properties of properties are
relevant. In other words, different higher order properties are made salient in different
contexts.169

3.4.1 Additional Concerns
There seem to be additional sources of inconstancy with respect to similarity
comparisons among properties. Since properties correspond to all sets of possibilia and
are therefore incredibly abundant, it seems that there are cases in which our language will
not pick out a specific property, but will be somewhat indeterminate between a range of
potential properties. For example, it is difficult to imagine that we can distinguish
between a property of blueness that includes all instantiations in all possible worlds, from
a property associated with blueness that includes all but one of these infinite
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This is only an attempt to provide a further explanation of how contextual selection might function, in
line with the current background assumptions. There may be other potential explanations for how this
takes place, but this is not explored here. The view proposed at the end of this chapter includes the idea
that inconstancy applies to discourse about properties, and that this is reflected by a context-sensitive
similarity relation, but as long as this notion is accommodated, it is not necessary to rely on any particular
method of accounting for contextual selection.
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instantiations of blue, other than by stipulation. Of course, discussing the de re modal
properties of a property means looking at the modal properties of particular properties.170
However, this imprecision with respect to property terms carries over to our discussion of
de re modal properties, given that not only will different contexts make different higher
order properties relevant, but the same term in different contexts can select entirely
different properties. 171 Therefore, we must be cautious when evaluating claims involving
property terms to ensure that our intuitions are meant to reflect the relevant property. I
will return to this consideration briefly below, in responding to concerns affecting the
current understanding of properties.
Returning to the example of blueness, we can note that it is possible to refer to
any number of properties—to a particular set of blue things corresponding to a particular
shade of blue a specific wavelength of light, to objects in worlds like ours or as viewed
by beings like us, or to a general property meant to encompasses the blue things from all
possible worlds. Here, it is not just that we are focusing on some aspects of a particular
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See the discussion of the de dicto/de re distinction in Chapter 1.
Although the situation appears to be far better in the case of individuals, there are issues there as well.
For example, consider “The Problem of the Many,” here discussed by Lewis: “Think of a cloud—just one
cloud, and around it a clear blue sky. Seen from the ground, the cloud may seem to have a sharp boundary.
Not so. The cloud is a swarm of water droplets. At the outskirts of the cloud, the density of the droplets
falls off. Eventually they are so few and far between that we may hesitate to say that the outlying droplets
are still part of the cloud at all; perhaps we might better say only that they are near the cloud. But the
transition is gradual. Many surfaces are equally good candidates to be the boundary of the cloud. Therefore
many aggregates of droplets, some more inclusive and some less inclusive (and some inclusive in different
ways than others), are equally good candidates to be the cloud. Since they have equal claim, how can we
say that the cloud is one of these aggregates rather than another? But if all of them count as clouds, then we
have many clouds rather than one. And if none of them count, each one being ruled out because of the
competition from the others, then we have no cloud. How is it, then, that we have just one cloud? And yet
we do (Lewis “Many, but almost one,” 164).” There are other potential issues in distinguishing individuals
from one another as well; e.g., issues of identity over time. These issues might affect the ease with which
we refer to any particular individual. Therefore, this is not an issue unique to properties.
171
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property as relevant, but are instead selecting a different set of individuals altogether, and
therefore, a different property altogether.172
These complications seem to be exaggerated in the case of properties, perhaps
because of the sheer abundance of properties, but inconstancy is a multi-faceted
phenomenon for properties and individuals alike. It seems that there is inconstancy based
on picking out different properties in different contexts as well as in picking out distinct
possibilities for the same property.

3.4.2 Inconstancy and Perfectly Natural Properties
Whether this inconstancy applies to perfectly natural properties is a further
question. For example, it appears to be a fixed and constant matter which properties are
fundamental. Does this mean that a fundamental property cannot possibly have been
otherwise, such that fundamental properties essentially fundamental? Does it make sense
to say that a natural property might not have been a natural property? And in addition,
does the degree of naturalness vary with context?
Because perfect naturalness does not vary from world to world,173 this might seem
to eliminate any role for inconstancy. However, as with non-perfectly natural properties,
it appears that our intuitions with respect to what is possible for fundamental properties is
inconstant. Whether or not some property is necessarily perfectly natural might depend
172

Sometimes, it might not be clear which particular property is meant, especially since two properties,
perhaps with infinite members, can differ by a single instantiation. This might yield distinct properties that
our language is not precise enough to differentiate. Presumably, we can stipulate that a particular property
is meant, or accept that there will be some property corresponding to that claim, even we cannot precisely
specify which one. Similar concerns will crop up below in consideration of world-boundness applied to
properties as well, since ‘blueness’ seems to refer to a set of world-bound instantiations in some contexts,
and a set of instantiations from multiple worlds in others, which suggests that both notions must be
included in one’s theory. This will be explored below.
173
See Lewis, e.g., On the Plurality of Worlds, 60.
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upon context. For example, if a context is selected that focuses on particular aspects of
that property that are relevant to naturalness, (e.g., being joint carving) then we might say
that there is no way that it could have been a non-natural property. But if we focus on the
fact that it is instantiated by some particular number of things, we might say it could have
been non-natural given that there are non-natural properties with 897 members that are its
counterparts. 174 Inconstancy would provide an explanation for these otherwise
inconsistent claims.175 It seems that the current view can accommodate the inconstancy
of de re modality, by modeling what takes place with individuals.

3.5 World-bound Properties
So far, it has been possible to model the elements of property counterpart theory
directly on those for standard counterpart theory for individuals. The next element to
consider is the world-bound condition. Standard counterpart theory holds that individuals
exist in only one world, and are represented at others by counterparts. The idea that
individuals might be world-bound has long been considered to be a worthy option.176 In

174

Given that our de re modal discourse tends to be a vague and inconstant matter in general, inconstancy
among natural properties might be expected. However, this is tied into issues not considered here, for e.g.,
quidditism, and the details about the essential properties of properties. This need not be settled here, but it
is a benefit that the property counterpart view arrived at here will be able to accommodate either intuition.
175
Imperfect naturalness also appears to be inconstant. While it is important to ensure that naturalness is
not merely equated with usefulness, the point is that considerations of naturalness might be made within a
context, such that in some cases, degrees of naturalness correspond to these features of properties, and in
others, to those features. For example, in some circumstances, blueness would be more natural than
roundness, and in others, less natural, depending on what is relevant.
176

The idea of individuals being bound to a particular world is often thought to have its roots in Leibniz’s
philosophy, for example Discourse on Metaphysics (1686). E.g., Elisabeta Sarca quotes Leibniz as follows:
“I have said that all human events can be deduced not simply by assuming the creation of a vague
Adam, but by assuming the creation of an Adam determined with respect to all these
circumstances, chosen from among an infinity of possible Adams. […] [B]ut when speaking of
several Adams, I was not taking Adam as a determinate individual. […] [W]hen one calls Adam
the person to whom these predicates are attributed, all this is not sufficient to determine the
78

contrast, properties (and especially universals) are usually conceived of as transworld
entities, and taking properties to be world-bound is somewhat unfamiliar.177 This is due
in part to their use as the markers of similarity both in general and across worlds, which
seems to require properties to be identical from world to world.
Despite the tradition to consider properties as transworld entities, several
philosophers have found reason to put forth or discuss world-bound property counterpart
views.178 Derek Ball suggests that a property counterpart view that relies on world-bound
properties can overcome certain metaphysical puzzles, especially with respect to
arguments against physicalism. Mark Heller’s property counterpart theory also includes
the claim that properties are world-bound. Heller’s view is based on an ersatz
understanding of possible worlds, and property counterpart theory is suggested as a way
to overcome various objections to that view. Although his property counterpart views is
not considered from within a modal realist background, on his view, properties are
equivalent to world-bound entities.179

individual, for there can be an infinity of Adams, that is, an infinity of possible persons, different
from one another, whom this fits.”
Sarca continues: “This description is very similar to David Lewis’ notion of an individual’s counterparts in
other possible worlds. (Sarca, “Leibniz and Kripke on Trans-World Identity,” 75).” However, see Cover
and Hawthorne, “Leibniz on Superessentialism,” for an argument in opposition to this view.
177
In Ramseyan Humility, Lewis outlines a potential world-bound property counterpart theory, and
concludes that there are few reasons to support such a view it other than to uphold identity of structurally
indiscernible worlds, (where structurally indiscernible means that the worlds differ just by permutation or
replacement of properties); or to reject humility, which he thinks unnecessary. In the same article, Lewis
notes that just as we find it unproblematic to think of properties as being located in different spatiotemporal
locations, it is unproblematic to think of properties as being located in different possible worlds. See Lewis
“Ramseyan Humility,” 210-211.
178
See, for example, Ball, “Property Identities and Modal Arguments,” Ehring, “Property Counterparts,”
and Heller “Property Counterparts in Ersatz Worlds,” “Transworld Identity for the Ersatzist,” For
additional discussion, see: Dorr, “Propositions and Counterpart Theory,” Egan, Egan “Second-order
Predication,” Guigon “The Metaphysics of Resemblance,” Coextension and Identity,”, “Quidditism and the
Resemblance of Properties.”
179
Although his is not an example of a property counterpart view, it is worth mentioning that Sider’s
temporal counterpart theory includes ‘instantaneous’ temporal parts, which appear to be analogous to
world-bound parts: x is an instantaneous temporal part of y at an instant t =df (i) x exists at, but only at, t,
(ii) x is part of y at t; and (iii) x overlaps at t everything that is part of y at t. (Four Dimensionalism, 60).
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In addition, there seem to be instances in which transworld properties are
insufficient for our purposes, suggesting the need for a world-bound notion. Although
there are several issues facing a world-bound property counterpart theory given the
parameters defined so far, I will suggest that with a few modifications yield an intuitively
promising view, based on inclusion of transworld as well as world-bound properties.
This is a departure from a view that directly mirrors standard counterpart theory, but I
think it is the most reasonable way to compromise while maintaining other attractive
assumptions.

3.5.1 Background Assumptions
Before discussing world-bound properties and their potential to fit within the
property counterpart view being developed, I would like to briefly review some of the
assumptions underlying the view thus far. I am assuming that properties are sets of
possibilia, and that they are abundant. Similarity among individuals and among
properties has been explained in terms of property sharing, and I have suggested that the
primitive distinction between natural and non-natural properties could be extended in
order to include higher order properties. Additional assumptions are that de re modality
is inconstant, and that this extends to include our discourse involving properties as well.
I find each of these assumptions to be independently plausible, and since I am attempting
to extend Lewisian counterpart theory in particular, I have tried to maintain the
assumptions that fit with this view. However, any of these assumptions might be rejected
in favor of other views. For example, as suggested above, we could instead employ a
different notion of properties. This would yield a property counterpart theory distinct
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from what I sketch here. Nevertheless, the property counterpart view ultimately
supported within this chapter stems from these assumptions, and is taken to be
compatible with all of these.

3.5.1.2 Goals
Given these assumptions, my goal is to formulate a property counterpart theory
that makes intuitive sense and can also accommodate several additional intuitions that I
take to be important, while avoiding some issues effecting the assumptions undertaken
here. These issues stem from the attempt to restrict properties to world-bound entities,
which I will ultimately reject. First, with respect to the assumption that properties are
sets of individuals, a new version of an old worry about co-extensive properties arises.
Second, intuitions like that Humphrey’s counterpart wins in w2 seem to require one and
the same property being shared across worlds, and these intuitions need to be
accommodated. Third, the claim that properties are world-bound interferes with the
current proposal for similarity. In addition, I will argue that intuitive examples of
properties are ruled out by this restriction, and that therefore, properties are not abundant.
Because of this, I will argue that properties cannot be taken to be only world-bound
entities.
In response, I will outline a property counterpart view that avoids these problems
while still accommodating the desired assumptions. First, it will be necessary to layout
specific details regarding what is meant by ‘world-bound’ as it applies to properties.
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3.5.2 Defining World-bound Properties
According to Heller’s property counterpart theory, other possible worlds are
Ramsey sentences describing all the possible distributions of properties, and being
‘world-bound’ means that no property is represented by more than one world.180
Considering views like Heller’s property counterpart theory, it is clear that what is meant
by world-bound will depend upon one’s background metaphysics and understanding of
properties, and it is challenging to provide a neutral definition.181 Some philosophers
have opted to rely directly upon the definition of world-bound as applied to individuals.
For example, Ball describes world-bound properties by stating that: “redness, for
example, exists only at this world, and is represented by counterparts at other worlds.”182
Similarly, Lewis notes that for a property to be world-bound would mean that no property
is ever instantiated in two different worlds.183
Although these definitions stem directly from definitions of world-bound
individuals, without further detail, it is not clear how to apply them to a property
counterpart theory. Obviously, properties and individuals are distinct types of entities,
and this affects the plausibility of relying on a direct analogy to world bound individuals.
While it is clear what it means for some particular individual to exist at some world, it is
less clear what it means for some particular property (rather than, some instantiation(s) of
a property) to exist at a world. So far, I have relied upon Lewis’s framework, according

This is a technique used to replace the theoretical terms of one’s theory with variables. See Ramsey,
“Theories;” Carnap , “The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts;” Lewis “How to Define
Theoretical Terms,” and “Ramseyan Humility;” and Heller “Property Counterparts in Ersatz Worlds.”
181
Douglas Ehring also discusses the possibility of rejecting transworld trope identity in his counterpart
theory for natural class tropes. There, he rejects modal realism and instead considers this view given a
combinatorial modal background as well as an ersatzist approach like Heller’s. See Ehring, “Property
Counterparts and Natural Class Trope Nominalism.”
182
Ball, “Property Identities and Modal Arguments,” 8.
183
“Ramseyan Humility,” 211.
180
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to which properties are sets of possibilia, and so a world-bound understanding of
properties will be a world-bound understanding of these sets. However, it is not clear
that definitions of ‘world-bound’ for individuals can be applied to sets in any
straightforward way. One could question whether these sets exist in worlds, as parts of
worlds, or whether distinctions like these fail to apply to sets.

3.5.3 Properties as Sets
Consider the property being yellow. So far, we have taken this to be the set of all
possible and actual yellow objects from this and every other possible world. This set of
objects is not part of any single world, and does not vary from world to world, since
which things are in this set does not depend upon which world is being considered.
Different worlds will contribute different members of the set, but the property of
yellowness is the entire set of yellow objects from all worlds. Therefore, to say that
yellowness, exists “only at this world” seems to be contradictory. Lewis explicitly
denies that sets (and properties) are parts of worlds, in his postscript to Counterpart
Theory and Quantified Modal Logic:
“Finally, there are the non-individuals: the sets. Provisionally, my
ontology consists of iterative set theory with individuals; the only
unorthodox part is my view about what individuals there are. I take it
that the part-whole relation applies to individuals, not sets. Then no set
is in any world in the sense of being a part of it. Numbers, properties,
propositions, events---all these are sets, and not in any world. Numbers
et al. are no more located in logical space than they are in ordinary time
and space. Even a sequence of possible individuals all from the same
world is not, strictly speaking, itself in that world.” (Philosophical
Papers: Volume I, 40, emphasis added).

83

That is to say that no set (and therefore, no property) is part of any world; and no set is in
any world. 184 These ‘non-individuals’ must be handled in a way that is distinct from the
treatment of individuals, and therefore, it seems that notions like ‘world-bound’ must be
modified in order to apply to properties. Definitions like these do not seem suitable for
properties as sets, and it might be that in general, properties so understood do not fit well
with such a distinction.185. However, I will suggest one option that I take to be plausible.

3.5.3.1 World-bound Properties as Sets
Even though a property (as a set of possibilia) has the same members regardless
of what world is being considered, perhaps world-bound properties can be captured by
considering the ways that worlds can differ with respect to how and what they contribute
to a property. There are many ways distinct worlds can differ in what they contribute to a
property; some may add many members, others, none at all; the overall portion of objects
in that world that are members of a set will vary; there can be different types of
individuals selected, and different proportions of world-members contributed to a set.

Note that Lewis explicitly sets aside universals: “I’m not sure what to say about universals, as advocated
in D. M. Armstrong, Universals and Scientific Realism, except for this: they are not to be confused with the
sets of individuals that I call properties. If there are universals, they differ in many ways from properties
and they meet completely different theoretical needs (Philosophical Papers: Volume I, 40 n.).” Because
perfectly natural properties correspond to universals in some ways, this might suggest that they require a
different treatment as well. However, recall that in On the Plurality of Worlds, Lewis suggests that this is a
distinction between things of the same type, such that there are only sets of possibilia, and then a primitive
distinction among them such that some are fundamental and others are not. This would suggest that all
properties, whether abundant or fundamental, are sets. That is the assumption here, however, given the
property counterpart theory suggested at the end, there are additional resources and therefore, they might be
able to be accommodated even if other proposals are adopted. In addition, the considerations below appear
to rule out a clean division between world-bound and transworld properties on the basis of the distinction
between natural and non-natural properties.
185
Ball appears to be relying on a Lewisian notion of properties: “So far, we have generally taken for
granted Lewis's class nominalism, according to which properties are classes of actual (and, on Lewis's
version, possible) entities. (“Property Identities and Modal Arguments,” 14).” However, he also discusses
Lewis’s suggestion that there can be different properties suited for different roles, and so that response
might apply here as well. (See section 3.4 below and On the Plurality of Worlds, 55).
184
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If we focus on the aspects of properties that vary from world to world, these
features can provide a sense of ‘world-bound’ for properties as sets, as these facts are a
function of which particular world is being considered, and are more or less equivalent to
the ‘world-bound parts’ of the whole set. For example, call ‘yellowness@’ the worldbound property of being yellow at the actual world, and ‘yellownessw2’ the equivalent
world-bound property at another world, w2. Yellowness@ is instantiated by lemons,
canaries and daffodils, and yellownessw2 by pigs, clouds and pomegranates. If we can
establish that these two world-bound properties are counterparts, then we could then say
that e.g., yellowness@ could have been instantiated by pigs, since that is a property that
its counterpart has (in other words, yellowness@ could have had different properties than
it actually has).186 This is in line with the above considerations regarding similarity, and
so it seems that this method could support a similarity-based world-bound property
counterpart theory, and one that relies on a notion of properties as sets.
3.5.4 Evaluating this Proposal
Unfortunately, there are a few issues with this proposal, including a problem
based specifically on the assumption that properties can be sets of possibilia.
3.5.4.1 Coextensive Properties
As noted in chapter one, a traditional issue raised against the understanding of
properties as sets of actual individuals is that co-extensive sets of objects are identical
properties, and this sometimes yields counter-intuitive results. For example, the property

186

While we are typically interested in the modal properties of the transworld property of yellowness, and
not yellowness@, this is one straightforward example of how to use these worldbound counterparts within
property counterpart theory. Below, I discuss ways that property counterpart theory can accommodate
transworld properties as well.
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of having a heart is the set of all things that have a heart.187 But all creatures with hearts
(or ‘cordates’) in the actual world, are also creatures with kidneys (or ‘renates’).
Therefore, the property of being a cordate has the same members as the property of being
a renate. Since the same set of objects makes up ‘each’ of these properties, they are
identical on this view, even though they seem to be distinct properties.
Lewis avoids this issue by including otherworldly objects in his sets—since not
every possible cordate is also a renate, these sets have some distinct members, and
therefore are distinct properties188. However, with world-bound sets of properties, it
seems that the co-extension problem returns, given that all ‘cordate@’s will be ‘renate@’s
as well. There are some suggestions as to how to resolve the issue, including the property
counterpart view discussed below.189 Although this problem can be avoided by denying
that properties are sets, other issues seem to plague world-bound notions of properties
more generally.190
3.5.4.2 Intuitive Concerns
There are cases in which the notion that properties might be world-bound is at
odds with our intuitions about modal claims involving properties. Although a property

187

This example of the co-extension problem comes from a case discussed by e.g., Quine, “Two Dogmas
of Empiricism,” and Philosophy of Logic.
188
There are instances in which two seemingly distinct properties have the same extension in all worlds;
e.g., triangularity and trilaterality. Lewis proposes that even if this view of properties cannot overcome this
issue, there might be another notion that does. He gives some reasons why it would be acceptable to rely
on different notions of properties for different purposes. (See Lewis On the Plurality of Worlds, 55, also
discussed below). Also, the property counterpart theory presented in this chapter provides additional
flexibility that might be able to accommodate this issue, but this is not explored further here.
189
Other responses, include a property counterpart theory for ersatz worlds, as discussed by Heller (e.g.,
“Property Counterparts in Ersatz Worlds.”). See also Ball, “Property Identities and Modal Arguments,” 9;
as well as Ehring (“Property Counterparts”) and Guigon (“The Metaphysics of Resemblance,”
“Coextension and Identity.”).
190
Although these problems could be avoided by alternative views of properties, this is an attractive
account, especially if one is working from within a Lewisian ontology that includes possibilia and sets.
Fortunately, both of these issues can be explained by relying upon a property counterpart view like the
theory ultimately suggested at the end of this chapter
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counterpart relation provides additional resources for accommodating these intuitions, we
are still left with some unfavorable results if properties are taken to be world-bound
entities. Consider again the property of yellowness, which we might have thought was a
transworld property, spread across worlds such that the yellow things in the actual world
share this same property with the yellow things in other worlds.191 Instead, this is to be a
world-bound property not shared among individuals in distinct worlds.
In many contexts, world-bound sets seem to be sufficient to represent yellowness.
Consider the claim yellowness might have been instantiated by more things. If we mean
a property like actual world bound yellowness, world-bound sets are sufficient to
determine the truth of the claim. However, if instead we mean a more general property
that includes everything that is yellow from all possible worlds, then this claim depends
upon the transworld property corresponding to the entire set of yellow objects from all
possible worlds. 192

191

Note that calling this property ‘transworld’ is not entirely accurate. Typically, transworld objects can
exist in multiple worlds, and are identical across worlds. Taking properties to be sets of possibilia
complicates this explanation, as discussed above. It is more accurate to say that a property has parts (or
instantiations) in different worlds. For example, see Lewis: “A property [. . .] is spread around. The
property of being a donkey is partly present wherever there is a donkey, in this or any other world. Far
from the property being part of the donkey, it is closer to the truth to say that the donkey is part of the
property. But the precise truth, rather, is that the donkey is a member of the property (Papers in
Metaphysics and Epistemology, 10 – 11).” In this discussion, ‘transworld’ can be taken to mean
‘instantiated in more than one world.’ Alternatively, given that properties are understood in terms of sets of
possibilia, ‘having members in more than one world’ also establishes this notion.
192
A property counterpart theory could provide a translation of this claim, such that some world-bound
yellowness has a counterpart property that has more members, but it is not clear that this is sufficient to
distinguish between these properties. The world-bound and transworld notion appear to be distinct, as can
be seen by the fact that the first seems to be true, while the second comes out false, given the current view
of properties as sets. Even if property counterpart theory can provide a paraphrase, there are less resources
than are needed to distinguish between these claims. The objection is that there are two distinct properties,
(as can be seen by the fact that substituting one for the other makes the sentence change its truth value), and
world-bound counterpart theory can only accommodate one of them. Not that there is an objection to the
view that properties are sets based on the fact that claims like this one come out false. This will be
discussed briefly at the end.
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There seem to be many different properties that we can refer to by ‘yellow’, and
world-bound properties can account for some but not all of them.193 Other examples, like
yellowness-in-this-and-all-nearby-worlds, or positive-charge-in-worlds-with-the-samelaws-of-nature will be ruled out as well. Although there are transworld sets
corresponding to these entities, they are not properties and will not figure into our de re
modal claims.
There are other claims that rely on transworld properties as well. For example,
‘alien properties’ are fundamental properties that are not instantiated in the actual
world.194 Like all properties, on the current view, alien properties must be world-bound.
However, on this view, every fundamental property that is instantiated in a world other
than this one will be alien. Intuitively, some, but not all otherworldly fundamental
properties are alien properties, but this view does not distinguish alien fundamental
properties from any of the other fundamental properties that have instantiations in other
worlds. It’s not clear what the best way to translate this into world-bound counterpart
theory would be, but perhaps these could be taken to be fundamental properties that are
not instantiated in the closest worlds, or by considering fundamental properties that are
very dissimilar to the properties in the actual world, or perhaps fundamental properties in
other possible worlds that do not have counterparts in the actual world.195 The question
193

Of course, not all property terms are equally vague, and even when they are vague, we can stipulate, or
otherwise specify, that we mean to pick out a particular property. The point here is that there are many
properties, and sometimes our terminology is ambiguous. What is important for the current argument is that
some properties correspond to world-bound sets, others to sets with members in multiple worlds. As
discussed above, this vagueness can be made clear by considered two properties, each with infinite number
of members, such that they are identical except for one single member. Other than by stipulation, it seems
likely that our language is too coarse grained to distinguish between properties like these. Nevertheless, we
should in principle be able to account for them.
194
See, for example, Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, Section 3.2.
195
Note that in order to compare ‘fundamental’ properties across worlds, it seems that this would need to
have the same meaning across worlds, or be a transworld property. Since it is a property of properties,
perhaps this is acceptable even given a world-bound property counterpart theory.
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of whether any of these options can provide a translation that captures the intuitive notion
of alien property remains. In addition, Lewis’s definitions of duplication, intrinsic
properties, and closeness of worlds rely on transworld properties as well, and would
require similar translations.196

3.5.4.3 A ‘Humphrey’ Objection
Along the same lines, we might question whether our intuitions are captured
regarding the possibility that actual properties are instantiated in other worlds. For any
property instantiated in the actual world, there is no other world where that exact
property is instantiated. For example, the current view cannot allow for there to be
anything in any other world that has the property being human. This means that no
otherworldly humans are possible, even though there are otherworldly beings who
instantiate properties very similar to being human.
This objection might sound familiar, as it is very similar to Kripke’s ‘Humphrey’
Objection to standard counterpart theory, discussed briefly in Chapter 1. The above
concerns seem to depend upon our intuitions about how properties should be understood,
and the claim that world-bound properties fail to accommodate these intuitions.
Similarly, Kripke objected that the understanding of “Humphrey possibly wins the
election” provided by counterpart theory fails to capture our intuitions. It seems that

“We can say that two things are duplicates if and only if (1) they have exactly the same perfectly natural
properties, and (2) their parts can be put to correspondence in such a way that corresponding parts have
exactly the same natural properties, and stand in the same perfectly natural relations. (The class might be
redundant). Then we can go on to say that intrinsic property is one that can never differ between two
duplicates (On the Plurality of Worlds, 61).” See also 20-27. Although these terms could perhaps be
explained in terms of counterparts as well, it seems unintuitive to accept that, e.g., duplicates would no
longer share the same properties, but only similar ones, and this might even conflate scenarios involving
duplicates, rather than merely similar counterparts.
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Kripke’s objection has been adequately answered, and to some extent, a similar response
is available here. For example, cases involving the ‘transworld’ properties considered
above can be translated by property counterpart theory, and the property counterpart
theorist can reply that this just is what it means for a property to be alien on this view.
While I am not convinced that this is plausible, given that, e.g., it seems less than obvious
that this can capture claims about, e.g., duplication as opposed to extreme similarity,
there are additional concerns with respect to property counterpart theory in particular.
The original objection included the claim that Humphrey might not care that
someone similar to him has the property of winning, which was supposed to show that
this could not be the correct analysis of the claim. In response to the original objection,
one could say that while it is true that Humphrey might not care about this, this fact can
be adequately explained, e.g., given that Humphrey might care about something under
one description, and yet not care about that same thing under another description.197
However, given property counterpart theory, Humphrey would have cause for more
serious concern. Not only is it someone other than Humphrey who wins the election, in
this case, his counterpart does not even win, but instead does something like winning. It
seems that possibly doing something like winning does not capture what is meant by
‘possibly winning’ any more than actually doing something like winning captures what is
meant by ‘winning.’ In this case, it seems to be more than just a paradox of analysis. In
general, if properties are world bound, and represent different things in different worlds,

197

See, for example, Sider, “Beyond the Humphrey Objection,” and Chapter 1 above.
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then cross-world comparisons are less than straightforward, and there are reasons to think
that they cannot capture our intuitions. 198
Another problem is that world-bound property counterpart theory seems to affect
the plausibility of standard counterpart theory as well. Standard counterpart theory relies
upon transworld similarity comparisons, and without shared properties, it is difficult to
make such comparisons. 199 The main issue with a world-bound understanding of
properties so far is the seeming inability to account for transworld similarity relations, in
particular, when they are understood in terms of transworld property sharing.
Although this is an intuitive notion of similarity, it is not the only option. For
example, similarity could be taken to be a primitive unanalyzable notion. As suggested
above, there are some potential problems with this option e.g., the addition of another
primitive notion among our ontological commitments, and concerns related to the ability
for a primitive similarity relation to include contextual variation, and therefore, to reflect
inconstancy. A different option might be to adopt structural universals like Armstrong’s,
according to which similarity can be reduced to sharing of parts.200 Although this is a
plausible account, it would require accepting additional abstract entities and may be

This problem can be raised in respect to other claims as well. For example, the meaning of ‘Humphrey
is essentially human’ will no longer be analyzed in terms of whether or not all of Humphrey’s counterparts
in the given context are human. Instead, it will be based on whether or not all of his counterparts have
properties that are similar to being human (perhaps, have the most similar property to ‘humanness’ in their
worlds). This highlights the depth of the concern. It appears to be more than just an issue of complexity,
given that there is a sense in which ‘essentially human’ is lost on this account.
199
Notice that it is not only that Humphrey’s otherworldly counterpart does not instantiate the property of
winning that is problematic. In order to establish that Humphrey and his counterpart are counterparts, the
current proposal is to find properties that they share. However, two world-bound individuals from distinct
worlds will never share properties. There are a few ways to respond: 1) to reject this notion of similarity
in favor of a notion not based on property sharing (see comments below), 2) to reject the idea that wordbound individuals can have counterparts in other worlds (which would severely limit the usefulness of
counterpart theory for individuals and would be at odds with our intuitions about modality), 3) to reject
property counterpart theory, and/ or 4) to include a transworld notion. I opt for the last of these
suggestions.
200
See Armstrong, Universals:.
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rejected on other grounds as well.201 While this could lead to a rejection of the proposed
view of similarity instead, there are other options available that can accommodate this
view in combination with a counterpart theory for properties, as explored below.
Therefore, it is not necessary to reject this notion of similarity.
The goal of this section has been to explore the limits of a view based on a
number of plausible assumptions. So far, it seems that the least plausible component is a
condition for world-boundness, and if that is rejected, all other elements can remain,
including the proposed understanding of similarity. To some extent, the strength of these
objections depends upon the strength of the intuition that properties must be transworld
entities. The final objection considered depends less upon that intuition, and more upon
the notion that properties are abundant.

3.5.4.4 Abundance Lost
A final issue that plagues the view that properties are world-bound is tied into
many of the concerns discussed above. It appears that a world-bound notion of properties
eliminates some examples of (what appear to be) properties, and that it does so without
sufficient justification. Although a world-bound property counterpart theory has some
resources to explain away the apparent need for the transworld properties, given the depth
of the issue, the view becomes less intuitive and more unfavorable. In contrast, the
assumption that properties are abundant is highly plausible and well-supported, and
therefore, it should be maintained if possible.

201

See Lewis “Against Structural Universals.” See also, Armstrong “ In Defence of Structural Universals.”
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Given the background assumptions undertaken here, there are sets corresponding
to every possible combination of individuals, and properties corresponding to these sets.
However, if properties are world-bound, then sets of possibilia with instantiations from
more than one world are ruled out, and there are far fewer properties than originally
suggested.202 Restricting properties to only the world-bound appears to be an arbitrary
decision, as there are no obvious ways to draw a line between some of these sets (the
properties) and others that selects only the world-bound ones as genuine properties.
First, modal realism and set theory have been assumed, and therefore, abundant
properties come at no extra cost. There is no benefit to getting rid of transworld
properties in terms of reducing ontological commitment, since there will still be an
uncountably infinite number of world-bound properties. Therefore, this is no reason to
rule out transworld properties. In addition, as noted above, certain objections raised with
respect to individuals do not apply to properties.203
Instead, it might seem that one of the many distinctions between properties could
underlie this division. However, they do not seem to line up with transworld and worldbound properties. Relying on only sparse properties (or only abundant properties), for
example, will not support the decision to rule out transworld properties. The
sparse/abundant distinction does not correspond to the distinction between transworld and
world-bound properties, since there are both abundant properties and sparse properties
that have instantiations in single worlds and others that are instantiated in multiple
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An obvious response would be to rule out the view that properties are sets of possibilia. However, the
view put forth at the end of this can incorporate this assumption without succumbing to this problems
discussed, and other views need to account for transworld properties as well.
203
For example, the problem of accidental intrinsics is not an issue, given that transworld bilocation of
properties is innocuous (“Ramseyan Humility,” 211). See also Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds.
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worlds.204 In addition, we might agree with Lewis that we have a role for both the
abundant and the sparse properties, in which case, we have reason to reject this attempt
even if it could provide a way to rule out transworld properties.205 It will not help to rely
on the distinction between first order and higher order properties either, for similar
reasons; there are first order and higher order properties with instantiations in single
worlds and multiple worlds.206
Transworld properties cannot be ruled out on grounds of spatiotemporal or causal
disconnection, either, since that would also rule out certain plausible examples of worldbound properties, e.g., properties with no such connections between each member seem
possible.
There are no other obvious distinctions which can support the rejection of
transworld properties. In addition, it seems that an argument parallel to the argument
from vagueness could be raised here. In this case, one could ask “under what conditions
does a set of possibilia correspond to a property?” As it stands, a response of,
‘sometimes’ must be rejected given that there seem to be no reasons to draw the lines at
any particular point.207 It looks like to the extent that any sets of possibilia correspond to

For example, a non-perfectly natural property like ‘being instantiated by a transworld sum’ is not a
world-bound property, but other non-natural properties, like ‘being a world-bound fusion of a cat and a
dog’ are world-bound. Given that fundamental properties are meant to correspond to universals, it might
seem like they are good candidates for strictly transworld properties, but there is no reason to rule out
world-bound fundamental properties either.
205
See Lewis, “Ramseyan Humility,”
206
For example, ‘being an actual fundamental property’ is a world-bound higher order property, while
‘being instantiated in more than three worlds’ is instantiated in multiple worlds.
207
One distinction that seems to more favorably line up with world-bound properties is the contrast
between dispositional and categorical properties. Because they seem to be dependent upon the particular
facts and laws of the world where they are instantiated, perhaps they could be taken to be examples of
world-bound properties. (E.g., the fact that a glass has the dispositional property of fragility may seem to
be dependent upon the physical facts of the world). Assuming that these physical facts and natural laws are
not necessary, these properties would correspond to world-bound properties. However, this will not ground
the distinction between transworld and world-bound properties for a few reasons. First, the status of
dispositional properties is somewhat controversial. For example, some have argued that dispositional
204
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properties, they all do. This argument leaves open the choice to reject the current
suggestion to take properties as sets of possibilia, or to rule out the view that world-bound
properties are by themselves sufficient for our purposes. Given the concerns raised for
exclusively world-bound properties, this appears to be the best option. However, it is
important to note that the suggestion that properties are abundant will require inclusion of
both transworld and world-bound sets. This leads to a hybrid property counterpart
theory.

3.5.5 Modified Property Counterpart Theory
Although world-bound properties alone do not appear to be sufficient for our
purposes, a property counterpart theory can be supported as long as it allows for
transworld and world-bound properties. However, I suggested above that the worldbound condition is the most essential to any counterpart theory—the rejection of
transworld identity seems to be what distinguishes the view, and provides for many of the
intuitive features and benefits. It seems that we would be rejecting a main tenet of
counterpart theory by abandoning the condition that the entities in question be worldbound. Therefore, this proposal needs additional support. Fortunately, a hybrid property
counterpart theory can be supported in many ways, and is compatible with the plausible
assumptions taken on in this chapter as well as the other important elements of
counterpart theory.

properties are not genuine properties, but “somewhat phoney world-bound properties that depend on what
the laws of nature happen to be (described by Ellis, Scientific Essentialism, 7).” Second, whether or not
they are world-bound is controversial. For example, Ellis rejects the above description in favor of the view
that there are natural dispositional properties that are the same across all possible worlds (Ibid). Finally,
even if dispositional properties line up with world-bound, categorical properties do not.
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First, it is important to note that this view can accommodate both types of
properties while maintaining that the counterpart relation is a similarity relation. Relying
on a similarity based counterpart relation to ground de re modal claims can easily
accommodate the inconstancy of modal discourse. In this regard, it is worth recalling
what was said above with respect to the flexibility of our de re modal discourse about
properties, which seems to be an incredibly fluid matter.208 Acknowledging and
providing for this inconstancy is important, and this view can do so.
In addition, similarity can reduced to property sharing given this view. Even
though some properties are world-bound, and others are transworld, similarity
comparisons can still be made in terms of higher order property sharing, which is a
benefit. In addition, this has the benefit of providing the same semantics for properties as
for individuals.209
In addition, this view can provide replies to the problems considered here. First,
since not all properties are taken to be world-bound entities, it is possible to make
similarity comparisons between properties that have instantiations in more than one
world. This provides the resources to say that Humphrey’s counterpart wins in w2 given
that ‘winning’ in this sense refers to a property instantiated in multiple worlds.210
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For example, as mentioned above, two properties with infinite instantiations might differ by a single
instantiation. It is unlikely (beyond through stipulation) that our language has the resources to select one of
these properties over the other. Still, both properties need to be accommodated and can be by this view.
209
See, e.g., Ball: “It would be inelegant and methodologically undesirable to give entirely different
semantics for modal claims involving properties and those involving other individuals. (“Property Identities
and Modal Arguments,” 8),” and Dorr: “No matter what sort of thing we take propositions to be, if we
accept counterpart theory for individuals we must also accept some form of counterpart theory for
propositions, properties and relations (“Propositions and Counterpart Theory,” 213).”
210
Of course, if we wanted to rely on a less specific sense of ‘Humphrey possibly winning’ that is based on
Humphrey having a counterpart who has a world-bound property that is similar to the world-bound
property of winning@, this view has the resources to do so as well. This does not undermine the claim that
we need transworld and world-bound properties. Instead, it shows that this view can accommodate even
more intuitions.
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Similarly, some considerations of what is possible for properties rely on transworld
entities; e.g., comparing what is possible for 3 grams mass in worlds like ours relies on a
property that is (presumably) instantiated in multiple worlds. However, in other cases,
we want to refer to world-bound properties, and can do so. (E.g., in discussing what is
possible for the particular property of yellowness restricted to some particular thisworldly daffodil). This supports the decision to include both types of properties.
In addition, this view can accommodate our concerns with respect to co-extensive
properties. As with Lewis’s reply to the original problem, transworld properties provide
the resources to show that it is not necessarily true that being a cordate has the same
instantiations as being a renate, and this issue dissolves. Because the property
counterpart relation can select different counterparts in different contexts, the objection
can be dissolved.
Another example, mentioned above, was Egan’s concern that properties, taken as
transworld sets, must have their properties necessarily.211 The solution offered to this
problem applies to a related issue, based on the inability of a set-based property view to
account for the intuition that e.g., a property like yellowness could possibly have more
instantiations. In each case, we have properties that are made up of transworld sets of
individuals, and we run into problems given that all possible worlds are considered.
There is a way to reply to cases like these given the suggested hybrid property
counterpart theory.
One of Egan’s examples is the property ‘being the subject of extended
philosophical debate,’ which is a property of certain fundamental properties like ‘3 grams
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Egan, “Second-order Predication.”
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mass.’212 Because this property is within the set of all properties (from all possible
worlds) that are discussed extensively, it seems that it cannot have been other than it is.
Given the resources of property counterpart theory, we have a few ways that we
can respond. First, note that depending on the context, we might mean to pick out a
world-bound property, in which case, a similar property that is not the subject of
extended philosophical debate will serve as a counterpart. World-bound sets do not raise
the issue that Egan is concerned about, and we can accommodate that possibility.
However, it seems that we also need to be able to discuss the transworld property
‘3 grams mass’. Property counterpart theory has the resources to deal with this as well.
Assume that, e.g., ‘3 grams mass’ is within the set of all properties that are the subject of
extended philosophical debate. There are also properties that are not discussed by
philosophers at all, which we can call ‘boring properties.’ Within the set of boring
properties are some determinate properties, like ‘3 portions schmass’. Grams of mass
and portions of schmass are both determinable properties that can be divided into
determinates. Because ‘3 grams mass’ shares the property of ‘being a determinate
property’ with ‘3 portions schmass’ they are counterparts, and because ‘3 grams schmass’
is boring, ‘3 grams mass’ is possibly boring.
The related problem can make use of a similar reply. The issue is that claims like
‘yellowness might have been instantiated by more things,” seem to be true, but come out
false if a property like yellowness is taken to be the set of instantiations from all
worlds.213 That’s because this sense of yellowness selects the set of all possible yellow
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Ibid, 50.
See Ball “Property Identities and Modal Arguments,” 16 for a related example, based on classes of
tropes.
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objects from all possible worlds, and so it includes every possible yellow thing. Any
possible thing that is yellow is therefore already in the set, and so nothing else could
instantiate yellowness.214 The method described above could show how it is that
yellowness could have been instantiated by more things without abandoning the notion of
properties as sets, for example, by showing that ‘yellowness@’ has some property in
common with another property, e.g., ‘yellownessw1’ that has more instantiations. In this
way, the hybrid view can overcome this problem while maintaining the claim that
properties are sets of possibilia. In addition, this view is compatible with the claim that
properties are sets of individuals, and that they are abundant.
It is worth mentioning that properties are, as Lewis says, ‘creatures of theory’:
“To deserve the name of ‘property’ is to be suited to play the right theoretical role.”215 If
the hybrid property counterpart view discussed here can do more, that is justification for
accepting it. I have argued that it can accommodate our intuitions on several matters and
is compatible with plausible assumptions. Therefore, it might be right for the role of
accounting for de re modal properties of properties.

214

This version of property counterpart theory has an additional benefit as well. It seems like there is a
sense in which this claim should plausibly come out false. Here, I mean the same sense in which it makes
sense to say that ‘There could have been more possibilia” is false. Given that everything that is possible is
in this set, there is nothing remaining outside of this set that is possible. In the same way, any possible
yellow thing is already in the set of all possible yellow things. Both intuitions can be understood here.
215
Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, 55.
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CHAPTER 4
MASS-COUNTERPART THEORY AND DOUBLING POSSIBLITIES
Although the topic of this final chapter is somewhat distinct from the previous
considerations, the common element is counterpart theory, and the attempt to apply it
beyond the standard case of individuals. An interesting case in point is the use of a
“mass-counterpart relation” to provide a response to certain modal puzzles about the
modal properties of quantities.
Consider some particular actual object; such as your computer. It appears to be
possible for it to have been twice as massive as it actually is. What’s more, we might
think it is possible for each and every actual massive object at our world to have had
twice the mass that it actually does. The correct theory regarding the modal properties of
mass and other quantities should be able to make sense of possibilities like these.
However, the ability to account for these scenarios seems to depend on one’s views on
the fundamental facts of quantities. For example, it appears that “Comparativist” views
about quantity cannot accommodate situations like the doubling possibilities mentioned
above, while rival “Absolutist” views can.
After providing background on the views and setting out this objection, I will
defend it against a recent attempt to prove that the Comparativist can account for this
case, put forth by Shamik Dasgupta.216 In order to accommodate certain possibilities,
Dasgupta introduces a new “mass-counterpart” relation, analogous to the Lewisian
counterpart relation. However, his account of this relation is underspecified, and several
attempts to supply the necessary details are unsuccessful. In addition, the analogy drawn
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Dasgupta, “Comparativism and Absoultism about Quantity.”
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between standard counterpart theory and mass-counterpart theory is less than
straightforward.

4.1 Background: Quantities, Comparativism, Absolutism
A quantity can be thought of as a property or relation that comes in amounts, or
degrees.217,218 Taking mass as an example, one can specify not only that a body has
mass, but can also specify how much mass that body has.219 When comparing the mass
of two objects, such as a cup that has 250 grams of mass, and a laptop that has 500 grams
of mass, we could say that the laptop has 250 grams more mass than the cup, or that the
laptop is twice as massive as the cup. This roughly corresponds to two ways of
understanding mass—the first is in terms of particular intrinsic mass properties,
(Absolutism), and the second is in terms of relational facts about the mass of the objects
(Comparativism).220
Of course, we can consistently hold the view that an object with mass has a
determinate intrinsic property independent of its relationships to other bodies, while also
maintaining that bodies stand in various determinate mass relationships to each other.
The distinction between Comparativism and Absolutism goes further, and comes
from asking which of these views is more fundamental. Another way to ask this question

See, for example Bigelow and Pargetter, “Quantities,” 287-288. See also Mundy, “The Metaphysics of
Quantity.”.
218
Several features distinguish quantities from other properties and relations. Eddon, “Fundamental
Properties of Fundamental Properties,” provides a thorough discussion of the distinctive features of
quantities. In addition, Bigelow and Pargetter (Ibid) highlight aspects of quantities that require explanation
and a correct theory. Armstrong (“Are Quantities Relations?,” 305) notes the importance in developing the
correct theory of quantity for anyone who accepts scientific realism (305). Finally, the correct theory of
quantities is shown to be important in theories of measurement (Koslow, “Quantity and Quality”).
219
Other examples of quantities includes things like length, charge, volume, and density.
220
There is significant disagreement about the correct view. For example, Bigelow and Pargetter (1988,
1990) support a view that can be considered Comparativist, while Mundy (1987) and Armstrong (1988)
support views that can be considered Absolutist.
217

101

is in virtue of what do bodies stand in determinate mass relationships? The Absolutist
thinks that particular intrinsic mass properties ground all other mass facts. In contrast,
the Comparativist thinks that fundamental facts about mass stem from the mass
relationships between bodies, and that all other mass facts hold in virtue of these
relationships. So, Absolutists take absolute statements like “the laptop has 500 grams
mass” to be the fundamental mass facts, while Comparativists take comparative
statements like “the laptop is more massive than the cup” to be fundamental.
Throughout this chapter, I am making several assumptions. The modal arguments
are presented within the framework of modal realism and make use of Lewis’s
counterpart theory for individuals. Accordingly, properties can be thought of as sets of
possible individuals, and relations as sets of ordered n-tuples. Within this discussion, I
am assuming, with Dasgupta, that only objects can be counterparts of one another.221 I
will now set out the objections to Comparativism.

4.2 Modal Objections to Comparativism
The modal objections to Comparativism are closely related. In each case, a seemingly
plausible possibility is presented. It is then argued that the Comparativist cannot make
sense of this possibility. Each modal objection can be understood as an instance of an
argument of the following form:

1)
2)
3)
4)

Φ and Ψ are distinct possibilities involving differences in the masses of objects.
Absolutism can accommodate Φ and Ψ.
Comparativism cannot accommodate Φ and Ψ.
Therefore, Comparativism should be rejected.
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As will be seen later, this rules out a property counterpart theory, like that considered in the previous
chapter, as a potential solution to the modal objections. Dasgupta specifically rejects this view.
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One way that the Comparativist can reject this argument is to deny premise one by
arguing that there is no distinction between the possibilities discussed in each objection.
I am not considering this move here. However, note that the strength of such a response
depends on how plausible it is to deny the possibilities in question, and in each case
considered here, the possibilities are intuitively plausible.222 It seems possible that every
actual object could have had double the mass that it actually does, and, at the very least, it
seems possible that a single object could have had twice the mass that it actually does. If
such plausible possibilities cannot be accommodated, it is a strong mark against a theory.
Dasgupta takes a different approach in rejecting the argument. He seeks to deny the third
premise, by finding a way for the Comparativist to make sense of the same possibilities
that the Absolutist can. By introducing a variation of David Lewis’s counterpart relation,
a mass-counterpart relation, Dasgupta claims that the Comparativist will be able to make
sense of the possibilities in question. Unfortunately, the main attempts to understand this
relation fail to provide adequate support for Comparativism. Because of this, masscounterpart theory cannot be used to respond to the modal objections to Comparativism.
After discussing these objections, I will return to Dasgupta’s response.

4.2.1: The Possibility of Uniform Doubling
The first modal objection begins by considering the possibility that everything in
the actual world could have had double the mass that it actually has.223 It seems like this
222

Just how to determine whether something is possible is a thorny issue. One popular method of checking
whether a scenario is possible is having the ability to consistently imagine its taking place. For example,
its being conceivable that an object could have twice the mass that it currently has is good reason to think
that this is a possibility. For a thorough exploration of the potential to use conceivability as a guide for
determining what is possible, see Gendler and Hawthorne, Conceivability and Possibility.
223
Dasgupta cites arguments given in Hawthorne (“Quantity in Lewisian Metaphysics,”) and Eddon
(“Fundamental Properties of Fundamental Properties”) as the source of this objection.
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is a way that things could have been, and so the correct theory of mass should be able to
accommodate this possibility. The Absolutist can makes sense of this possibility, and can
easily distinguish between the actual world, and a uniformly doubled possible world.224
However, the Comparativist does not fare so well. The relational facts between all of the
objects at the actual world, and the relationships between all of the objects at the doubled
world (W2) are the same. If an object x is actually twice as massive as another object y,
W2 will also represent x as being twice as massive as y. The mass-relations will be the
same either way, so the possibility of every object having double the mass it actually has
cannot be represented by the Comparativist.
The first modal objection can be presented in the following way:
1) It is possible that everything has twice the mass that it actually has, and it is
possible that everything has the same mass that it actually has.
2) The Comparativist cannot distinguish between these possibilities.
3) The Absolutist can distinguish between these possibilities.
4) Therefore, Comparativism should be rejected.
After setting out the second modal objection, I will discuss the Comparativist response
advocated by Dasgupta.

4.2.2 The Possibility of a Single Object Doubling
The second modal objection involves the possibility of a single object doubling in
mass. Dasgupta considers the possibility that his laptop could have been twice as
massive as it actually is. This seems intuitively possible, especially considering how
massive laptops were in recent years. It is difficult to imagine how one might rule out
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For example, if an object (e.g., a cat) has a particular intrinsic mass value (e.g., 7 kg), then we can
compare it to a counterpart in W2, who has 14 kg of mass. This counterpart represents the cat as doubled,
and this possibility can be distinguished from the scenario in which the intrinsic mass facts of her
counterpart remain the same. Likewise for the consideration of each actual object doubling in mass. There
will be a difference between the particular intrinsic mass of the object and its counterpart, such that they
can be distinguished from one another, and doubling in mass is represented.
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this possibility.225 However, the Comparativist encounters a problem similar to that of
the first modal objection. Consider two worlds, Wn and Wm. In Wn, the laptop has
double its actual mass and every other object’s mass remains the same as in the actual
world. In Wm, the laptop has the same mass that it actually has, and every other object
has half its actual mass. The mass-relationships between the objects at Wn will mirror
those at Wm, and so the Comparativist cannot distinguish between these two possibilities.
This second modal objection can be presented in the following way:
1) It is possible that the laptop has twice the mass that it actually has, and it is
possible that the laptop has the same mass that it actually has while every other
object has half the mass that it actually has.
2) The Comparativist cannot distinguish between these possibilities.
3) The Absolutist can distinguish between these possibilities.
4) Therefore, Comparativism should be rejected.
The task of the Comparativist is to show how these arguments go wrong. Having ruled
out the denial of premise one by acknowledging that these are intuitively plausible
scenarios, the Comparativist is left to attack two or three. Premise three can be easily
proven and so the Comparativist is left to deny premise two.226
4.3 A Comparativist Response to the Modal Objections
Recall that Dasgupta is assuming modal realism and counterpart theory.227,228 In
addition, he introduces another tool, a “mass-counterpart” relation, which will allow for
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Especially if conceivability is a guide to possibility, as mentioned above.
For an example of how the Absolutist can accommodate possibilities like these, see note 201, above.
227
Dasgupta mentions that nothing hangs on the choice of using the framework of modal realism, and
suggests that modal operators could be used instead (“Comparativism and Absoultism about Quantity,”
115). He does not discuss other ways to understand the argument in his paper, and I will not discuss other
options here either.
228
It should be noted that there is at least one way that the Comparativist could allow for the possibility in
question; by allowing inter-world mass comparisons. The Comparativist could then show how an object
and its counterpart in W differ from each other in mass. Dasgupta claims that the cost of making interworld comparisons is relatively high and so, he avoids responses that make use of inter-world mass
comparisons (Ibid, 117).
226
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relational comparisons between objects at different worlds. Using the mass-counterpart
relation is supposed to allow the Comparativist to make sense of the possibilities in
question. After setting out and applying the mass-counterpart relation, I will show that it
cannot provide an adequate response to either of the modal objections.

4.3.1: The Mass-Counterpart Relation:
The mass-counterpart relation is added to standard Lewisian counterpart theory in
order to provide a response to the modal objections. It is similar to the usual counterpart
relation in several ways. First, recall that the counterpart relation is not an identity
relation, but stands in for identity when determining how a world represents an object.
Likewise, the mass-counterpart relation is not a mass-identity relation, but stands in for
identity when determining what a world represents as the mass of an object. Second, just
as the counterpart of an actual object x at world W is the object that is most similar to x
given a particular context of utterance, the mass-counterpart of an actual object x at W is
the object that has the most similar mass role to x’s mass role, given a particular
context.229
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As discussed above, context can determine which respects of similarity are salient. To illustrate, Lewis
considers some of the possible ways that Humphrey might be represented at different worlds; e.g., as an
Angel, or even as a poached egg. Finding Humphrey’s counterparts means asking which things are similar
to Humphrey, and therefore can be his counterparts. In response, Lewis explains that “you could do worse
than plunge for the first answer to come into your head, and defend that strenuously. If you did, your
answer would be right. For your answer itself would create a context, and the context would select a way
of representing, and the way of representing would be such as to make your answer true (On the Plurality
of Worlds, 251).”
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Although the details of what a mass role is need to be filled out, here is the basic
idea. A mass role is “the pattern of mass relationships entered into by an object,” and is
what picks out different mass-counterpart relations (13).230
To start to clarify the view, it will be helpful to discuss particular examples. Dasgupta
introduces this theory by considering the mass comparison between his laptop and his
cup. At the actual world, his laptop is twice as massive as his cup. Being twice-asmassive-as-the-cup is part of what constitutes the “mass role” of the laptop, and being
half-as-massive-as-the-laptop is part of what constitutes the “mass role” of the cup.
To make this picture clearer, consider a world W1, with just five objects. One of these
objects is a laptop (call it Laptop) and another is a cup (call it Cup). The other objects at
W1 are M, N, and O. Here are the mass relationships that hold between Cup and the
other objects at W1:
Cup is half-as-massive-as Laptop.
Cup is one-quarter-as-massive-as M
Cup is twice-as-massive-as N
Cup is equally-as-massive-as O
Cup is equally-as-massive-as Cup
To make the mass role of Cup more explicit, we can abbreviate these relationships as
follows:
½ (Cup, Laptop)
¼ (Cup, M)
2 (Cup, N)
1(Cup, O)
1(Cup, Cup)

It can be noted that relationships between an object’s mass and other quantities, such as force and
charge, could be included in the consideration of the mass role. Dasgupta is focusing only on mass for
simplicity, and I will do so in this paper as well. Although it is difficult to imagine how, perhaps it is
possible that relations to other quantities could provide the Comparativist with additional resources to
distinguish between the possibilities in question. This is not explored here.
230

107

The mass role of Cup is made up of the relationships in mass between Cup and the other
objects at a world. We can understand the mass role of Cup as pattern of mass
relationships entered into by the object that satisfies the following open sentence:
½ (x, Laptop) & ¼ (x, M) & 2 (x, N) & 1(x, O) & 1(x, x).231
Note that the mass relationships that O enters into are very similar to the mass
relationships that Cup enters into:
Cup’s Mass Role:

O’s Mass Role:

½ (Cup, Laptop)
¼ (Cup, M)
2 (Cup, N)
1(Cup, O)
1(Cup, Cup)

½ (O, Laptop)
¼ (O, M)
2 (O, N)
1(O, Cup)
1(O, O)

Or:

Cup:
O:

½ (x, Laptop) & ¼ (x, M) & 2 (x, N) & 1(x, O) & 1(x, x).
½ (y, Laptop) & ¼ (y, M) & 2 (y, N) & 1(y, C) & 1(y, y).

We see that Cup and O enter into the same pattern of mass-relationship to all the objects
at W1, other than to Cup and O. In addition, Cup is 1 time as massive as O, and O is 1
time as massive as Cup. According to Dasgupta, this means that Cup and O have the
same mass role as one another at W1. To capture this fact, he says, we can describe Cup
and O as mass1-counterparts of one another. Intuitively, this means that Cup and O have
the same mass.232

231

One might think that the last conjunct, 1(x,x) is trivial, and so ought not to be included in the mass role
of an object. It is included in the mass role, however, in part because Dasgupta makes use of this particular
mass relationship in his discussion of the second modal objection, as well as in response to a further
objection, not considered here. More on this mass relationship below.
232
I have assumed that objects in the same world can be counterparts of one another in this example, but
nothing rides on this assumption. It is presented in this way for clarity in exposition of the masscounterpart relation. What is important is that a close match of the mass roles of two objects is what allows
us to refer to them as mass-1-counterparts. We can imagine the comparison being made between Cup’s
mass role and that of an object P at another possible world. (For discussion of this issue in standard
counterpart theory, see Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, 231.)
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Next, notice the mass relationships that Laptop enters into at W1, compared to Cup:
Laptop:
1(Laptop, Laptop)
½ (Laptop, M)
4 (Laptop, N)
2(Laptop, O)
2(Laptop, Cup)
Or:

Cup:
½ (Cup, Laptop)
¼ (Cup, M)
2 (Cup, N)
1(Cup, O)
1(Cup, Cup)

Laptop: 1 (z, z) & ½ (z, M) & 4 (z, N) & 2 (z, O) & 2 (z, C).
Cup: ½ (x, L) & ¼ (x, M) & 2 (x, N) & 1 (x, O) & 1 (x, x).

Note that the pattern of mass-relations that Laptop enters into is similar in a
certain way to the pattern of mass-relations that Cup enters into. Specifically, the massrelationships that Laptop enters into differ from the mass-relationships that Cup enters
into by a factor of 2. Laptop is half as massive as M, while Cup is one-fourth as massive
as M; Laptop is 4 times as massive as N, while Cup is 2 times as massive as N, Laptop is
twice as massive as O, while Cup is equally as massive as O.
In addition, Cup is one time as massive as Cup and Laptop is two times as
massive as Cup; and Cup is half as massive as Laptop, while Laptop is one time as
massive as Laptop. According to Dasgupta, this means that Laptop’s mass role at W1 is
twice that of Cup’s mass role at W1. To capture this fact, he says that the Comparativist
can describe Laptop and Cup as mass2-counterparts of one another. In addition, the
Comparativist can introduce a different mass-counterpart relation for each real number, r:
“More generally, she can say that x and y are massr-counterparts just in case x’s mass
role resembles y’s mass role modulo a factor of r (118).” Dasgupta suggests a general
principle, that “relative to a counterpart relation and a set of mass-counterpart relations, a
world W represents an actual object x as being r times as massive as it actually is just in
case x has a counterpart in W that is also x’s massr-counterpart (118).”
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4.4: Application to Each Modal Objection
Identifying an object’s massr-counterparts is supposed to allow the Comparativist
to describe the potential changes in an object’s mass; if a mass2-counterpart is selected,
then this accounts for the object doubling in mass. In this way, the Comparativist should
be able to accommodate the doubling possibilities set forth in the modal objections.
However, the application of this tool depends on which modal objection is under
consideration; in the second objection, comparisons are made between the laptop in the
actual world, and it’s counterpart in a distinct world, which is used to represent both
possiblities.233 With respect to the first objection, in the first case, the comparisons are
initially made between objects in distinct possible worlds for the sake of clarity, but
ultimately depend upon comparisons made within one world, the actual world, as
discussed below. To begin with, (and, to follow Dasgupta’s presentation of the issue), it
will be useful to consider the comparisons between objects in the actual world and a
“doubled world” which we can call w2 for convenience. Later we will see that the
doubled world is the actual world, and is taken to represent both possibilities.
Given this simplification, the mass-relationships that the objects at one world bear
to each other can be compared to the mass relationships of the counterparts of those
objects in another world. This comparison can then be used to pick out the masscounterparts of the objects. If an object x is said to be doubled in mass, then there is a
world at which x has a counterpart y, such that y’s mass role differs from x’s mass role by

233

Dasgupta claims that both possibilities for Laptop can be represented by the same world, based on an
analogy to an example from David Lewis. This will be discussed in what follows.
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a factor of two. To respond to the first modal objection, the Comparativist needs to find a
mass2-counterpart at W2 for each object at W1, to show that W2 represents a doubled
world. To respond to the second modal objection, the Comparativist needs to find a
mass2-counterpart of Laptop, as well as a mass1-counterpart of Laptop to represent both
possibilities at that world. These attempts will be considered separately in what follows.

4.5 Objections to the Mass-Counterpart Solution
In order for Dasgupta’s response to work, the mass-counterpart relation must
provide a way for the Comparativist to differentiate between the two proposed scenarios
set out in each objection. However, spelling out the details of the mass-counterpart
relation and its use in picking out the correct mass-counterparts has proven to be difficult,
and I will argue that two attempts to do so fail. First, further clarification of the mass
roles of objects is required.

4.5.1 Using Mass Roles to Select Mass-Counterparts
Although I have already attempted to lay out what the mass role of an object is,
and what role it plays in picking out mass-counterparts, the details need to be filled out.
In what follows, I propose two ways to understand how mass roles can be used to pick
out different mass-counterparts based on context. I am not claiming that Dasgupta
endorses either of these ways, or that they are independently plausible. I am attempting
to lay out what I take to be the main options given the framework he has adopted and the
description he has provided. Given these ways of understanding mass roles, the modal
objections to Comparativism still stand.
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4.5.2 Complete Mass Role
In order to evaluate the response to the modal objections, it is necessary to
understand how an object’s mass role is used to make comparisons to other objects.

A

first attempt might be to look at the entire mass role of an object at some world, and the
entire mass role of its counterpart at another world, and then to compare the mass roles of
the objects to determine what massr-counterpart relation holds between them. In the case
of the first objection, this will involve comparing each mass relationship between an
object x and its worldmates to each mass relationship that x’s counterpart bears to each of
its worldmates. The “complete” mass role of x is then the entire pattern of mass
relationships between x and its worldmates. In this case, the Comparativist might then
attempt to overcome the modal objections by making comparisons between the complete
mass role of an object and the complete mass role of its counterpart.
The details are different regarding the second modal objection, and so I will
attempt to adjust this technique to accommodate the second modal objection after
considering its application to the first.

4.5.3 Complete Mass Role and the Uniform Doubling Objection

Beginning with the uniform doubling objection, consider a world with only five
objects for simplicity (Laptop, Cup, M, N, and O). If there is a suitable response to this
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simplified objection, it should hold as a response to the original objection, given that the
important details will remain the same (i.e., each and every object doubles in mass).234
According to this description, the mass relationships between the objects are identical, as
shown: 235
World 1:

World 2 “Doubled World”236:

Cup: ½(C, L) ¼(C, M) 2(C, N) 1(C, O) 1(C, C)
Laptop: 1(L, L) 2(L, C) 2(L, O) ½(L, M) 4 (L, N)
M: 2(M, L) 4(M, C) 2(M, O) 8(M, N) 1(M, M)
N: ¼(N,L) 1/8(N,M) ½(N,C) ½(N,O) 1(N,N)
O: ½(O,L) ¼(O,M) 2(O,N) 1(O,C) 1(O,O)

Cup: ½(C, L) ¼(C, M) 2(C, N) 1(C, O) 1(C, C)
Laptop: 1(L, L) 2(L, C) 2(L, O) ½(L, M) 4 (L, N)
M: 2(M, L) 4(M, C) 2(M, O) 8(M, N) 1(M, M)
N: ¼(N,L) 1/8(N,M) ½(N,C) ½(N,O) 1(N,N)
O: ½(O,L) ¼(O,M) 2(O,N) 1(O,C) 1(O,O)

234

In his discussion of this objection, Dasgupta suggests considering an ordered set of all of the massive
objects at the world, and considering the relations on that set. He then claims that, in one context, the set
may be its own mass1-counterpart, and in another context, it may be its own mass 2-counterpart. (See
Dasgupta (120).) There are several ways to understand this claim. If we take this at face value as a claim
about sets, then it seems strange to say that sets have mass, or that they enter into any massrelations. Instead, one might take Dasgupta to be talking about the mereological fusion of all the objects in
the set. If so, however, this object enters into only one mass-relation - the equally as massive relation to
itself - and so does not seem to support the conclusion Dasgupta wants to draw (for more discussion of this,
see section 6.2 below). Finally, one might understand Dasgupta as saying that, when we consider all the
objects at the world and all the mass-relations that each object enters into, we can use these relations to
generate different mass-counterpart relations. This is essentially the understanding of Dasgupta that I am
using in the text.
235
We can represent the mass roles of objects in this way:
World 1:
Cup1: ½(x, L) ¼(x, M) 2(x, N) 1(x,O) 1(x,x)
Laptop1: 1(y, y) 2(y,C) 2(y,O) ½( y, M) 4 (y, N)
M1: 2(z,L) 4(z,C) 2(z,O) 8(z, N) 1(z,z)
N1: ¼(w,L) 1/8(w,M) ½(w,C) ½(w,O) 1(w,w)
O1: ½(u,L) ¼(u,M) 2(u,N) 1(u,C) 1(u,u)

World 2 “Doubled World”:
Cup2: ½(x, L) ¼( x,M) 2(x, N) 1(x, O),1(x,C)
Laptop2: 1(y,y) 2(y,C) 2(y,O) ½( y, M) 4 (y, N)
M2: 2(z,L) 4(z,C) 2(z,O) 8(z, N) 1(z,z)
N2: ¼(w,L) 1/8(w,M) ½(w,C) ½(w,O) 1(w,w)
O2: ½(u,L) ¼(u,M) 2(u,N) 1(u,C) 1(u,u)

I have presented it as I have above for ease of exposition, but this does not affect the outcome of the
argument.
236
Recall that these ‘worlds’ turn out to be one and the same, as discussed below. Given that the doubled
world should be a mass2-counterpart of the actual world regardless of which world it is (the mass roles of
the objects will be related to the mass roles of the objects in the actual world by a factor of 2), this
simplification will not make a difference in what the mass roles of objects look like. Still, it is important to
note that for Lewis, two possibilites that do not differ in any non-haecceitistic way will be represented by
the same world. This is because he rejects qualitatively indistinguishable (and yet distinct) worlds. See On
the Plurality of World, section 4.4, 220-248.
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Immediately, it seems difficult to imagine how the Comparativist can make use of this
information to represent both scenarios.237 The problem is that there is no way to pick
out any difference in the mass of the objects at W1 and W2. All of the mass relationships
between the objects at W1 and their counterparts at W2 are the same, even though there is
supposed to be a difference between the two cases. Even if the mass role of an object
like Cup is made up of every relationship in mass between Cup and its worldmates, there
is not enough information to yield a distinction between the two worlds. There is no way
to tell that the doubled world is a world where each object has doubled in mass, and so it
seems that the Comparativist cannot make sense of the possibility.238

4.5.4 Complete Mass Role and the Laptop Doubling Objection
Before abandoning this attempt to understand the mass-role of an object, it is
important to recall the differences between Dasgupta’s approaches to the first and second
modal objections. In the case of uniform mass doubling, comparisons are made between
the complete mass role of an object at one world and the complete mass role of that
object’s counterpart in another. In response to the second modal objection, however,
recall that one possible world is supposed to be able to represent both possibilities for
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We can also represent the mass roles of objects in this way:

World 1:
Cup1: ½(x, L) ¼(x, M) 2(x, N) 1(x,O) 1(x,x)
Laptop1: 1(y, y) 2(y,C) 2(y,O) ½( y, M) 4 (y, N)
M1: 2(z,L) 4(z,C) 2(z,O) 8(z, N) 1(z,z)
N1: ¼(w,L) 1/8(w,M) ½(w,C) ½(w,O) 1(w,w)
O1: ½(u,L) ¼(u,M) 2(u,N) 1(u,C) 1(u,u)

World 2 “Doubled World”:
Cup2: ½(x, L) ¼( x,M) 2(x, N) 1(x, O) 1(x,C)
Laptop2: 1(y,y) 2(y,C) 2(y,O) ½( y, M) 4 (y, N)
M2: 2(z,L) 4(z,C) 2(z,O) 8(z, N) 1(z,z)
N2: ¼(w,L) 1/8(w,M) ½(w,C) ½(w,O) 1(w,w)
O2: ½(u,L) ¼(u,M) 2(u,N) 1(u,C) 1(u,u)

I have presented it as I have above for ease of exposition, but this does not affect the outcome of the
argument.
238
Although, the choice to include other aspects of counterpart theory, as considered below, will offer
additional resources to the Comparativist.
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Laptop, in the same way that David Lewis claims that one possible world can represent
multiple possibilities for him by having multiple counterparts at that world. This
requires an alternative understanding of the “complete mass role” of Laptop.
Briefly, here is an example of how Laptop doubling in a world with five objects
total might be represented:

World 3:
Cup3:
Laptop3:
M3 :
N3:
O3:

½ (C, L) ¼(C, M) 2(C, N) 1(C, O) 1(C, C)
1(L, L) ½ (L, M) 4 (L, N) 2 (L, O) 2(L, C)
2 (M, L) 1(M, M) 8(M, N) 2(M, O) 4(M, C)
¼ (N, L) 1⁄8(N, M) 1(N, N) ½(N, O) ½(N, C)
½ (O, L) ¼(O, M) 2(O, N) 1(O, O) 1(O, C)

The “complete mass role” in this case might then be made up of the group of relations
highlighted above. It is unclear how these relations can be compared to each other to
yield any useful information about the potential differences in Laptop’s mass role. For
example, noting that Cup and O are each half as massive as Laptop does nothing to show
that Laptop has doubled in mass, nor that Laptop’s mass role has remained the same.
These comparisons do not seem capable of representing these two distinct possibilities.
However, this may be due to an incorrect understanding of Dasgupta’s position. There
are two further considerations that come into play; the concept of “aspect of an object’s
mass role” and the analogy to Lewis’s examples, both of which are specifically applied to
the second modal objection. I will consider these suggestions in turn, stopping along the
way to see if the first modal objection can be supported by any of the details.
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4.5.5 Aspects of an Object’s Mass Role
Some of Dasgupta’s remarks suggest an alternative way to select the correct
mass-counterpart relation between an object and its counterpart. To show that the
Comparativist can make sense of the possibility of the laptop doubling, he argues that
whether or not Laptop is represented as doubled, depends on which aspects of the mass
role are being considered (118). Accordingly, he claims that the features that allow us to
make comparisons of similarity in mass between an object and its counterparts are
aspects of each object’s mass role. In addition, the aspects of an object’s mass role that
determine what mass-counterparts it has depend on context.
Perhaps consideration of these individual “mass role aspects” can aid the
Comparativist in accommodating the modal possibilities. Before embarking on this
exploration, however, it is important to further discuss the notion of context in play here.
Context is what will pick out the relevant individual mass role aspects, and is essential to
this view.

4.5.6 Similarity and the Role of Context
Because Dasgupta claims that aspects of the mass role of an object are what differ
among contexts, they are what allow the Comparativist to pick out the similarity relations
that determine which mass-counterparts an object has; “those aspects of a body’s mass
role relevant to determining what its massr-counterparts are depend on the conversational
context.”239 Dasgupta compares this to the ordinary counterpart relation, according to
which “the features of individuals relevant to determining whether they resemble one

239

118.
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another, and therefore whether they are counterparts, are sensitive to the context in which
the modal claim is made.”240 Similarly, certain features, or aspects, of an object’s mass
role will be picked out by a particular context, and used to determine whether or not the
object’s mass role resembles another object’s mass role.241 The aspects of a body’s mass
role that determine what mass-counterparts it has depend on context:

For example, a context in which mass relationships to my
laptop are particularly salient might be one in which my
laptop’s counterpart in W is also my laptop’s mass1counterpart (since the latter agrees with my laptop on all
mass relationships to itself). Relative to this masscounterpart relation, W represents my laptop as being the
same mass as it actually is and everything else as being half
as massive as they actually are!242
Here is an example. Consider worlds W3 and W4. Given one context in which certain
aspects of Laptop3’s mass role are made salient, Laptop4 represents Laptop3 as doubled in
mass. Given another context in which different aspects of Laptop3’s mass role are made
salient, Laptop4 represents Laptop3 as having the same mass. In this way, W4 is supposed
to represent both possibilities for Laptop3. There is one possible world, W4, but it
represents these two distinct possibilities for Laptop. In this way, once the details are
properly spelled out, the Comparativist should be able to make sense of the possibility of
the laptop doubling, and therefore to overcome the second modal objection.
More will be said regarding the potential for one world to represent multiple
possibilities in what follows. First, however, let’s return to the consideration of mass role

240

Ibid.
Above, I suggested that context could be broken down in terms of relevant properties shared among
individuals, or relevant higher order properties shared among properties. In order to avoid non-neutral
assumptions between comparativism and absolutism, I have attempted to maintain the language of
‘aspects.’
242
118.
241
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aspects in response to the Laptop doubling objection, and attempt to fill out that details of
the above example.

4.5.7 Individual Mass Role Aspects and the Laptop Doubling Objection

Aspects of a mass role are the features that allow the Comparativist to make
comparisons of similarity in mass between an object and its counterparts. Since the
mass-role of an object is the pattern of mass relationships that it enters into with the other
objects at its world, aspects of an objects mass role must then be the individual mass
relationships themselves.243 In this section, I will assess the plausibility of this strategy
by attempting to pick out particular aspects of an object’s mass role, and using them to
support the assignment of particular mass-counterpart relations.
First, recall the mass roles of the objects inW1 and W2:

World 1:
Cup1: ½(C, L) ¼(C, M) 2(C, N) 1(C, O) 1(C,C)
Laptop1: 1(L,L) ½( L, M) 4 (L, N) 2(L,O) 2(L,C)
M1: 2(M,L) 1(M,M) 8(M, N) 2(M,O)4(M,C)
N1: ¼(N,L) 1/8(N,M) 1(N,N) ½(N,O)½(N,C)
O1: ½(O,L) ¼(O,M) 2(O,N) 1(O,O)1(O,C)

World 2:
Cup2: ½(C, L) ¼( C, M) 2(C, N) 1(C, O) 1(C,C)
Laptop2: 1(L,L) ½( L, M) 4 (L, N) 2(L,O)2(L,C)
M2: 2(M,L) 1(M,M) 8(M, N) 2(M,O) 4(M,C)
N2: ¼(N,L) 1/8(N,M) 1(N,N) ½(N,O) ½(N,C)
O2: ½(O,L) ¼(O,M) 2(O,N) 1(O,O)1(O,C)

If the current attempt to supply the relevant detail is correct, then at W1, Cup has five
mass role aspects to bring into the comparison. This means that the possible contexts
that can be used to pick out Cup’s mass-counterparts stem from these five relationships.
Context should then allow for the Comparativist to focus on any one of these aspects.
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Dasgupta seems to be relying on these features of the mass roles of objects, and so his account is not
purely stipulational, as discussed at the end of this essay. For example, Dasgupta uses the relationship
between Laptop and itself to select a context in which Laptop is Laptop’s mass 1-counterpart. He is not just
stipulating that this is the case.
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Recall that the second modal objection is that the Comparativist cannot accommodate the
possibility of a single object, such as a laptop, doubling. We can apply the current
strategy to this objection. Laptop’s mass role is comprised of the following aspects:

Laptop3: 1(L,L) ½( L, M) 4(L, N) 2(L,O) 2(L,C)

Laptop4: 1(L,L) 1(L,M) 8(L,N) 4(L,O) 4(L,C)

According to this way of setting out the mass role of Laptop, there are five aspects of
Laptop3’s mass role, and five aspects of Laptop4’s mass role. Consider the following
strategy: Focus on the comparison between Laptop3 and itself. Laptop3 is equally as
massive as itself. Laptop4 is also equally as massive as itself. Because they are alike
with respect to this aspect of their mass roles, in this context, one might say that they are
mass1-counterparts of one another. This seems to be on a promising way to understand
the project. However, there are complications.
When the mass-counterpart relation was originally set out by Dasgupta, he
described this as a relationship based on the comparison of the mass role of an object and
its counterpart. The mass role was described as the entire pattern of mass relationships
that an object enters into with its worldmates. So, it seems as if we cannot use a single
mass role aspect to justify the claim that an object and its counterpart are also massrcounterparts. However, it is hard to see what else Dasgupta could be using to justify the
claim that Laptop and its counterpart are mass1-counterparts, especially since he claims
that this designation stems from the mass relationships to Laptop, and the fact that the
two counterparts agree on all mass relationships to themselves. If we are looking at the
five mass role aspects that Laptop3 bears to the other objects at its world, it is clear that
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there is only one relationship in mass that it has in common with Laptop4; the relationship
between Laptop3 and itself, and Laptop4 and itself:

Laptop3: 1(L,L) ½( L, M) 4(L, N) 2(L,O) 2(L,C)

Laptop4: 1(L,L) 1(L,M) 8(L,N) 4(L,O) 4(L,C)

Focusing on this mass role aspect of Laptop3 and Laptop4 selects a context in
which this mass role aspect is important. Both Laptop3 and Laptop4 are alike with respect
to this role, and so we might say that in this context that they are mass1-counterparts. If
so, then this aspect of Laptop’s mass role can be used to pick out a context in which
Laptop has the same mass, and everything else has halved at W4.
There are two concerns for this view. The first is that this aspect of Laptop’s
mass role seems trivial, since every object stands in this mass relationship to itself. So it
may seem suspect for this aspect to play a substantial role in determining the masscounterpart relation.244 The second concern is that even if one could use this aspect of
the mass role to support a mass1-counterpart relation, a bigger worry remains: focusing
on different aspects of the mass role does not enable the Comparativist to distinguish
between intuitively distinct possibilities.
Setting aside the relationship to itself, Laptop4’s other four mass role aspects do
not allow for a way to pick out a context in which Laptop4 has doubled, rather than that
the other objects at W4 are half as massive. Focusing on any one aspect, we can see that
this does not succeed.
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However, Dasgupta seems to make use of this particular mass role aspect in his response to a further
modal objection, which is that the Comparativist cannot make sense of there being a world with only a
single object, and with a determinate mass property. Here, he claims that the object at least bears the
mass1counterpart relation to itself, and uses this to support the claim that it has a determinate mass
property. (See Dasgupta, “Comparativism and Absoultism about Quantity,” 122).
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Consider for example the comparison of Cup’s relationship to Laptop at W3 and at W4,
highlighted here:

Laptop3: 1(L,L) ½( L, M) 4(L, N) 2(L,O) 2(L,C)

Laptop4: 1(L,L) 1(L,M) 8(L,N) 4(L,O) 4(L,C)

At W3, Laptop3 is two times as massive as Cup3, and at W4, Laptop4 is four times
as massive as Cup4. So, we might say that this aspect of Laptop3’s mass role is “twice”
that of the corresponding aspect of Laptop4’s mass role, and that because of this, (given
this context), Laptop4 is Laptop3’s mass2-counterpart, and hence that Laptop4 represents
Laptop3 as being doubled in mass.
However, it is not clear that this will work. First, it is not clear that it makes sense
to say that a single aspect of Laptop3’s mass role is “doubled” in another world, since the
Comparativist does not allow cross-world mass relations, or second-order mass relations.
Second, even if this does make sense, it isn’t clear that it follows that Laptop4 represents
Laptop3 as being doubled in mass. For even if Laptop4 did not represent Laptop3 as being
doubled in mass, (and instead, Cup4 represented Cup3 as half-as-massive as it actually is),
the mass-relation between Laptop4 and Cup4 would still be “double” that of the
corresponding relation between Laptop3 and Cup3.
Although it is clear that something at W4 is different from its W3 counterpart,
there is no way to show that Laptop’s counterpart is twice as massive as Laptop3, and not
that Cup’s counterpart is half as massive as Cup3. Similar remarks can be made about the
mass role aspects that compare Laptop to M, to N, and to O. None of these four aspects
can select a context in which to say that Laptop3 and Laptop4 are mass2-counterparts of
one another, given that none of the four show that it is the Laptop that has a different
mass at W4.
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Therefore, this way of using mass role aspects to help select appropriate masscounterparts does not succeed.
4.5.8: Individual Mass Role Aspects and the Uniform Doubling Objection
Although single aspects of an object’s mass role cannot help the Comparativist to
distinguish between the possibilities required for the second modal objection, it is
worthwhile to see if anything here can be applied to the first modal objection.
Recall that the first modal objection is that everything could have uniformly
doubled in mass, and that the Comparativist cannot accommodate this possibility. Mass
role aspects should allow the Comparativist to find a context in which to represent the
world as doubled. In order to represent this possibility, for each object there would need
to be a comparison between an aspect of that object’s mass role at W1 and an aspect of
the mass role of the object’s counterpart at W2, such that W2 represents that object as
being twice as massive as it is at W1. Immediately, this case looks problematic. Recall
the mass roles considered in the simplified five object world:

World 2 “Doubled World”:

World 1:
Cup: ½(C, L) ¼(C, M) 2(C, N) 1(C, O) 1(C, C)
Laptop: 1(L, L) 2(L, C) 2(L, O) ½(L, M) 4 (L, N)
M: 2(M, L) 4(M, C) 2(M, O) 8(M, N) 1(M, M)
N: ¼(N,L) 1/8(N,M) ½(N,C) ½(N,O) 1(N,N)
O: ½(O,L) ¼(O,M) 2(O,N) 1(O,C) 1(O,O)

Cup: ½(C, L) ¼(C, M) 2(C, N) 1(C, O) 1(C, C)
Laptop: 1(L, L) 2(L, C) 2(L, O) ½(L, M) 4 (L, N)
M: 2(M, L) 4(M, C) 2(M, O) 8(M, N) 1(M, M)
N: ¼(N,L) 1/8(N,M) ½(N,C) ½(N,O) 1(N,N)
O: ½(O,L) ¼(O,M) 2(O,N) 1(O,C) 1(O,O)

There does not seem to be any difference in mass role aspects that allows us to see
that the world has doubled in mass. If we take a single object, like Cup, we can see that
each aspect of Cup’s mass role is exactly like each aspect of its counterpart’s mass role.
If we focus on a single aspect, such as: ½ (C,L), we could say that the Cup is half as
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massive as Laptop is (at W1, and at W2) or we could instead say that Laptop is twice as
massive as the Cup is (at W1, and at W2). But, this does not allow us to pick out any
difference between the two possibilities. There does not seem to be any way to pick out a
context in which to describe W2 as a world that has doubled, given this way of
understanding “mass role,” and “aspects of an object’s mass role.” Either this cannot be
the correct way to use the mass roles of objects to select mass-counterparts, or the masscounterpart relation itself is faulty and should be abandoned.
Either way, at this point, it is unclear how an object’s mass role, and how aspects
of an object’s mass role, can be used to generate the mass-counterpart relations that
Dasgupta relies on to address the modal objections to Comparativism. So, it does not
seem like mass-counterpart theory can be used to overcome these objections. The only
information that the Comparativist has at his disposal stems from the mass relationships
that make up an object’s mass role. Yet, these relationships do not appear to provide
enough information to support the needed distinctions, without relying on cross-world
mass comparisons.
All that remains to be considered is Dasgupta’s final source of support, the
analogies to examples relevant to standard Lewisian counterpart theory. Recall that
Dasgupta’s use of the mass-counterpart relation to show that a single world may
represent itself as having one mass, and also represent itself as having a different mass, is
supposed to be directly analogous to Lewis's use of the counterpart relation to show that a
single world may represent me as being one way, and also represent me as being another
way. However, there appear to be important differences between the cases.
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4.5.9 Analogy to Lewis’s Twins Example
The potential for one world to represent multiple possibilities is controversial.
Therefore, to support this idea, Dasgupta claims that the laptop doubling case is
analogous to a well-known example from David Lewis.245 Lewis considers the
possibility that he could have had a twin. This is represented by a possible world where
he has a counterpart that has a twin. So, there are two distinct possibilities for David
Lewis to have had a twin, one in which he is one twin, and one in which he is the other.
It might seem that we need to represent each of these possibilities with distinct possible
worlds. However, Lewis argues that there is no qualitative difference between the
worlds that represent these possibilities since there is no qualitative difference between
the scenario in which he is the first twin, and the scenario in which he is the second.
Because of this, he argues, the same world can represent both possibilities.
In the case of the twins, context will pick out which possibility is being
considered. For example, there is a context in which the first twin is picked out by the
stipulation that this is the counterpart we mean. For this to be a successful analogy, the
Comparativist needs to show how it is that different contexts can pick out different mass
similarity relations, which in turn determine which mass-counterparts an object has.
More specifically, in order for a world to represent both possibilities for Laptop,
Dasgupta needs to show that there is a context that can pick out a mass1-counterpart of
Laptop, and a context that can pick out a mass2-counterpart of Laptop, at the same world.
This should be similar to Lewis’s twins example.

245

Dasgupta, 119. This example is discussed by Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, 231.
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But it is not clear that these uses are analogous. In Lewis’s twins example, one
world represents two possibilities for him by containing two distinct individuals, each of
whom represents a different way for him to be. In a given context, we can stipulate that
one of those individuals, as opposed to the other, is a way for him to be. In other words,
we are making a choice between two counterparts and stipulating which one represents
Lewis in that context.
This is somewhat different from the case where we want to distinguish the
possibility that Laptop doubles in mass and everything else stays the same from the
possibility that Laptop stays that same and everything else is half as massive. According
to Dasgupta, one world represents both possibilities, but not by containing two distinct
counterparts (one that represents Laptop as being one way, and another that represents
Laptop as being a different way). Rather, the choice is between two distinct masscounterpart relations, and the stipulation that we mean to use one or the other to represent
the mass role of Laptop.
To some extent, this move can be questioned on the basis of the above concerns:
even though it is said that Laptop’s counterpart is both a mass1-counterpart of Laptop and
a mass2-counterpart of Laptop, the details of how this takes place have not been supplied,
and as it stands, therefore, it is not clear that both of these mass-counterpart relations can
be linked to the same individual. And, with respect to the uniform doubling objection, it
is not clear that both sets of mass-counterpart relations (mass1counterpart relations and
mass2-counterpart relations) can be found within the actual world. If these details can be
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successfully filled in, then the analogies to Lewis’s examples can more fruitfully be
applied.246
I agree that for the comparativist, the same set of relational facts represents both
possibilities, and that therefore, one world could in principle represent both. One might
still take issue with the claim that the comparativist has provided a successful way to
distinguish between the possibilities, and therefore, the strength of the argument to some
extent rests on the strength of the mass-counterpart relation, which, I have argued, has not
been fully specified.

4.5.10 Stipulation
Before concluding this chapter, it is worthwhile to elaborate on the use of
stipulation, to see if there is another way to support Dasgupta’s response. Given how he
has described the mass roles of objects and the importance of the roles in picking out an
object’s mass-counterparts, it appears that these mass relationships play a role in
determining what an object’s mass-counterparts are, based on similarities between mass
roles. Standard counterpart theory relies on similarity between objects to pick out
counterparts as well, but stipulation also plays a large role. By stipulating that it is
possible for some object to be some way, you can create a context in which it is possible

246

It may also be beneficial to consider a different case that provides a better approximation of the move
that the Comparativist should make with respect to the uniform doubling case. Although Dasgupta bases
his analogy on the twins example as well as an example of the possibility of having a counterpart within
one’s own world, a related example Lewis discusses is the possibility of a world of eternal recurrence, such
that the entire history of the world is repeating itself over and over, ad infinitim (On the Plurality of
Worlds, 232). In such a world, an individual who exists in some epoch, ‘e’, can be represented as existing
in another epoch by having a duplicate there. This counterpart is an exact duplicate of this individual, and
there is no qualitative difference between them. This example also reflects what is taking place within
Dasgupta’s argument.
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for that object to be that way. Returning to the twins example, a context in which the first
born twin is selected as being Lewis’s counterpart can be created just by stipulating that
he could have had a twin who was born later than he was. This is because similarity does
not need to be independent of context, and context can include stipulation.

This alone

allows for a context in which to say that Lewis is the first born at that world, without any
further reliance on similarity between Lewis and one twin or the other.
Perhaps this method could help the Comparativist pick out the mass-counterparts
of an object, by relying less on the particular aspects of an object’s mass role, and more
on stipulation. One reason to think that Dasgupta is not relying on stipulation in selecting
the mass-counterparts of objects is that the possible mass-counterparts that an object has
depend on the object’s mass role. Without this restriction, it might be possible to
stipulate that W4 represents Laptop4 as doubled, or as the same mass as Laptop3. But as it
stands, the particular aspects of each objects mass role seem to constrain what
possibilities can be picked out by any particular mass counterpart an object has.
This approach is not ruled out, or discussed by Dasgupta, and the details would
need to be filled in. Still, it is another option that is available to the Comparativist. A
Comparativist theory that did not attempt to use mass roles to pick out mass-counterparts,
but instead relied on stipulation might fare better.
A different conclusion that one might draw on this front is that there is a larger
issue for the counterpart theorist, especially for the reliance on stipulation. If it is
possible to use stipulation in the way sketched above, this might be provide a prima facie
reason to reject or modify counterpart theory. This might also raise issues regarding the
ability to apply counterpart theory to relations other than mass comparisons. The
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discussion of property counterpart theory in the previous chapter has, I hope, made clear
that there are challenges in extending counterpart theory beyond application to
individuals. In addition, I hope that I have highlighted some of the ways that extensions
might be possible.
Regarding the current discussion, the possibility of using mass-counterpart theory
to overcome the modal objections to Comparativism seems unlikely, at least without
further information about how such a theory can be used to distinguish between the
possibilities in question. I have outlined several ways to apply mass-counterpart theory
to the objections, given the limited description of the theory provided by Dasgupta. Each
attempt was unsuccessful, and their common failure seems to be due to the lack of
relevant information that can be taken from the mass roles of objects and used to make
the needed mass comparisons.
It is worth recalling that the standard Comparativist response to the modal
objections is to deny that the situations described represent distinct possibilities.
Although mass-counterpart theory seemed to be a way for the Comparativist to represent
the possibilities as distinct without giving up the view that mass facts are comparative, it
seems that this is a more difficult task than mass-counterpart theory can handle. As things
stand, it seems that the Comparativist cannot accommodate the same possibilities that the
Absolutist can.
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CONCLUSION
In this discussion, I have attempted to highlight some important features of
counterpart theory, and to explore potential applications beyond grounding de re modal
claims for individuals.
One goal has been to show how the details of the view play out, especially when
employed within an account of the de re properties of properties. I have suggested what I
take to be the most plausible combination of assumptions that together can form a
property counterpart view: the counterpart relation should be understood to be a context
sensitive similarity relation; similarity can be understood in terms of higher order
property sharing (which requires a distinction between natural and non-natural higher
order properties); properties must be taken to be both world-bound and trans-world
entities, and this is to be understood in terms of having instantiations at world(s). In
addition, properties were understood to be sets of possibilia. This combination of views
yields a property counterpart theory that can avoid the issues I laid out. An additional
outcome of this chapter is that de re modal claims involving properties seem to be subject
to as much inconstancy as de re modal claims for individuals. This is something I intend
to explore further.
There are several additional avenues open to further exploration, such as the
details of the relationship between perfectly and non-perfectly natural properties, and the
potential for there to be a distinction among natural and non-natural higher order
properties, grounded in the first order distinction.
The second chapter not only points to the challenges of distinguishing lump
theory from counterpart theory, but draws attention to the fact that while we often speak
loosely of our counterparts without specifying a context, it is important to note that what
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we say and what we intend to represent constrains which counterpart we have.
Therefore, talk of the set of all of one’s counterparts, or the mereological fusion of all of
one’s counterparts should be understood as contextually bound. The discussion in
Chapter 2 also reflects at the importance of inconstancy to the entire project. If we do not
think that de re modal claims are inconstant, counterpart theory would be less of a
contender.
In the final chapter, I set out a response to an attempt to rely on the machinery of
counterpart theory to rescue a comparativist account of quantities from a modal
objection. Chapter 4 is to some extent a stand-alone chapter, given the specificity of the
argument explored. However, the arguments considered within the chapter further
highlight the importance of specifying the details of the counterpart relation.
In the end, counterpart theory remains a promising view, even when extended
beyond the scope of a theory for individuals alone. I have attempted to clarify the
important details of the view, and also to develop and analyze extensions of the view.
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